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ABSTRACT 
 
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON IRREGULAR IMMIGRATION 
IN GREECE, SPAIN AND TURKEY 
 
Şenses, Nazlı 
PhD, Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Saime Özçürümez 
 
January 2012 
This research is a comparative politics study, focusing on the particular 
irregular immigration policies and politics of three countries: Greece, Spain and 
Turkey.  The research is concerned with the extent of the rights irregular immigrants 
can „enjoy‟ in the democratic states where they reside and work.  The study questions 
if there is a divergence or convergence among Greece, Spain and Turkey in the way 
they treat irregular immigrants in relation to the recognition of these immigrants‟ 
fundamental human rights.  The study also questions whether or not civil society 
participation and judicial review, as democratic accountability mechanisms, can also 
function as liberal constraints on the state in its regulation of irregular immigration 
and immigrants‟ rights.  The theoretical basis of the study derives partly from the 
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comparative politics literature on accountability and state society relations, and partly 
from the literature on immigration policy-making.  The main reason for comparing 
Greece, Spain and Turkey is because the countries display certain immigration 
relevant similarities arising from geographical proximity, but also they have distinct 
patterns of policies when it comes to protective measures concerning immigrants.  As 
part of the research, a documentary analysis of relevant policy documents, such as 
reports of civil society organizations, policy briefs, and immigration laws and 
regulations was conducted.  In a comparative analysis of this documentary data, the 
study sought to identify the similarities and differences between the policies of 
Greece, Spain and Turkey relating to the recognition and protection of irregular 
immigrants‟ rights.  In addition, in-depth interviews with experts on immigration 
policy in Greece, Spain and Turkey were also conducted.  The goal of the interviews 
was to find out to what extent democratic accountability mechanisms at a national 
level, such as the activism of pro-migrant organizations, human rights groups, trade 
unions and other civil society organizations, together with court decisions, influence 
the state‟s protection of the rights of irregular immigrants.  
 
Keywords: irregular migration, human rights, democratic accountability, civil 
society, courts, Spain, Greece, Turkey 
 
 
 
  
 
v 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
HAKLAR VE DEMOKRATİK HESAPVEREBİLİRLİK: 
YUNANİSTAN, İSPANYA VE TÜRKİYE‟DEKİ DÜZENSİZ GÖÇ ÜZERİNE 
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA 
 
 
Şenses, Nazlı 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Saime Özçürümez 
 
Ocak 2012 
Bu araştırma üç ülkenin (Yunanistan, İspanya ve Türkiye)  düzensiz göç 
politikaları üzerine odaklanan bir karşılaştırmalı politika çalışmasıdır. Düzensiz 
göçmenlerin yerleştikleri ve çalıştıkları demokratik devletlerde yararlanabildikleri 
haklarının kapsamı ile ilgili araştırma yapmaktadır. Daha net bir ifadeyle bu çalışma 
Yunanistan, İspanya ve Türkiye arasında düzensiz göçmenlerin temel insan haklarını 
tanımalarıyla ilişkili olarak bu devletlerin söz konusu göçmenlere muameleleri 
arasında ayrışma ya da benzeşme olup olmadığını sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma 
ayrıca demokratik hesapverebilirlik mekanizmalarından sivil toplum katılımı ve 
yargı denetiminin, düzensiz göçün ve göçmenlerin haklarının düzenlenmesiyle ilgili 
devlet üzerindeki liberal kısıtlamalar olarak bir işlev yüklenip yüklenmediğini 
sorgulamaktadır. Çalışmanın teorik temeli hem hesapverilebilirlik ve devlet toplum 
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ilişkileri üzerine karşılaştırmalı politika literatüründen, hem de göç politikaları 
literatüründen gelmektedir. Yunanistan, İspanya ve Türkiye‟yi karşılaştırmanın temel 
nedeni bu ülkelerin göçle ilgili olarak coğrafi yakınlıktan kaynaklanan benzerlikler 
göstermeleridir; fakat göçmenlerle ilgili koruyucu önlemlerlere geldiğinde bu 
ülkelerin farklı politika modelleri vardır.  Bu durum da karşılaştırma çalışma için 
elverişli bir durum ortaya çıkarmaktadır.  Araştırmanın bir bölümü, sivil toplum 
kuruluşlarının raporları, politika özetleri ve göç yasaları ve düzenlemeleri gibi ilgili 
politika dokümanlarının belgesel analizini kapsamaktadır. Bu belgelerin 
karşılaştırmalı analizinde, düzensiz göçmenlerin haklarının tanınması ve korunması 
ile ilgili olarak Yunanistan, İspanya ve Türkiye‟nin politikaları arasındaki 
benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Araştırmanın bir diğer 
bölümündeyse, Yunanistan, İspanya ve Türkiye‟deki göç politikası uzmanlarıyla 
derinlemesine mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Bu mülakatların amacı, göçmen 
organizasyonlarının, insan hakları gruplarının, sendikaların ve diğer sivil toplum 
organizasyonlarının etkinlikleri ve yargı denetimi gibi demokratik hesap verme 
mekanizmalarının ulusal düzeyde devletin düzensiz göçmenlerin haklarını 
korumasında ne derece etkili olduğunu ortaya çıkarmaktır.   
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Düzensiz göç, insan hakları, demokratik hesapverilebilirlik, 
sivil toplum, mahkemeler, İspanya, Yunanistan, Türkiye 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Statement of the Problem 
Immigration to democratic industrial states has been on the rise since the end 
of World War 2. This development has been explained through various factors, such 
as the classical pull-push argument, which emphasizes the demand for foreign labour 
in the industrialized world coupled with unemployment in non-industrialized regions 
of the world; the emergence of transnational kinship and network relations, which 
ease the mobility of people; and the development of transportation technology. The 
economic factors that have triggered immigration are especially worth highlighting: 
in post-war Europe, immigration played a crucial role in fostering the economic 
growth of the 1950s and 1960s by providing new labour, thereby preventing labour 
shortages in times of expansion. Thus, some argue that Europe‟s post-war economic 
miracle would not have been possible without immigration. However, as economic 
expansion came to a halt in the 1970s and 1980s, a discourse emerged that 
questioned the benefits of immigration and even considered it unnecessary from then 
on (Hollifield, 1992).   
At the same time, a “liberal paradox” has developed for liberal democratic 
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states:  On the one hand, economic forces push states towards greater openness, 
including opening markets for foreign labour, in order to preserve their 
competitiveness in the global economy. On the other hand, a political concern with 
border control and sovereignty, together with nationalist sentiment, place 
immigration within a security discourse and demand border closures and other 
restrictionist policies (Hollifield et al., 2008). Nevertheless, immigration has 
continued to persist against this backdrop of restrictionist discourse and policies.  
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that currently there are 
approximately 214 million migrants in the world making up nearly 3.1 percent of 
world population.  Of these 214 million people, roughly 20 to 30 million are 
estimated to be undocumented (IOM, Facts & Figures, Global Estimates and Trends, 
n.d.).  According to Hollifield (1992), the persistence of immigration is not solely 
due to market forces. Rather, there are also political constraints on the liberal states 
that block the imposition of stronger restrictionist policies.  One of the most 
significant political factors is the granting of rights to the immigrants and the 
development of inclusive legal cultures that protect the immigrant from the arbitrary 
power of the state (Hollifield, 1992: 8).  As Hollifield puts it, “[t]he attraction of 
markets (including the demand for cheap labour) and the protection given to aliens in 
rights-based regimes taken together explain the rise in immigration and its 
persistence in the face of economic crisis, restrictionist policies, and nationalist (anti-
immigrant) political movements” (1992: 216).  However, one should still question 
the extent to which immigrants, as non-citizens, are actually able to enjoy their 
fundamental human rights on an equal basis with the citizens of the country they 
migrated.   
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IOM reports that immigration “is now an essential, inevitable and potentially 
beneficial component of the economic and social life of every country and region” 
(IOM, Global Estimates and Trends, n.d.). If this is the case for migrant receiving 
countries and regions then one should ask whether or not migration is also as 
beneficial for the economic and social life of every migrant, as it is for every country 
and region into which these migrants are moving.  According to Hollifield (1992: 
vii), “[p]eople are not just commodities: can an individual reside and work in a 
liberal society without enjoying the rights that are accorded, in principle, to every 
member of society?” According to him, liberal constraints should not allow such 
discrimination, so states should be obliged to grant rights to immigrants as well. 
However, the living and working conditions of undocumented / irregular immigrants 
today in many liberal democratic states show that in reality an individual can reside 
and work in a liberal society without enjoying the rights that are, in principle, 
supposedly granted to every member of the society.   
Bearing all this in mind, I am concerned in this study with the extent of the 
rights irregular immigrants can enjoy in democratic states, where they may reside 
and work for many years.  Thus, I question whether irregular immigrants can gain 
access to their fundamental human rights, such as access to the free health care and 
education that the liberal state grants in principle to every member of the society.  I 
also question whether or not civil society participation and judicial review can 
function as “liberal constraints” on the state in its regulation of irregular immigration 
and immigrants‟ rights. 
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1.2. The Research Questions 
 This study can be categorized within political science, and specifically within 
comparative politics research. The research reported here, focusing on immigration 
policies and politics, was conducted in three different national settings, Greece, 
Spain and Turkey, where the volume of irregular migrants is significant, in order to 
permit a comparative analysis of the following questions:  
 Is there divergence or convergence among Greece, Spain and Turkey 
in the way they treat irregular migrants in relation to the recognition of these 
immigrants‟ fundamental human rights?  
 
 What is the role of democratic accountability mechanisms (civil 
society activism and judicial review) in the protection of the rights of 
irregular immigrants who are already living in the receiving country? 
 
The study contributes to the related research fields and theoretical knowledge 
in three main ways. Firstly, it expands our knowledge of irregular immigration by 
offering a distinctive perspective that focus on the formal protection of these 
immigrants‟ rights.  Secondly, the study adopts a rather different theoretical 
framework to existing ones, which also study similar topics concerning immigration 
politics, policies and liberal constraints. Thirdly, the research primarily uses a 
comparative method of inquiry, and for that reason the results of the analysis provide 
specific and original comparative information on Greece, Spain and Turkey in this 
specific area of inquiry.  That is, no previous study has compared these three 
countries concerning this specific research topic.  Below, I elaborate further on these 
points. 
    In total, there are now a significant number of studies on irregular 
immigration, as the topic has established and consolidated its importance for the lives 
of people and states regarding the global flow of people. Migration generally, or 
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more specifically international migration, is an area that has been studied within 
various social science disciplines, such as sociology, anthropology, demography, 
economics, politics and psychology, as well as through multi-disciplinary research. 
Irregular immigration is not an exception to this, including both studies within 
various disciplines, and also ones that adopt multi-disciplinary perspectives.  Given 
the multi-disciplinary nature of the field, in what follows, I categorize the existing 
literature on irregular immigration in terms of the main themes and concerns that the 
literature addresses in order to situate my own study within this existing body of 
work, regardless of the main discipline of the study.    
First of all, there is a significant group of studies, which focuses on the 
general characteristics of irregular immigration flows within the global regime of 
international immigration.  These studies analyse these flows in detail and explain 
the overall social, economic and political atmosphere in the sending and receiving 
countries, together with the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the 
immigrants involved in these irregular flows.  These studies also provide statistics on 
the flows, so as to, in some way, document the „undocumented‟ (for some examples 
see, İçduygu, 2007B; Monzini, 2007).   
The second group of studies focuses on the political economy of irregular 
immigration and provides a structural analysis of the problem of irregular 
immigration.  These studies are concerned with the linkages between irregular 
immigration and the labour market structures of the sending and receiving countries. 
They focus on globalization, neo-liberal policies and politics as underlying drivers of 
irregular immigration.  Therefore, this group of work includes studies analyzing the 
global structural causes and consequences of irregular immigration (for some 
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examples, see Likic-Brboric, 2007; Overbeek, 2002). 
While these two groups of works looking at the flows themselves and the 
political economics of the issue are not directly related with the main theme of this 
study, they nevertheless bear on my topic as their findings provide the main outline 
of the issue and demonstrate the general significance of studying irregular 
immigration.  Reference to these studies is also necessary in order to better identify 
the gap in the literature and place my study within the overall literature on irregular 
immigration. For this reason, in the second chapter, where I review the literature on 
irregular immigration, I refer to various works from both of these groups.  The next 
two groups of work on irregular immigration focus on the policies towards 
immigrants and their life situations – themes which are directly related to this study.    
The third group of work, studies looking at policies on irregular immigration, 
usually deals with the measures and policies designed to control and curtail irregular 
immigration. Most of the time, these studies adopt a state centric focus on the issue 
by placing national interests and sovereignty at the centre of the discussion.  In other 
words, the main concern is with issues such as the „protection of the borders‟, 
„preservation of state sovereignty‟ and „illegal crossing of the borders‟, whereas there 
are not many studies that adopt an original and critical perspective about these 
notions in relation to irregular immigration (for some examples, though, see Broeders 
and Engbersen, 2007; Spijkerboer, 2007).  My work relates to this group of studies as 
it also focuses on the policies of irregular immigration. However, it diverges from the 
state centric studies within this group by focusing solely on the person, i.e. the 
irregular immigrant, rather than the territory, or the border, or the market.
1
 In this 
                                                     
1
 There are also studies that focus on the regularization of irregular immigrants. However, these are 
rather few in number compared to others. These studies also adopt a state centric focus as well, by 
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way, it fills a gap in the literature concerning the perspective that is focused on the 
policies that protect the individual rather than the state.
2
  
The fourth and last group of work investigates the life situations of irregular 
immigrants living within the receiving states in various ways.  Some studies treat 
irregular immigrants as a vulnerable group and concentrate on the hardships and 
deprivation they face in their daily routines.  Others focus on the ways in which these 
immigrants accommodate and cope with their irregular position within the receiving 
state, while another set of studies reconstruct the basic understandings of citizenship 
and state sovereignty based on the life situations of irregular immigrants (for some 
examples, see Taran, 2000; Varsanyi, 2006).  My work is related to this group of 
studies as well, as I also focus on „life situations‟ by concentrating on the rights 
granted to irregular immigrants. However, my study adopts a rather distinct 
perspective by bringing in the perspective of the state and other non-state political 
actors as well.  In the literature on the life situations of irregular immigrants, there is 
a lack of detailed analysis of the politics and policies concerning the rights granted to 
irregular immigrants living within the receiving state.  There are studies that 
carefully analyze which rights irregular immigrants are able to access or not, along 
with the mechanisms that exploit the material and moral power of the immigrants. 
However, there are no studies providing a systematic and comparative analysis of the 
position adopted by state and non-state actors towards this issue. By focusing on the 
liberal constraints on this issue my study seeks to fill this gap in the literature.   
Therefore, I may also say that my research question is located at the 
intersection of the studies on control policies and studies on the life situations of 
                                                                                                                                                      
focusing generally on the success of regularization in curtailing the number of irregular immigrants 
within the state. 
2
 An article with a very similar focus on the main concerns of this study is recently published 
(Laubenthal, 2011).  
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irregular migrants.  The literature on the life situations of irregular migrants shows 
what rights irregular migrants may or may not enjoy.  However, it lacks a state 
perspective on the matter that could examine why and under what conditions states 
aim to and do protect the rights of irregular migrants as persons eligible for 
protection under the rubric of international law of human rights and the general 
commitment to liberal democratic principles. Conversely, the literature focusing on 
policy analysis of states towards irregular migrants almost completely fails to 
consider state policies in terms of or in relation to the fundamental rights of irregular 
immigrants.  Advocates of the necessity for this approach tend to remain confined to 
the realm of normative accounts of civil society activism rather than empirical 
academic research. Therefore, responding to this research question will fill the gap in 
the literature on irregular migration caused by the two lines of research (on policies 
and life situations/rights) currently developing almost independently of each other. 
 Adding to this contribution to our knowledge and understanding of irregular 
immigration, my study, through its rather different theoretical orientation, also 
contributes to studies concerned with immigration policy making and the liberal 
constraints restricting the scope of action of the nation state.  Chapter 3 on the 
theoretical framework analyses in detail the existing works and explains how my 
study differs from these. However, to formulate the distinction briefly here as well, I 
would start by first pointing out that the inspiration for the overall theoretical 
framework adopted in this study is derived from a somewhat different literature that 
supports existing studies, namely the literature on democratization. 
 Studies focusing on the protection of the rights of immigrants, and the ones 
looking at the politics of immigration, have both come to focus on the liberal 
  
 
9 
constraints that force states to respect the rights of immigrants on the same basis as 
their citizens. One impressive and illuminating body of work considers various 
global constraints, such as the international human rights discourse/regime as the 
core mechanisms that prevent states from arbitrarily restricting the rights of 
immigrants (for some examples, Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1997).  Other studies, some 
of which were developed to critique the former group, focused on domestic 
constraints on states (for some examples, Joppke, 1998; Freeman, 1995; Hollifield, 
1992). For example, Joppke (1998) argues that it is national liberal constitutions and 
national courts acting according to those constitutions, rather than an international 
human rights discourse, that have in fact been most influential in protecting the rights 
of foreigners from the discretionary power of host states.  A third group of studies 
focused on the actions of civil society organizations and their potential to act as a 
liberal constraint upon the state in the protection of the rights of immigrants.  
However, I would like to note that these studies are rather few and less developed 
compared to those which look at liberal constitutions and courts.  
 My study is inspired by the second group that looks at the liberal constraints 
within domestic structures. However, while establishing my theoretical framework I 
also utilize particular themes and concepts from the democratization literature in 
order to more comprehensively answer the research questions.  Thus, I use the term 
democratic accountability mechanisms to refer to two rather distinct political 
mechanisms, civil society activities and judicial actions, which put pressure on the 
state in its treatment of immigrants.  In other words, I analyse and discuss the 
potential of courts and civil society working as „liberal constraints‟ by viewing them 
as democratic accountability mechanisms.  This enables me to consider both the 
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power of civil society organizations and judicial review at the same time in a 
meaningful and original theoretical framework. Thus, the theoretical framework of 
this research contributes to existing studies on immigration politics and policy-
making by adding a novel perspective to the issue.   
 The final contribution of my research derives from the fact that it provides an 
original comparison between three countries. In fact, there are no studies which 
compared Greece, Spain and Turkey in a systematic manner on any immigration 
issue. Therefore, my study provides valuable new comparative information about 
these three countries, thereby opening the way for further comparative research 
concerning these countries and similar others.  In the next section, I justify why I 
chose to compare these three particular cases in order to clarify the contribution of 
the research in this respect.  
 
1.3. A Note on Methodology and Data Collection 
In this study, I employ case study as the main method of inquiry.  I study 
Greece, Spain and Turkey in order to arrive at an overall answer to the previously 
mentioned research questions, rather than studying these countries for their own 
sake. That is, this study employs a comparative case study method instead of 
focusing on a single case. By following a comparative perspective that asks the 
research questions in several settings, I aim to observe particular similarities and/or 
divergences across the cases that will make my explanations more powerful.  
Specifically, I aim to offer a meaningful explanation of the relationship between 
democratic accountability mechanisms and the protection of the rights of irregular 
immigrants through a symmetrical analysis of the three cases.  
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The first reason for focusing on Greece, Spain and Turkey is that 
Mediterranean countries, as noted by many scholars, have become attractive final 
destinations, as members of the European Union (EU), and/or popular transit or 
emerging migration countries, such as Turkey. Consequently, they have been 
receiving growing numbers of irregular migrants, making them critical cases for 
research on irregular migration. A second reason for comparing these three countries 
is to be able to control the effect of certain important structural characteristics that 
might be affecting the treatment of irregular migrants in the first place, such as the 
demand for irregular migrant labour in certain economic sectors, size of the informal 
economy and type of welfare regime. Third, when it comes to the treatment of 
migrants in general, there appear to be differences among these countries, leading 
one to expect to observe also differences in relation to the treatment of irregular 
migrants in particular. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index, in terms of 
best practice on integration policies, Spain ranks 8
th
 among 31 migrant receiving 
countries
3
 with “slightly favourable” integration policies, whereas Greece ranks 16tth 
with “slightly unfavourable” policies on integration (MIPEX, 2011).4 Thus, there is a 
clear difference between Greece and Spain in terms of the integration policies 
offered to immigrants in general, so we may expect that such divergence will be 
observed also in terms of the treatment of irregular immigrants and recognition of 
their human rights, and that such divergence can be explained by the diverging 
democratic accountability mechanisms operating at the national level, such as the 
                                                     
3
 The countries included in the MIPEX are; Sweden, Portugal, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Norway, Spain, USA, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, United Kingdom, Demark, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Cyprus, and Latvia. (They are sorted by rank in terms of best 
practice on integration policies) 
4
 Migrant Integration Policy Index does not have figures for Turkey.   
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activism of pro-migrant organizations, human rights groups, trade unions and other 
civil society organizations and movements. 
In this study, the main indicator of a state‟s recognition of irregular migrants 
in relation to their fundamental human rights is national legislation allowing irregular 
migrants‟ access to fundamental rights, such as health care and education for 
migrants‟ children. Data on this part of the research was gathered mainly through a 
documentary analysis of related policy documents, such as reports of civil society 
organizations, policy briefs, and especially immigration laws and regulations. In a 
comparative analysis of the data thus gathered I sought to find out if there were any 
divergences among Greece, Spain and Turkey in the way they treated irregular 
immigrants in relation to the recognition of their fundamental human rights, and to 
what extent they protected the rights of irregular migrants. 
Data on the extent to which democratic accountability mechanisms at the 
national level, such as the activism of pro-migrant organizations, human rights 
groups, trade unions and other civil society organizations and movements impact the 
treatment of irregular migrants was gathered through in-depth interviews with 
experts on immigration policy in each country. The interview questions were 
intended to determine the level of influence of such mechanisms in pushing states to 
recognize the rights of irregular immigrants.  In other words, the interviews were 
used to find out to what extent these mechanisms are effective during migration 
policy making in ensuring the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants. 
 
 
1.4. The Organization of the Study 
  In the next chapter, „the Analytical Framework‟, I focus in depth on the 
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notion of irregular immigration in order to clarify with which specific type of 
immigration this study is concerned. For that reason, I discuss various definitions of 
irregular immigration and the existing approaches towards irregular immigration. I 
specifically contrast the approach which considers immigrants to be „illegal‟ and 
calls this type of immigration „illegal immigration‟ with another approach which 
recognizes these immigrants as vulnerable groups, highlights the fact that they are 
subject to discriminatory processes, and draws attention to the sometimes forgotten 
fact that these people are (or should be) recipients of human rights as well.  In the 
second part of the chapter, I review the existing literature on irregular immigration. 
This review has two functions regarding the development of my discussion. First of 
all, the review aims to deepen our understanding of irregular immigration, and hence 
reveal the necessity of posing the research questions of this study in order to gain a 
complete picture of irregular immigration in our times. Secondly, the literature 
review situates the discussions of this research within the existing literature on 
irregular immigration. 
 In chapter 3, the Theoretical Framework, I explain the main connections and 
borders of the theoretical discussion within which the research questions are to be 
answered. Thus, I bring together, review and evaluate the existing literature 
investigating similar types of research questions. Thus, it is in this chapter that I refer 
to the possible contributions of the democratic accountability mechanisms to the 
official protection of the rights of irregular immigrants. In this chapter I also review 
the immigration literature looking at the politics of immigration in general, as well as 
that having a specific focus on civil society activism and/or the involvement of 
courts.  
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 In chapter 4, I describe the methodology of the research, explaining how the 
research was conducted and which techniques were utilised.  In this chapter, I also 
justify why I compare three national cases, while trying to relate my case selection to 
the general principles of the comparative case study method.  The chapter then 
describes the fieldwork conducted in Greece, Spain and Turkey in order to explain 
the dynamics and parameters of the qualitative interviews I conducted, and the 
documents I analyzed. Appendices A, B and C complement the information given 
within this chapter on the study‟s research methodology by presenting further 
information on the interview questionnaire, the interviewees and documentation.  
 In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I analyse the main concerns and questions of the 
research for Greece, Spain and Turkey respectively. Each chapter provides a 
complete picture of the main findings of the research for each case in line with the 
theoretical framework provided in Chapter 3.  Thus, I look at the role of democratic 
accountability mechanisms in the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants for 
each case by utilising interview and documentary data. It is important to note that the 
analysis of the interviews and documents is given separately for each case in a 
systematic and parallel manner, as is reflected in the identical headings and sub-
headings of the three case chapters.  In this way, the reader is better able to compare 
the cases back and forth across the three chapters.  
 The last chapter provides the overall analysis and conclusions of the study in 
a comparative manner, by bringing together the information on all three of the cases.  
That is, the findings presented separately in Chapters 5, 6, 7 are integrated and re-
explained, this time in direct relation to each other. In this way, the main propositions 
of the research are evaluated in light of the comparative analysis. The chapter ends 
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with my conclusions and summarization of the findings of this research, its 
limitations, and its contribution to the literature.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
  
 This chapter is composed of two main parts. In the first part, I aim to define 
irregular migration and the causes behind its emergence.  I discuss two different 
approaches that have emerged around debates on irregular migration: “illegal” versus 
“rights-based”.  In the second part of the chapter, I review the literature on irregular 
migration in general, and place the contribution of this study within the existing 
literature on irregular migration.  
 
2.1. Studying Irregular Migration 
Membership of a nation-state, i.e. being a citizen of a state, grants an individual 
certain rights, but also sets certain obligations.  The scope of these rights and duties 
varies for each state.  However, states not only regulate the actions of their own 
citizens; they also govern the actions of foreigners who enter their territory.  States 
identify certain obligations and (in some places) certain rights for those people who 
seek to enter and reside, for different reasons and for varying lengths of stay.  In 
other words, certain immigration acts, policies, or regimes emerge that regulate the 
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actions of non-citizens, and also the state in its treatment of those people.  Failure to 
control the actions of non-citizens constitutes one of the major challenges to the 
sovereignty of the state in the official approach in many countries.  Thus, nation 
states aim to attain full control over the governance of non-citizens entering their 
territory, with the intention of preventing the entry and residence of unwanted guests. 
Nonetheless, despite a plethora of actions, legislation, policies and practice designed 
to prevent and combat the unwanted or unauthorized irregular movement of 
foreigners across their borders, most countries contain substantial numbers of 
irregular migrants.  These groups of immigrants are described in various ways, 
ranging from illegal to undocumented, and from unwanted to irregular.  Such 
disagreements over how to define the status of these types of foreigners remain far 
from resolved. In the next section, I review the various definitions given in the 
literature before identifying the definition I adopt in this study.   
 
2.1.1. Defining and Explaining Irregular
5
 Migration 
According to Samers, “undocumented immigration is defined, in relation to 
what is legal, by national sovereign states” (2001: 131-132).  As already mentioned 
above, states specify certain rules governing the conditions of entry, exit and 
residence of non-citizens.   A person becomes an irregular immigrant if they break 
some or all of these rules.  From this common starting point, the literature has 
produced various definitions or conceptualizations of irregular immigration.  
                                                     
5
 Throughout this study, I choose to use the term “irregular” to refer to the type of immigration I 
study, and to the people who are involved in this type of immigration. The reasons behind this choice 
will become clear as the chapter proceeds with the definition and description of the discourses on the 
rationale for migration. 
  
 
18 
For example, Tapinos (as cited in Haidinger, 2007: 6) lists six different 
categories of irregular immigrants. First, an immigrant who is staying in the country 
legally through a residence permit, might be working illegally. Secondly, an 
immigrant who has entered legally, such as with a tourist visa, could be living and 
working within the country illegally. The third category is the same as the second 
except that the illegal resident does not work. The fourth category is for a migrant 
who has entered the country clandestinely and works illegally without a residence 
permit.  The fifth category is the same as the fourth except that the migrant does not 
work. Finally, there are migrants who have entered clandestinely, but who have later 
gained a residence permit, for example through a regularization program, yet work 
illegally. 
By contrast, Samers (2001: 132) provides a brief definition of irregular 
immigration. For him, undocumented migration mainly involves either clandestine 
entry, by entering the country without abiding by the laws regulating entry, or 
overstaying a visa. Samers also points out that, based on this understanding of 
undocumented immigration, “informal employment” and “illegal residence” should 
be seen as two distinct terms, although “in the popular press and imagination, there is 
a tendency to conflate undocumented immigration, informal employment, and illegal 
residence”. Instead, we should think of them as “distinct, yet often intertwined” 
(Samers, 2001: 132).   Therefore, unlike Tapinos, Samers does not consider informal 
or illegal employment as a definitional characteristic of irregular migration. Rather, 
he views informal work as a distinct category which could be related to irregular 
migration.  A similar definition of irregular migration emerges from Russel King‟s 
(2002) identification of two main mechanisms of irregular migration: illegal entry 
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using forged documents or through unprotected borders; and legal entry followed by 
overstaying the visa.  This distinction implies that irregular migration is basically 
illegal entry and residence in a receiving state.  However, as with Tapinos‟s 
categorization, in most of the definitions, informal work also appears as an aspect of 
irregular immigration. For example, Krause (2008: 331-348) uses the term 
“undocumented migrants” and conceptualizes the term as referring to people who are 
neither citizens of the receiving country nor have any formal right to residence and 
work.  
 Identifying the reasons for irregular migration is as challenging as defining 
the concept. The aim of this chapter is neither to come up with an overarching 
definition of irregular immigration nor to find out the causal mechanisms behind 
irregular immigration in general.  Instead, the aim is to refer to some of the 
discussions on the rationale for irregular migration in order to situate the definitions 
and analyses adopted in this study. 
King (2002) notes that, although it is difficult to document the exact numbers 
of irregular immigrants, there is a consensus that „illegal‟ immigration has been 
increasing. For example, in the European Union (EU), the number of illegal or 
irregular entrants was approximately five times more in 2000 than 1994 (King, 2002: 
96). According to King, this was mainly because of push factors operating in the 
migrants‟ countries of origin, together with the ever-growing restrictions in terms of 
migration control in Western European countries that defines more and more 
migrants as „illegal‟.   
The factors „forcing‟ people to migrate illegally to other countries and stay 
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illegally include, among others, poor economic conditions, ethnic conflict and civil 
wars, and unbearable climate conditions.  As Likic-Brboric puts it,  
[t]he implementation of neo-liberal policy packages both in developing and 
former socialist countries have led to rising inequalities, poverty, 
unemployment, deindustrialization, expansion of informal and illegal 
economies, state capture, violent conflicts, state collapse and new emergencies. 
(2007: 167).  
               
Such socio-economic impacts of globalization in these countries could easily 
be considered as legitimate reasons for a person to seek better living conditions 
elsewhere.  However, irregular immigration is also mainly the result of such push 
factors occurring in combination with the use of restrictive immigration measures by 
the states where these migrants see prospects for a better life.  
Starting in the mid-1970s, Western governments have severely restricted 
immigration into their territories previously possible through work permits and 
asylum applications.  For example, treaties such as the Schengen agreement and 
polices like the third country rule, coupled with ever stricter policing of borders, have 
made it harder and harder to gain asylum in EU states (Krause, 2008: 331-48).  
Moreover, the diminishing desire of European States to accept any more migrants 
looking for work has limited the „legal‟ opportunities to escape from the kind of 
socio-economic problems described above (i.e. the push factors) in migrants‟ 
countries of origin.  Nevertheless, according to Krause, these restrictive immigration 
measures in European states have failed to prevent immigration. They have instead 
“illegalized work migration and driven many potential asylum-seekers underground” 
(2008: 331).   
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Scholars argue that, in a globalizing world, the “neo-liberal offensive”, as 
Overbeek (2002: 3) terms it, of deregulation, liberalization, and flexibilisation 
increases the demand in the industrialized world for unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour in precarious working conditions.  He argues that, in these circumstances, 
undocumented immigration becomes a vital tool for employers, because “[t]he 
employment of undocumented foreign labour has ... in many cases become a 
condition for the continued existence of small and medium size firms” (Overbeek, 
2002: 3).  Overbeek also claims that, when this market flexibilisation and 
deregulation is combined with restrictive immigration policies, it leads to an increase 
in illegal immigration (2002: 6).   
Similarly, Haidinger (2007: 10) argues that it is the flexibility that 
undocumented migrants display, and which citizen workers lack in the labour 
market, that makes the former attractive to employers.  He too sees the deregulated 
economy as attracting undocumented immigrants into the labour market, and claims 
that this happens not only in large globalized cities but also in the rural peripheries, 
where the agricultural sector depends on the labour of irregular workers. 
In conclusion, in very general terms, it can be argued that irregular 
immigration has emerged as a result of a three-way combination of the push factors 
operating in migrants‟ countries of origin, the restrictive immigration policies of the 
receiving countries, and the high level of demand for irregular migrant work in the 
economies of the receiving countries.  
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2.1.2. Two Different Approaches on Irregular Migration  
In this section, my objective is to discuss two rather opposing approaches on 
irregular immigration. The first, which could be termed the official approach, 
emphasizes legality, and is usually used by states, though sometimes also by 
(inter)national governmental institutions.  The second, rights-based, approach on 
irregular migration differs substantially from the official approach. The discourse of 
civil society organizations is a good example of this.  
 
2.1.2. 1. The Official Approach 
According to Russell King (2002: 89-106), a number of heuristic divides or 
binaries of migration have emerged, such as voluntary versus forced migration, or 
internal versus international migration. For King, although these binaries may help 
beginners in the field of migration studies to construct a mental map of the field, in 
the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries, they are no longer effective distinctions for 
understanding migration.  He identifies five such binaries
6
, including the legal versus 
illegal migration dichotomy.  King points out that, the dichotomy between illegal and 
legal migration “fails to match many aspects of contemporary migration reality” 
(2002: 93).  He highlights opposing views which consider „illegal migration‟ as 
requiring to be combated, or a consequence of „natural forces‟ of migration, hence a 
process to be appropriately managed. Moreover, he draws our attention to the fact 
that “the boundary between legality and illegality is easily crossed” (King, 2002: 93).  
As an illustration, a regularization law could turn an illegal status into one of legality, 
or a person who legally resides in a receiving country could acquire an illegal 
                                                     
6
 These binaries are: process vs. product (i.e. studying either the migratory movement or the migrating 
group); internal vs. international migration; voluntary vs. forced migration; temporary vs. permanent 
migration; legal vs. illegal migration 
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migrant status if he or she works without a work permit.  Therefore, the use of the 
term „illegal‟ does not allow one to capture the real nature of developments in this 
area and hinders the identification of what this process may entail.  Although this is 
the case, still in many contexts the term „illegal migration‟ is often used with the 
binary between illegal and legal migration being carefully preserved.  
Unsurprisingly, official approach is one such context where the use of this binary is 
strictly observed.  Even when the state‟s discourse uses the term „irregular‟ (or 
others) instead of „illegal‟ the use of the term „legal migration‟ connotes its antonym.  
In state discourse, the term „illegal‟ is preferred, basically because the presence of 
migrants within the receiving state against the will of the latter challenges the 
sovereign rights of the state to decide who can reside and/or work within its 
territories.  Thus, by using the term „illegal migration‟ instead of „irregular‟ or 
„undocumented‟ migration, states find a way to attribute a criminal character to these 
people, implying that they break the laws that regulate migration and related 
procedures.  
The EU‟s official approach dealing with irregular immigration is no exception 
in that sense; it also maintains an „illegal‟ approach on such issues, and in documents 
covering irregular migration.  It also provides a specific definition of „illegal 
migration‟ that has similarities with the definitions referred to in the first part of this 
chapter.  The EU definition reads: 
The term „illegal immigration‟ is used to describe a variety of phenomena. This 
includes third-country nationals who enter the territory of a Member State 
illegally by land, sea and air, including airport transit zones. This is often done 
by using false or forged documents, or with the help of organised criminal 
networks of smugglers and traffickers. In addition, there is a considerable 
number of persons who enter legally with a valid visa or under a visa-free 
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regime, but “overstay” or change the purpose of stay without the approval of 
the authorities; lastly there are unsuccessful asylum seekers who do not leave 
after a final negative decision. (EU, Communication from the Commission, 
2006: Article 3) 
As another illustration of the „illegal‟ approach, the section on the official EU 
Justice and Home Affairs website that summarizes the policies adopted towards 
irregular migration is listed under the heading “Wide-ranging common actions to 
combat illegal [author‟s italics] immigration at EU level and promote return of 
illegal immigrants” (EU Home Affairs, n.d.).  This heading signifies that the EU 
approach involves measures taken against a group of criminal (as they are “illegal”) 
migrants during a war (since there is “combat”) that is being fought against them.   
The website also states that “Solidarity, mutual trust and shared responsibility 
between Member States is a key requirement in an area without internal borders, 
which poses a particular burden with respect to pressure from illegal immigration on 
Member States who control an external border” (EU, Communication from the 
Commission, 2006: Article 7).  Thus, having criminalized immigrants, and put it at 
war with itself, the EU also links irregular migration with security of its borders – 
one of the most prioritized and „sacred‟ possessions of a state. 
The manner in which this approach characterizes various actions as a “fight”, 
“combat”, and “illegal” can be criticized using the point made by King (2002), that 
the division between legal versus illegal migration fails to capture the reality behind 
the emergence and continuation of the concept and the attending processes.    
EU approach also contributes to the precarious position of irregular migrants 
in the EU, since “[m]igrants themselves are criminalized, most dramatically through 
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widespread characterization of irregular migrants as “illegals”, implicitly placing 
them outside the scope and protection of the rule of law” (Taran, 2000: 11). 
It can be argued that irregular migration or irregular migrants have become 
the objects of the process of the “securitisation of certain persons and practices as 
„threats‟” (Guild et al., 2008: 2) that has been going on in the EU context. “The 
„undesired‟ form of human mobility often called „irregular immigration‟ is being 
subsumed into a European legal setting that treats it as a crime and a risk against 
which administrative practices of surveillance, detention, control and penalisation are 
necessary and legitimised” (Guild et al., 2008: 2). As stated earlier, EU measures 
have also linked irregular movements with border security.  Irregular migration has 
been considered as one such threat, against which the security of the borders of the 
EU must be preserved.  Thus, one other important objective of EU border 
management is to effectively “fight” against or “combat” all the “illegal” attempts to 
cross the borders of the EU.  The selective use of such expressions as “fight against”, 
“combat” and “illegal” could be considered as a discursive strategy place irregular 
immigration within the context of security, and to create a category of human activity 
and a group of people who threaten the security of the state (Guild et al., 2008: 3). 
Similarly to the above argument, Samers argues that the threat of „illegal‟ 
immigration in the EU is in a way created by the discourse and actions of EU 
officials themselves (2004: 27-45).  Samers observes that irregular migration, or in 
the EU‟s discourse “illegal migration”, grows through official words and deeds.  “If 
illegal migration is produced by stricter regulations, then the state is not so much 
controlling it, the popular press not so much reporting it, as they are both creating it 
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… through popular and governmental arguments such as „we need to reduce the 
number of bogus asylum-seekers” (2004: 29).  
This securitization discourse seems to have had great success in encouraging 
common EU decisions concerning immigration as aimed at in the Amsterdam treaty, 
in contrast to any other field (Samers, 2004: 31).  One could question why this is the 
case.  The answers could be multiple and diverse, but in relation to the above 
discussion on EU discourse on irregular migration, it could be argued that, since a 
dominant approach in the official context could emerge, the definition of the policy 
problem turns out to be simple and clearly focused on security and combating 
irregular migration, which in turn suggests an unambiguous and patent solution.  In 
other words, if the EU‟s problem is „illegal‟ immigration, then the solution is to 
“fight” against or “combat” it, and such a process is to be implemented by the 
relatively smooth process of formulating common measures at the EU level for this 
clearly defined problem and its solutions.   
 
2.1.2. 2. The Rights-based Approach 
The previous section discussed mainly the official state approach on irregular 
immigration by using the EU as an example to show how the emphasis on being 
„illegal‟ is used to highlight the significance of state sovereignty over its territory.  It 
was argued that by criminalizing and punishing the irregular migrant the state can 
reinforce the sovereignty of itself and its citizens (McNevin, 2007: 655-74). This 
occurs because, through its discussions over irregular immigrants, a state reinforced 
its power to decide who can and cannot be one of its members, and whose presence 
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in the state is not to be tolerated. Thus, the choice of the attribute „illegal‟ serves the 
purposes of states. Moreover, “…as long as irregular migrants lack formal 
recognition they remain constitutive outsiders whose imminent but „other‟ identity 
helps to establish the meaning of the state‟s „inside‟ and „self‟” (McNevin, 2007: 
669).  And for that reason, it can be argued that the territorial aims of states are better 
served by maintaining the irregularity of migrants rather than having regularizations 
and “legalizing” their status.  However, there is another side to this issue concerning 
the threat to the fundamental human rights of irregular immigrants. Haidinger notes 
this problem in the following way: 
Undocumented migrants suffer discrimination in regard to their human rights, 
including: the right to adequate housing; the right to health care; the right to 
education and training; the right to family life; the right to minimum 
subsistence; the right not to be arbitrarily arrested; rights during detention or 
imprisonment; the right of equality with nationals before the courts; the right to 
due process; the prohibition of collective expulsion; and the right to fair 
working conditions, embodied by the right to a minimum wage, the right to 
compensation in cases of workplace accidents, injury or death, the right to 
equality before the law (e.g. in employment-related cases), and the right to 
organize. (2007: 24) 
This means there is a competing approach to the „illegal‟ approach that can be 
termed the „rights-based‟ approach.  The rights based approach exposes the limits of 
the official approach and how it may be detrimental to the protection of the basic 
human rights of irregular migrants.  It claims that the „illegal‟ approach leads to a 
failure of the overall understanding of irregular migration to recognize that such 
individuals should also have access to their basic human rights.  Instead, the state 
draws borders around a group of people, deeming their status as illegal, and 
represents them in such a way that the protection of their rights becomes considered 
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as irrelevant, since they broke the law(s) on entry, exit and/or stay, hence committing 
criminal act(s) by violating the state‟s rules regarding the management of its borders. 
In practice, the most vocal and multifaceted arguments in favour of the rights-based 
approach to irregular immigration is usually presented by civil society. In order to 
illustrate this approach I therefore refer to some of the statements of the Platform for 
International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) in the rest of this 
section.
7
 
The website of PICUM states that the aim of the organization is “to promote 
respect for the basic social rights (such as the right to health care, the right to shelter, the 
right to education and training, the right to a minimum subsistence, the right to family 
life, the right to moral and physical integrity, the right to legal aid, the right to organize 
and the right to fair labour conditions) of undocumented migrants” (PICUM, Mission, 
n.d.: para.2). Clearly, this organization aims to situate discussions on irregular 
migration within a fundamental rights framework.  One of the methods of the 
organization in promoting the rights of irregular migrants is stated as “[f]ormulating 
recommendations for improving the legal and social position of these immigrants, in 
accordance with the national constitutions and international treaties. These 
recommendations are to be presented to the relevant authorities, to other 
organizations and to the public at large” (PICUM, n.d.). That is, the organization 
seeks to create greater awareness, both on the part of governments and civil society.
8
 
                                                     
7
 The academic literature exhibiting a rights-based discourse is reviewed in the second part of this 
chapter, under the section that reviews studies of the life situations of irregular migrants.   
8
 Some of the names of the publications of PICUM are as the following: Access to Health Care for 
Undocumented Migrants, PICUM‟s Concerns about the Fundamental Rights of Undocumented Migrants, 
Undocumented Migrants Have Rights! An Overview of the International Human Rights Framework, Ten 
Ways to Protect Undocumented Migrant Workers, Health Care for Undocumented Migrants (PICUM, 
Publications, n.d.).  For example, the publication, Undocumented Migrants Have Rights! An Overview of 
the International Human Rights Framework, demonstrates that the human rights of irregular migrants are 
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To conclude, the rights-based approach differs significantly from the „illegal‟ 
discourse. The former sees the irregular migrant as someone whose rights need to be 
respected and protected, while the latter criminalizes the process and the individual 
from a sovereignty and security oriented perspective. In other words, “the social 
category of “undocumented/illegal immigrant” is often associated unnecessarily with 
other forms of criminal activities and frequently carries with it racial assumptions” 
(Samers, 2001: 132).  Such an attitude and policy direction further challenges the 
irregular migrant and his/her rights within states, while almost completely excluding the 
macro-level structural reasons behind irregular migration and the accompanying micro-
level human suffering.  
 
2.1.3. Concluding Remarks 
The main aim in this part of the chapter was to provide a broader 
understanding of irregular immigration.  In order to do that I first discussed some 
conceptualizations of the term and the causes of irregular migration, as addressed in 
the literature. I then elaborated on the two competing approaches that have emerged 
regarding irregular migration.  In the rest of the chapter, I review the literature on 
irregular immigration with the aim of locating the main concerns of this study within 
the existing literature.  
 
2.2. The State of the Art on Irregular Migration 
The main research question of this study is: “What is the role of democratic 
accountability mechanisms (i.e. civil society activism and judicial review) in the 
                                                                                                                                                      
in fact being granted in the relevant human rights treaties and in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.   
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protection of the rights of irregular immigrants who are already living within the 
receiving country?”  The goal of this chapter is to integrate this research question 
into the existing literature on irregular migration in order to show how answering this 
research question can contribute to understanding irregular immigration. Throughout 
this chapter I therefore classify and analyze some of the most important studies on 
irregular migration in order to draw a picture of the state of the art on the topic and 
present the gap that is filled by my research.  In the final section of the chapter, I 
discuss the possible contributions that can be made to the literature from responding 
to the central question of this research.  
Haidinger (2007: 4), in a literature review report on undocumented migrants 
and the informal economy, classifies the thematic focus of European research on 
irregular migration into three topics. One group of studies deals with the life 
situations of irregular migrants, such as their healthcare situations, working 
conditions and residential circumstances.  The second group of studies is concerned 
with the control policies formulated towards irregular immigrants.  This research 
mainly focuses on issues like border controls, border management and inter-state 
control. The final category of research focuses on the relationship between irregular 
migration and labour market structures, and the integration of irregular migrants into 
labour markets.
9
 
Although Haidinger only reviews European research on irregular migration, I 
would argue that his classification can also be applied to the literature in general, 
even if it is not specific to the European continent.  For that reason, I adopt his 
classification as the basis of this review, although I also make certain modifications 
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 In comparison with the first two groups, less research has been conducted for this final category. 
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and additions.  More specifically, I add one more thematic group to his classification, 
in which I place those studies which focus on the general characteristics of irregular 
migratory flows and the people involved.  That is, this category involves studies 
analyzing who migrates, through which migratory routes, and how, i.e. by using what 
kind of means.  Additionally, I broadened Haidinger‟s third category to include 
studies that focus on the political economy of irregular migration.  Therefore, taking 
Haidinger‟s classification as the basis of this review, I classify the existing literature 
along the following thematic lines: (1) studies which focus on the general 
characteristics of irregular migratory flows and the people involved; (2) research that 
analyzes the political economy of irregular migration; (3) studies which work on the 
control mechanisms/policies of states towards irregular migration; and (4) studies 
that focus on the life situations of irregular migrants within the receiving states. 
In passing, one should note that this classification is as artificial as the other 
classifications of any literature in general, since any one study may well have 
intersecting thematic foci, as indeed is the case.   Nevertheless, I believe that this 
classification is useful in providing a broader understanding of the state of the art 
regarding irregular migration, as well as providing the broadest possible analytical 
framework in which to locate the main concern of my research. 
 
2.2.1. The General Characteristics of Irregular Migratory Flows 
Among the studies on irregular migration there is a body of work that focuses 
on the very nature of irregular migration, showing who migrates, through which 
migratory routes, and how, i.e. by using what kind of means. These studies provide 
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data on the characteristics of irregular migratory flows, and on the migrants who are 
involved in irregular immigration.  It is important to mention this work since it sheds 
light on the general dynamics of irregular migration in the global international 
migration framework, the understanding of which will allow me to present my 
research question. Additionally, I try to focus on studies that concentrate more on 
Europe, and especially on those that focus on Southern Europe, since the focus of the 
present research is on the Mediterranean countries of Greece, Spain and Turkey.  
İçduygu (2007B) provides a thorough overview of irregular migratory flows 
in the Mediterranean countries of France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 
demonstrating that irregular migration constitutes one of the main forms of migratory 
movements in the Mediterranean area.  The study provides data on the estimated 
number of irregular immigrants in each country, and from where the flows mostly 
originate.  For example, southern European countries receive migrants from diverse 
countries to the east of the Mediterranean basin, such as Turkey, or from Asia, such 
as Pakistan, or from Africa, such as Congo.  The study also reveals evidence on how 
these irregular movements operate across the Mediterranean basin, on whether they 
constitute illegal entry or overstayed visas, and also on the nature of regularization 
programs introduced in receiving countries for irregular immigrants.  The review 
highlights the increasing volume of irregular migratory flows, which it attributes to 
the situation produced as a result of the dilemma between the restrictionist 
immigration rhetoric and policies of the states, and “a liberal frame of economic 
rationality” that attracts and absorbs irregular migratory flows (İçduygu, 2007B: 
142). 
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Among the studies within this group, there is also a large body of case studies 
investigating the nature of irregular migration within single countries.  For example, 
focusing on Turkey as a transit and receiving country, İçduygu (2003) finds that 
three main trends characterize the nature of irregular immigration to Turkey.  First, 
there are job-seeking migrants from Eastern Europe, such as Moldovan immigrant 
women who work as domestic workers taking care of middle and upper class 
families‟ children or elderly. The second trend concerning irregular migration flows 
to Turkey involves transit migrants from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and 
Iraq, or from Asian countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, or from 
African countries such as Congo, Nigeria, and Somalia. The third form of irregular 
migration flows is the rejected asylum seekers, who do not return home but instead 
look for illegal work, and/or ways to move to another country (İçduygu, 2003: 17-8). 
Studies examining irregular migration in the context of human trafficking and 
smuggling can be included in this group too as they concentrate on a specific kind of 
irregular migration - the one that happens through human smuggling or trafficking. 
One such study demonstrates that migrants who entered Europe through the help of 
smugglers had no alternative ways of legally travelling to Europe (van Liempt, 
2007). This study also demonstrates that, even if the migrants had had valid 
documents to enter Europe, they might not have had legal permission to leave their 
state of origin; under these circumstances too, smugglers are consulted to enable 
immigration to European states. Irregular migrants pay large amounts of money to 
the smugglers for this service.  The findings suggest that it is the smugglers who 
decide most of the time on the final destination of the journey meaning that, even 
though migrants pay large sums of money for their route, they may end up in 
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countries not of their preference, so they may need to pay other smugglers to 
continue their journey to their desired destinations. Concerning irregular migratory 
flows into European states, the study shows that the use of smugglers is increasing, 
which could be considered to be the consequence of restrictive immigration policies.   
 Salt (2000) claims that it is impossible to find a precise definition of 
trafficking and smuggling in the literature. However, he also notes that there is now 
an acceptance of a kind of analytical divide between trafficking and smuggling.  In 
that sense, the goal of the former is to move people against their will to places where 
their labour can be exploited and their human rights abused. Smuggling, on the other 
hand, is facilitating illegal entry to a destination country. Even though Salt refers to 
this division between trafficking and smuggling, he also recognizes that, in reality, 
the two may be mixed; where trafficking can involve smuggling or smuggling can 
also involve serious human rights abuses by the smugglers.  
He conducts an analysis of the characteristics of trafficked and smuggled 
migrants in terms of their nationality, demography, socio-economic conditions, and 
motivations, based on the studies of International Organization for Migration.  He 
shows that the demographic characteristics, economic skills and education and 
motivation of trafficked and smuggled migrants vary according to their country of 
origin; and that in fact all these variables are interlinked. For example, trafficked 
women from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia are usually highly educated with 
university degrees (Salt, 2000: 47). 
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2.2.2. The Political Economy of Irregular Migration 
The literature on irregular migration includes studies that may be classified as 
focusing on the political economy of irregular migration in general, and the relation 
between irregular migration and labour market structures in particular.  It is 
important to refer to these studies in a literature review on irregular migration 
because, by focusing on the economics of irregular migration, these studies directly 
or indirectly refer to the causes behind the emergence of irregular migration, which 
provides a setting in which this study‟s research question becomes significant.10   
The studies in this group focus on underlying factors such as globalization, 
neo-liberal policies and the global division of labour that have triggered the 
emergence of irregular migration (Likic-Brboric, 2007), the demand for irregular 
migrant work, and new relationships between the informal market and irregular 
migration in the economies of receiving countries (Toksöz, 2007; Samers, 2003). 
Samers (2003) analyzes the political economy of undocumented migration in 
France in the 1990s, within the frameworks of Marxist and Liberal political-
economic explanations of immigration control in general.  He points out that, from a 
Marxist perspective, it could be argued that, as welfare rights have been extended to 
legal migrants almost at a similar level to that of the natives, undocumented migrants 
have become more attractive to employers, who seek to minimize their labour costs. 
That is, undocumented migration is inseparably associated with “capital 
accumulation and the nature and regulation of labour markets” (Samers, 2003: 575).  
In other words, he argues that undocumented migration affects the nature of labour 
markets and in turn capital accumulation, even if the empirical data shows that the 
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 I will elaborate more on this issue at the end of this section. 
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numbers of undocumented migrants are falling in the French labour market. 
Therefore, he argues that one should not expect immigration policy makers to 
disregard “the relationship between immigration and labour markets, because to do 
so would jeopardize the very foundations of capital accumulation, and thus the 
French capitalist state” (Samers, 2003: 575). 
Like Samers, Jahn and Straubhaar (1998) also treat the economics of irregular 
migration and legal migration as similar.  They argue that the logic that evaluates the 
economic impact of irregular migration is based on the “general economic impacts of 
the international movement of persons” (25).  In other words, the economics of 
illegal migration in terms of its effects on the labour market is no different than the 
economics of legal migration.  In order to determine the effects of irregular migration 
on the wages and employment of natives, the authors differentiate between whether 
the migrants‟ work complements or supplements the work of the natives. If the 
migrant labour supplements the native workforce, then, as the supply of labour will 
be abundant, wages will fall.  However, if migrant labour complements the native 
workforce, then one could expect to see the native labour force reach a higher 
productivity level and become better off (Jahn and Straubhaar, 1998: 26). 
One such study looking at the economic impacts of irregular migration 
analyzes the effects of irregular migration on workers, employers and consumers, on 
the welfare system in general, and also on structural adjustment and productivity 
growth (Ghosh, 2000).  Ghosh argues (as Jahn and Straubhaar do) that, in order to 
determine the effect of irregular migrants on wages in the receiving country, one 
should look at whether or not irregular migrants complement or compete with the 
  
 
37 
nationals and/or legal migrants in the receiving country. If irregular migrants only 
take jobs for which there is a labor shortage then there is not much effect on wages. 
However, when irregular migrants compete with nationals and legal migrants for 
scarce jobs, then they cause wages and other benefits to decrease. In this case, 
irregular migrants offer large financial incentives for employers, who find legal 
employment more of a financial burden. Ghosh refers to a situation in the 
Netherlands where employers who were convicted of hiring irregular migrants had 
made large financial gains, even after paying their fines (2000: 143). In terms of the 
effects on the welfare system, Ghosh argues that it depends on the extent to which 
irregular migrants (and their families) use the welfare systems, and also to the extent 
of their contribution to the welfare system. However, he recognizes that measuring 
their cost and contribution to the welfare system is very hard in terms of providing 
accurate data.  In terms of structural adjustment and productivity growth, he 
concludes that irregular migration is “contributing to the segmentation and 
dysfunctioning of the labour market. In addition it can inhibit restructuring and 
upgrading of the economy in the destination country” (Ghosh, 2000: 145).  This 
happens because non-competitive firms prefer hiring irregular migrants in order to 
reduce their production costs instead of investing in productivity increasing 
technologies in order to increase their competitiveness. This situation can also create 
a vicious circle by increasing the demand for irregular migrants. “Since improved 
productivity is the basis of economic and wage growth, cheap foreign labour can be 
counter-productive in the long run” (Ghosh, 2000: 157). 
The studies cited above exemplify how the general economics of irregular 
migration are analytically considered in the literature. There are also studies that 
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consider the emergence of irregular migration from an economic perspective.  
Boswell and Straubhaar argue that the illegal employment of foreigners develops due 
to two major factors: (1) strict legislation on legal labour migration that makes it 
impossible to hire legal labour migrants in certain industries, such as agriculture, 
construction and cleaning; and (2) the demand of businesses for cheap labour, which 
they can satisfy by hiring irregular migrants because this will lower their production 
costs through “non-payment of social contributions, lower salaries, and hiring 
workers willing to work more flexible hours or with sub-standard working 
conditions” (Boswell and Straubhaar, 2004: 4).  Additionally, illegal employment of 
foreigners creates conflicting interests for the government. On the one hand, illegal 
employment is economically beneficial for employers by lowering their costs as 
outlined above. Thus, curbing the employment of foreigners would bring economic 
costs for governments in general.  On the other hand, governments are also under 
serious pressure to manage the illegal employment of foreigners and flow of irregular 
migrants in order to meet other concerns, such as competition of illegal labour 
migrants with nationals for scarce jobs, exploitation of workers, pressures arising 
from negative public opinion towards illegal immigration, and pressures from 
organized interests such as migrant rights organizations, churches and trade unions. 
Boswell and Straubhaar argue that this situation creates “an ambivalent stance” on 
the part of the governments towards the issue of the illegal employment of 
foreigners: “While condemning it in public, they have shown a less than robust 
commitment to tackling it in practice” (2004: 5).  
Looking at Southern European states (especially Italy and Greece), Toksöz 
(2007) argues that the existence of a strong informal economy is the essential factor 
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shaping the flow of irregular labour migrants in the Mediterranean region.  Informal 
work is present mostly in sectors like textiles/clothing, repair workshops, transport, 
entertainment (in Italy), and also in agriculture, tourism, construction, domestic 
services, and small manufacturing firms (in Greece). The employment of irregular 
labour migrants is greatest in these sectors, where the share of informal work is 
higher. Irregular labour migrants are concentrated in agriculture, domestic work, 
peddling, construction, small manufacturers, hotels and restaurants, low status urban 
services, entertainment and prostitution.  There is also gender-based segregation 
within these sectors.  Migrant women mostly work in the sex industry, entertainment, 
and domestic work, whereas men work mostly in construction and agriculture. On 
the other hand, seasonal and temporary work in tourism and textiles provides 
employment for both male and female migrant workers.  Toksöz (2007) finds that, in 
the Southern European countries, productivity is relatively poor in some sectors, such 
as agriculture and manufacturing.  Therefore, in order to survive, businesses in these 
sectors rely on cheap and flexible labour, which can only be supplied by irregular 
labour migrants as most natives are uninterested in such low-paid jobs even if they 
are unemployed.  
From another perspective, Ahmad (2008) looks at the socio-economic 
consequences of being a smuggled migrant, particularly those from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, in the labour market of the receiving country.  The study compares and 
contrasts these migrants‟ socio-economic conditions in London with other migrants, 
irrespective of nationality, as well as with some natives. This leads Ahmad to 
question common generalizations about the socio-economic conditions of „illegal‟ 
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labour, such as being the same as “semi-slavery”. 
Scholars such as Ahmad also point out a conceptual differentiation between 
work and job. The latter signifies “regular hours of guaranteed employment and rates 
of pay” (Ahmad, 2008: 864), whereas work stands for labour that is being provided 
with unregulated and irregular terms and conditions with a “take-it-or-leave-it basis 
at a given moment” (Ahmad, 2008: 865).  His argument is that low pay is not 
determined by the legal status, i.e. of being a smuggled migrant or not. Rather, wage 
levels are determined by whether the migrant is doing work or has acquired a job.  
To sum up, studies in this group suggest that there are substantial similarities 
between the economic impacts for receiving countries of irregular migrants and 
others who move across international borders. However, the economic consequences 
of these movements are not mutually exclusive. Whether irregular migrants compete 
for or complement the jobs of the regular migrants, they impact the wage levels of 
regular migrants and the native population one way or the other.  These studies also 
demonstrate that receiving states have a certain capacity to absorb incoming irregular 
migrants, either in jobs or works, and the existing informal economies coupled with 
the demands of employers for cheap and flexible labour can function as the pull 
factors of irregular migration.  However, irregular immigrants working in the 
informal economy most of the time lack any labour safety protection or any other 
economic protection because of their labour‟s „illegal‟ status.  In this context, 
searching for answers to the question, to what extent states protect the rights of 
irregular immigrants becomes especially important in order to find out if there are 
any formal mechanisms to prevent this exploitation of irregular immigrant labour.    
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2.2.3. Policies Controlling Irregular Migration 
The starting point for the studies in this group is the problematic relationship 
between irregular immigrants and the receiving state. Despite substantive 
improvements in the facilitation of the free movement of capital, goods and services, 
there are still major limits to the free movement of people, with nation states still 
reserving the sole authority and sovereign right to decide who can enter and reside 
within their territories. The fact that there are people, such as irregular migrants, who 
happen to remain there against the state‟s will presents a sovereignty crisis.  Hence 
states develop certain policies and measures to control these irregular migratory 
flows, which have been extensively studied in the literature on irregular migration. 
Those studies show that the „war‟ against irregular immigrants may be fought both 
on the border and also within the territory.  Thus, while some studies in this group 
focus on border management, others discuss developments within the territory of the 
states. 
I begin by referring to one study (Broeders, 2007) which focuses on three 
EU-wide large-scale electronic surveillance systems: the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) and its complementary systems, SISII and SIRENE; and the European 
Dactylographic System (EURODAC) and the Visa Information System (VIS).  SIS, 
SISII and SIRENE are large data systems containing personal information on five 
different categories of people in Europe.  Irregular migrants are categorised under the 
title “persons to be refused entry to the Schengen area as unwanted aliens” 
(Broeders, 2007: 79). Broeders reports that “[i]nformation on persons that may be 
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stored in the SIS consists of a rather basic and limited set of information: first and 
last name, known aliases, first letter of the second name, date and place of birth, 
distinctive physical features, sex and nationality, whether persons are considered to 
be armed and/or dangerous, reason for the report and action to be taken” (2007: 79). 
EURODAC on the other hand, is aimed mainly to prevent „asylum-shopping‟, i.e. 
applying for asylum in more than one country at the same time. The system stores 
the fingerprints of both asylum claimants and irregular migrants. The goal of VIS, 
meanwhile, is to identify irregular migrants who enter with a legal visa but somehow 
end up becoming irregular migrants within the host country.  
Broeders notes that these computerized information systems can also be used 
for goals that are unrelated to the original reason for their construction, allowing 
“function creep” to emerge because of political considerations.  As he puts it, “the 
panoptic focus on territory has shifted to a focus on population, and in the case of 
surveillance on (irregular) migrants, it has shifted to an internationally mobile 
population.” (Broeders, 2007: 89). 
Another study, by Broeders and Engbersen (2007), focuses on the internal 
control policies of states to exclude and discourage those irregular migrants who 
have somehow managed to pass through the border.  The authors first discuss why 
irregular migration is a „threat‟ for the state, arguing that “[a]fter family and asylum 
migration, it is now irregular migration that is casting doubts on the liberal state‟s 
capacity to refuse and deter unwanted immigration.” (Broeders and Engbersen, 2007: 
1592).  Thus, the main implication of increasing flows of irregular migration is the 
impression that the state is losing control over immigration. When the number of 
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migrants defined as „illegal‟ according to immigration laws increases within the 
territory of a state, they, as irregular migrants, “become a direct challenge to the 
state‟s notions on legal mobility and territoriality in a globalized world” (Broeders 
and Engbersen, 2007: 1594).  Therefore, gathering information on, and identification 
of, the migrant population of the state becomes vital in order to identify and exclude 
those who are there against the will of the state.  For that reason, states have designed 
varied surveillance strategies to identify and exclude irregular migrants from key 
institutions of the society.  In this context, the authors elaborate on three central 
strategies of states for excluding irregular migrants. First, states block their access to 
the stable and tax-paying labour market by sanctioning employers, requiring diverse 
documents, and organizing regular inspections of labour market through 
computerized checks on identities and other documents. Second, the state can use 
incarceration and expulsion to exclude irregular migrants.  When caught, irregular 
migrants are „housed‟ in closed centres, under conditions similar to a prison regime.  
These deportation centres are designed for the efficient organization of forced 
returns.  The third strategy is digitalization of borders, i.e. documenting data on 
irregular migrants through systems such as VIS and SIS, SISII, discussed earlier. 
 Various studies have focused on the Europeanization of border control 
policies and the impact of the EU on the control of the flows of irregular migrants. 
Samers (2004), for example, provides a thorough description and analysis of 
European policy developments with respect to irregular immigration since the Treaty 
of Amsterdam.
11
  The central thesis in Samers‟ work is his claim that the threat of 
„illegal‟ immigration in the EU has, in a way, been created by the discourse and 
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 A description of EU policies on irregular migration will be provided separately in greater detail in 
other chapters of this study. Here, I focus just on Samer‟s analysis of the EU‟s irregular migration 
policies.  
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actions of EU officials themselves (2004: 27-45). In order to explain this EU 
creation, Samers adopts the term „virtualism‟ from economic anthropology, which 
denotes basically the creation of economic reality by economic models rather than 
the other way round. Using this term as a means to understand the geopolitics of 
irregular migration, he observes that irregular migration, or according to the EU‟s 
discourse „illegal migration‟, has grown through official statements and deeds.  For 
example, visa policy, according to Samers, is one such policy area where one can 
observe the emergence and effects of virtualism.  He explains the reason for this 
using the EU Commission‟s own statement: “Illegal immigration represents one of 
the basic criteria for the determination of those third countries whose nationals are 
subject to the visa requirement” (Samers, 2004: 32).  Samers argues that the selective 
application of restrictive visa policies to particular countries, decided on the basis of 
a risk analysis based on the socio-economic characteristics of these countries and the 
resulting likelihood of mass migration from them, actually creates visas overstaying, 
and consequently a market for smuggling and trafficking (2004: 32).  This situation, 
in turn, encourages the state to impose further restrictions on granting visas for the 
citizens of other specified countries, which creates a vicious circle.  Based on this 
analysis, Samers states: “If illegal migration is produced by stricter regulations, then 
the state is not so much controlling it, the popular press not so much reporting it, as 
they are both creating it … through popular and governmental arguments such as „we 
need to reduce the number of bogus asylum-seekers‟” (2004: 29).  
 From another point of view of the literature on control policies, Spijkerboer‟s 
(2007) study evaluates their consequences and efficiency. The study questions 
whether or not the sea border controls of European states have succeeded in securing 
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the borders from the „invasion‟ of irregular migrants, and tries to discover the 
repercussions of these border controls for migrants‟ physical well-being.  
 As Spijkerboer (2007) reports, European countries compel the authorities in 
migrants‟ countries of origin to control irregular migratory flows from them and to 
take back apprehended irregulars of their nationality.  This pressure to conform to the 
demands coming from Europeans, has led to various human rights violations at these 
points of departure, such as dumping people who try to cross borders illegally in 
isolated areas without food or water.  At the same time, stricter border controls at 
these points of departure, such as Morocco, force migrants to use other far more 
roundabout routes to the European mainland, for example via Libya, Tunisia, 
Mauritania and Senegal.  a eh Tvailable data does not support the assumption of 
European authorities that intensified border controls decrease the volume of irregular 
migratory flows. On the contrary, migrants do keep coming to the European 
mainland, but this time over longer and more dangerous routes.  
 It is also important to note that the European states‟ intensified border 
controls also disregard the physical well-being of irregular migrants. Although states 
refer to human rights while introducing border control policy proposals, in practical 
terms, and in the policy outlines, they do not address how to protect migrants from 
the risks that they could face as a result of border controls (Spijkerboer, 2007: 132).  
For example, it has been stated that Spanish boats for border patrol possess the 
equipment to intercept migrants, but not to rescue them from drowning or other 
threat to their physical well-being (Spijkerboer, 2007).   
Overall, Spijkerboer‟s study clearly demonstrates that, since irregular migrants 
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do not abandon their plans to migrate despite enhanced border controls, but simply 
choose more dangerous routes, and since European states focus solely on border 
security and surveillance, and disregard the protection of migrant lives at borders, 
intensified border controls have led to growing number of human casualties at the 
borders (2007: 136). 
A very similar observation and analysis of control policies is made in the US 
context by Cornelius (2005).  As with the European context, in the US too new 
strategies are being developed, such as a computerized database with the photos, 
fingerprints, and other personal information of migrants, called IDENT, the 
establishment of video surveillance systems at US borders, and the building of a “10-
foot high steel fence” in order to prevent entry from San Diego and El Paso 
(Cornelius, 2005).  
By considering these post 1993 investments in border control strategies, 
Cornelius argues that the growth of irregular migration („unauthorized‟ migration in 
his terms) has occurred at a time when the government of the United States is 
spending more on the control of its borders.  The “concentrated border enforcement 
strategy” of the US aims to control the most popular borders12 for illegal entrants 
from Mexico, with policy makers assuming that “geography [will] do the rest”. That 
is, the policy relies on irregular migrants unwilling to risk their lives by entering 
through dangerous routes, such as the desert (Cornelius, 2005).   However, as in the 
case of illegal European border crossings, in the US too, irregular migrants have 
started arriving via hazardous areas, so one indirect consequence of the new border 
policy has been to redistribute illegal entries more widely along the United States‟ 
                                                     
12
 These are El Paso, Texas, San Diego, central Arizona.  
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borders.  Two other consequences of the border policy are an increase in the physical 
risks of border crossings, and an increase in entrants having to seek assistance from 
human smugglers. 
Both Spijkerboer‟s and Cornelius‟ study demonstrates that these inefficiencies 
and human costs of border management arise because of the narrow approach 
adopted towards the management of irregular migratory flows. Both authors argue 
that irregular migrants will keep coming unless the social, economic and political 
conditions are improved in the countries of origin, and/or the demand for irregular 
migrant labour is curtailed in the destination countries. 
Studies analyzing policies adopted towards irregular immigration mainly 
concentrate on control strategies, which aim to stop the flow of irregular migrants 
and also identify and decrease the number of irregular migrants already within the 
territories of the receiving states.  However, there is a gap in the literature in focusing 
on other kinds of policies adopted towards irregular immigrants.  The literature has 
failed to ask whether or not receiving states develop policies of any other kind than 
control, exclusion, identification, and deportation.  More specifically, they have not 
questioned or analyzed theoretically whether or not receiving states enact any 
policies to protect the fundamental human rights of irregular migrants within their 
territories.
13
  This study will fill this gap in the literature, by investigating the policies 
whose function is to protect the fundamental rights of irregular migrants in the 
receiving states.  The intention is that this analysis will help to bring about a shift in 
the focus of policy analysis concerning irregular migration in general.  
                                                     
13
 There is some research done by civil society organizations, such as PICUM (Platform for 
International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants) , and FRA (The European Union Fundamental 
Rights Agency) that looks at the rights provided to irregular migrants within the territories of 
receiving states.  However, these are not theoretical studies of policy analysis. 
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2.2.4. The Life Situations of Irregular Migrants 
 The studies to be considered in this section reflect on the different dimensions 
of the life situations of irregular immigrants in receiving countries.  Some 
concentrate on immigrants‟ conditions in terms of their access to fundamental human 
rights; others focus on the ways in which they accommodate and cope with their 
irregular migrant status; others reconsider general understandings of citizenship, state 
sovereignty and related terms based on the life situations of irregular migrants in 
receiving states. 
Taran (2000) argues that the application of human rights norms to non-
citizens, and especially to irregular migrants, is inadequate and imperfect.  In his 
study, Taran highlights the problem that irregular migrants remain “at the margin of 
protection by labour workplace safety, health, minimum wage and other standards; 
they often are employed in sectors where such standards are non-existent, non-
applicable or simply not respected or enforced” (2000: 14).  He argues further that 
the choice of the term „illegal‟ in official state approach to name these people further 
worsens their situation because, through this characterization, they are criminalized 
and implicitly placed “outside the scope and protection of the rule of law” (2000: 
11). 
 In another study, Krause uses the perspective provided by Hannah Arendt‟s 
work, such as The Origins of Totalitarianism to argue that undocumented migrants 
(or the “stateless”) lack “the right to have rights” and for that reason they are subject 
to total domination in the receiving state.  She argues that “[t]he fate of the stateless, 
when they appear in great numbers, calls attention to the fact that, for all practical 
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matters, the rights of man are still identified with the rights of citizen” (Krause, 2008: 
339).  She goes on to point out that stateless or undocumented migrants attracts 
attention to the anti-democratic nature of the existing nation-state system, in which it 
is the state which constitutes the citizenry rather than people constituting the state 
(Krause, 2008: 338).  In other words, the living conditions of irregular migrants in 
receiving states demonstrates that, in today‟s world, a person only has his basic 
human rights protected if he is a citizen of a particular country; otherwise, he doesn‟t 
have the “right to have rights”.  We can thus consider Krause‟s work as a critical 
analysis of discourse and thought positions undocumented migrants as „illegal‟ in the 
context of crime and criminality. 
Another work that deals with the life situation of irregular migrants studies 
their irregular presence in the receiving state in relation to the idea of citizenship 
(Varsanyi, 2006: 229-49).  She acknowledges that the line between citizens and non-
citizens − irregular immigrants in this case − influences the meaning and practice of 
citizenship.  Varsanyi supports an understanding of citizenship “in which full 
membership would not be dependent upon an explicit consent to enter and remain in 
a bounded community, as in the case with contemporary citizenship in the liberal 
democratic welfare state, but instead upon the mere reality of presence and residence 
in a place” (2006: 239).  Based on that, she reports how irregular immigrants into the 
United States are being considered as “de facto residents” of sub-national 
communities, and how, in some states, a variety of rights, such as those of voting, 
avoiding deportation, having a legally accepted identity, and attending a higher 
education institution, are being coded into local and state laws (Varsanyi, 2006: 244).  
As she points out, this is a necessary step because those who remain „illegal‟ in terms 
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of the discourse of the state are, “in many other ways, regular participants in the life 
of their communities” as neighbours, customers, workers, and parents to school 
children (Varsanyi, 2006: 240). 
Focusing on a different dimension of irregular migrants‟ life situations, 
McNevin (2007) studies the mobilization of irregular immigrants for political 
belonging in the United States during March, April and May 2006, and discusses the 
implications of their demands for the practices of the “political”, meaning “a radical 
questioning of what it means to belong” (2007: 656).  The starting point for McNevin 
is Laclau and Mouffe‟s argument that “democratic struggle relates not only to the 
rights and opportunities afforded to defined groups (citizens, for example) but also to 
the contestation of boundaries through which those groups themselves are defined” 
(as cited in McNevin, 2007: 656).  
She further argues that, when the state authorities punish and deter irregular 
immigrants, they reinforce the “territorial account of belonging”, which underpins 
the sovereignty of the state and its citizens.  Thus, irregular immigrants‟ claims for 
political rights challenge the territorial sovereignty and the definition of legitimate 
membership of the state. 
Erdemir and Vasta (2007) study the „irregular‟ dimension of Turkish 
immigrants to London over the last 20 years.  All the migrants in their sample have 
experienced a certain form of irregularity.  The main concerns of the study are how 
these people develop and manage specific work strategies that help them cope with a 
“deregularised” and “casualized” labour market, the problematic dichotomy between 
the regularity and irregularity of a migrant‟s status, and the role of solidarity among 
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migrant co-patriots in adapting to this irregularity.   
The authors‟ analysis indicates that solidarity between an irregular migrant 
and his/her co-patriots may not always be to the full advantage of the migrant. Even 
though this solidarity helps solve some problems arising from irregularity, it can also 
exploit the migrant both morally and materially. From another perspective, in order 
to manage their irregularity in the labour market, migrants have to accept jobs 
requiring skills well below their qualifications. Thus, a certain level of deskilling 
occurs among irregular Turkish migrants in London. Another finding of the study is 
that migrants are able to move between statuses of regularity and irregularity.  
However, although “most Turkish immigrants manage to regularize their 
immigration status over the years [, a] parallel regularization ... is not observed 
concerning their labour market status” (Erdemir and Vasta, 2007: 311). 
Another study, by Gibney (2000), compares the life situations of irregular 
migrants in three different countries, discovering very similar results. The study 
synthesizes three national country reports (for the UK, Germany, and Spain) 
prepared by the Jesuit Refugee Service in 1996.  In all three reports, interviews were 
conducted with irregular immigrants themselves, and/or with contacts having direct 
knowledge and experience of both the life experiences of the irregular immigrants 
and the national authorities.  Although different methodologies were adopted in each 
case, Gibney (2000) argues that the findings in each country report demonstrate 
striking similarities about the everyday life experiences of irregular migrants. 
Specifically, the life of irregular migrants is “a rightless existence without the basic 
protections of criminal and civil law and with no legal avenues by which to assert an 
  
 
52 
entitlement to just and humane treatment” (Gibney, 2000: n/a).  Moreover, due to 
their rightlessness, irregular migrants remain deprived of a public stage to express 
their grievances, thereby remaining “locked into a position of social and political 
invisibility” (Gibney, 2000: n/a). 
Another important contribution to research looking at the life situations of 
irregular migrants is Chavez‟s 1998 book Shadowed Lives.  This study provides a 
case study of the living conditions of irregular Mexican immigrants in the United 
States, in San Diego County.  Regarding the over-general and one-sided media 
coverage of undocumented migrants as “illegal aliens”, the author says: “I sensed 
that there was a great deal more to the study. Who were these people? I wondered 
about their lives, their motivations, and their aspirations for the future… What was 
missing was a sense of their everyday reality and experiences” (Chavez, 1998: xi).  
The author thus intended that the book should fill this gap, and the study thoroughly 
describes and analyzes the life situations of the participants.  In particular, it provides 
evidence about why these people chose to migrate, what their strategies were while 
crossing the border illegally, the housing conditions that they ended up with as 
irregular migrants, how they formed social networks through families and friends, 
and their fears and experiences of being an undocumented migrant. Chavez (1998) 
finds that these undocumented migrants have migrated mainly for economic reasons, 
and that they wish to find steady jobs.  Many of them live rough in canyons and 
ravines, under bushes, others in makeshift housing. Finally, no matter how long they 
have been living in the US, most of them fear the possibility of apprehension and 
deportation each and every day. 
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As this review illustrates, the literature looking at the life situations of 
irregular migrants is valuable in acknowledging their uneasy and unprotected life 
situations in receiving states.  These studies highlight that, although these people 
have not committed any crimes, they are identified as „illegal‟ which means that they 
remain deprived of their social, economic and political rights. Hence, survival 
becomes their number one goal in the receiving countries.  Therefore, studies looking 
at the life situations of irregular migrants are directly or indirectly highly critical of 
the „illegal‟ state approach adopted towards these migrants. However, what is 
missing in this literature is an analysis of the state‟s position regarding their life 
situations.  There is almost no analysis of what states „think‟ about the life situations 
of irregular migrants within their territories, and a lack of research into whether or 
not policy-makers feel obliged to improve the life situations of irregular migrants. By 
analyzing the irregular immigration policy-making process, and identifying the 
conditions under which the rights of „illegals‟ are protected, this study can help shed 
some light on these under-researched questions that have emerged in the literature on 
irregular migration. 
 
2.2.5. Concluding Remarks: The Gap in the Literature and the 
Contribution 
So far, I have reviewed the literature on irregular migration with the aim of 
situating my study within it, while also demonstrating how this study aims to 
contribute to the state of the art on irregular migration.  
One important gap within the literature is that the four different lines of 
research discussed here currently seem to be explaining different aspects of the 
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question in an exclusive manner.  Studies focusing on the very general characteristics 
of irregular migratory flows successfully show that there is this flow of people to 
certain regions from other parts of the world.  For most of the time, these people 
enter the receiving countries without the formal permission of the latter, thereby 
ending up as „illegals‟ in these countries. These studies, while useful, remain mainly 
descriptive, providing narratives and evidence on what goes on with respect to 
irregular migration. The literature on the political economy of irregular migration, 
meanwhile, shows that there are certain strong pull factors in receiving countries that 
attracts people from poorer regions of the world.  They demonstrate that the 
economies of receiving countries can easily absorb those „illegals‟ and that certain 
segments of their economies may actually gain from employing these people.  States 
therefore face a dilemma: on the one hand, they need to respond to the infringement 
of their immigration laws; on the other hand, this „illegal‟ labour can benefit certain, 
primarily capitalist, interests in their economies.   
In contrast to this line of research, studies on immigration control policies 
ignore this legal-economic dilemma, instead describing state policies that seek to 
identify, capture and exclude „illegals‟.  Such studies also appear to be blind 
regarding the existence of policies other than identification, detention and 
deportation.  In other words, the literature focusing on the policy-analysis of states 
towards irregular migrants disregards policies concerning the rights of irregular 
migrants.  While the final line of research, on the life situations of irregular migrants, 
usefully reports what rights irregular migrants have or have not been able to claim, it 
lacks a state perspective on the matter: of showing why and under what conditions 
states do protect the rights of irregular migrants. For this reason, the research 
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question of this study is deliberately located at the intersection of these two lines of 
research: studies on immigration control policies, and studies of immigrants‟ life 
situations.  To put it in another way, the research lies at the intersection of the 
“illegal” versus “rights-based” approach on irregular migration; hence it can provide 
an account that combines both the state approach and descriptions of how migrants 
actually lead their lives.  Therefore, by providing an answer to the question “What is 
the role of democratic accountability mechanisms (i.e. civil society activism and 
judicial review) in the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants who are 
already living within the receiving country?”, this thesis aims to fill a gap in the 
literature on irregular migration that has been created because these two lines of 
research have proceeded almost independently of each other.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
 
         3.1 Introduction: Research Questions and the Context 
        Research on comparative immigration policy has developed two distinct 
approaches (Freeman, 2007). The first approach focuses on cross-national variation 
in management of migration control and their political consequences. The second 
approach focuses on common problems that nation-states face and looks for evidence 
of convergence in the migration policies of different nation-states. “In practice, most 
serious studies involve some mixture of these two approaches, asking how diverse 
countries deal with common immigration problems” (Freeman, 2007: 27).  The main 
aim of this study, which also takes an eclectic approach, is to scrutinize the 
relationship between democratic accountability mechanisms and protection of the 
rights of irregular immigrants.  In doing this, it also aims to compare how three 
European countries, Greece, Spain and Turkey, deal with a common migration policy 
challenge: the treatment of irregular migrants within their borders. The existence of 
divergence and convergence is sought within the context of the three main questions: 
1. Is there a divergence or convergence among Greece, Spain and 
Turkey in the way they treat irregular migrants in relation to the 
recognition of these migrants‟ fundamental human rights? 
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2. What is the role of democratic accountability mechanisms (civil 
society activism and judicial review) in the protection of the rights of 
those irregular immigrants who are already living in the receiving 
country? 
 
and 
3. To what extent do democratic accountability mechanisms at the 
national level (such as the activism of pro-migrant organizations, 
human rights groups, trade unions and other civil society 
organizations together with judicial review) impact on the treatment 
of irregular migrants?  
 
Overall then, this research seeks to find out the variation or convergence 
among Greece, Spain and Turkey in their recognition of irregular migrants‟ 
fundamental social rights, specifically access to public health care systems and 
education, and while doing this it focuses on the integration of democratic 
accountability mechanisms to the politics of irregular immigration.  This chapter 
aims to compare and contrast the existing literature on migration policy-making in 
order to identify the main arguments relating to the treatment of aliens in general and 
to the above-stated questions in particular. 
 
3.2. Does International Human Rights Regime Explain the Treatment of 
Irregular Migrants? 
 
  Some studies focus on non-citizens‟ access to their rights as transnational actors 
through the legitimacy they receive from international human rights codes and 
norms. These studies highlight the power of international human rights regimes in 
fostering aliens‟ rights in a nation-state and by this way transforming the 
understanding of citizenship. As an illustration, in her classical work Limits of 
Citizenship, Soysal (1994) problematizes existing accounts of nation-state citizenship 
by asking:  “Why have European states extended the rights and privileges of their 
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citizens to migrant workers?”(2). In her comparative study of Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, she concludes that 
granting of rights to migrant workers has been shaped by the  “historically encoded 
membership systems” of the states concerned, and also by “global changes in the 
concept and organization of individual rights” (29).  Soysal argues that European 
states differ in their incorporation regimes with varying organizational structures and 
policy discourses, which affects how migrants (as well as citizens) “become 
incorporated into its [society‟s] legal and organizational structures and participate in 
various activities of the polity” (30).  However, what has actually made possible 
migrant workers‟ access to certain rights and privileges that were previously granted 
only to citizens is the new global human rights discourse that emerged in the Post-
war period and led to “postnational membership” (Soysal, 1994).  In the Post-World 
War II era, a universal approach on human rights emerged that has been formalized 
and coded within a multiplicity of international codes and regimes which influence a 
state‟s behaviour, not only towards its citizens but also towards non-citizens. “By 
setting norms, framing discourses, and engineering legal categories and legitimate 
models, they [international human rights regime] enjoin obligations on nation-states 
to take action” (Soysal, 1994: 149).                           
        Similar to Soysal, David Jacobson (1997) also emphasizes the role played by 
international human rights norms in transforming understandings of the nation-state 
and citizenship in that these norms make membership of a nation-state irrelevant for 
enjoying rights. He argues that by paying more attention to international laws and 
norms, now national courts rule over the “[p]rinciples of national self determination, 
national interest, the scope of a court‟s jurisdiction, and sovereignty” (106) and make 
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all these secondary to international human rights norms. As a result, the state turns 
into “a forum where transnational laws and norms are administered, mediated and 
enforced” (Jacobson, 1997: 106). 
The arguments put forward by Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1997), as well as 
by „globalists‟ like (Joppke, 1998), clearly show that, as post-national structures, 
international human rights regimes have a certain influence in creating a global 
acknowledgement of and adherence to the individual‟s rights as „human‟ rights 
instead of „citizen‟ rights; they also have the potential to oblige migrant receiving 
states to recognize the fundamental rights of aliens within their borders.  
        When one looks at various international human rights treaties, one can argue 
that the rights of irregular migrants are protected by almost all of the documents, as 
their main concern is the rights of man, rather than the rights of a citizen specifically.  
For example, the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants 
(PICUM) published an article which reviews the core human rights treaties that 
apply to undocumented migrants. The article clearly shows that rights to physical and 
mental integrity, health care, an adequate standard of living, fair labour conditions, 
education and equality before the law are granted and protected by certain articles of 
core international human rights treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965), the International Covenant on Economic and Social 
and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women  (1979), the Convention 
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Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1984), and the UN Declaration on Individuals Who Are not Nationals of the 
Country in Which They Live (1985) (Biocchi and LeVoy, 2007). Of particular 
significance is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), as it is the most relevant 
international human rights treaty protecting the rights of irregular migrants.   
        Therefore, „globalists‟ such as Soysal and Jacobson have a point when they 
argue that international human rights norms protect the rights of non-citizens and 
make nation-states protect the rights of not only their citizens but also aliens within 
their borders. However, when considered in terms of their capacity to protect the 
rights of „illegal‟ migrants per se, this argument needs more elaboration - especially 
in order to clarify whether it can form part of the explanation in this research as to 
what factors improve the liberalness of the treatment of irregular migrants. 
        It is useful to consider, as a starting point, whether undocumented migrants have 
become direct objects of protection, as in the case of women or children within the 
framework of any international human rights treaty.  
Bosniak (1991) highlights the point that, prior to the 1990 UN International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families (ICRMW), protection of the human rights of irregular migrants as a 
distinct group did not exist, either in international or in regional conventions on 
human rights. The only exception to that was the ILO Convention number 143 
(1978),
14
 which states under Article 9: 
                                                     
14
This ILO convention has not been ratified by Spain, Greece or Turkey. 
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Without prejudice to measures designed to control movements of migrants for 
employment by ensuring that migrant workers enter national territory and are 
admitted to employment in conformity with the relevant laws and regulations, 
the migrant worker shall, in cases in which these laws and regulations have 
not been respected and in which his position cannot be regularised, enjoy 
equality of treatment for himself and his family in respect of rights arising out 
of past employment as regards remuneration, social security and other 
benefits. 
Additionally, another international convention, the UN Declaration on the 
human rights of individuals who are not nationals of the country in which they live 
(1985), also addressed the human rights of undocumented migrants. However, the 
declaration has not been much of use as it is non-binding and fails to cover clearly or 
comprehensively the rights and the specific conditions and needs of undocumented 
migrants (Bosniak, 1991). On the other hand, when it comes to the 1990 ICRMW, 
Bosniak states that the Convention protects the “vast majority of migrants in an 
irregular status in the territory of contracting states” (1991: 740). This obliges state 
parties to offer undocumented migrants “a range of civil, social, and labour rights” 
that include, among others, “due process of law in criminal proceedings, free 
expression and religious observance, domestic privacy, equality with nationals before 
the courts, emergency medical care, education for children, respect for cultural 
identity, and process rights in the detention and deportation context” (740-741). 
Thus, “[t]he Convention advances how the international community conceives the 
application of human rights in its provisions for „equality of treatment‟ between 
female and male migrant workers, between documented and undocumented workers, 
and between nationals and non-nationals” (von Oswald and Schmelz, 2009: 22).  
Nevertheless, the Convention is still somewhat ambivalent in relation to the 
protection of the rights of undocumented migrants.  
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First of all, the Convention exhibits a certain reluctance while protecting the 
rights of migrants, as it prioritizes national sovereignty, particularly regarding 
regularizations of irregular or undocumented statuses. An example of this situation is 
stated in Article 35 of Part III: 
Nothing in the present part of the Convention shall be interpreted as implying 
the regularization of the situation of migrant workers or members of their 
families who are non-documented or in an irregular situation or any right to 
such regularization of their situation. 
In relation to this, Bosniak (1991) argues that the Convention provides only 
partial protection to undocumented migrants as it over-emphasizes the sovereign 
rights of the state while trying to reach a balance between state sovereignty and the 
protection of migrants‟ rights. In other words, “the Convention accommodates the 
competing concerns about sovereignty and human rights by substantially 
incorporating them both. It counterposes rights narrowed by state immigration 
interests against state immigration interests curtailed - though only minimally - by 
rights” (Bosniak, 1991: 758). Thus, “in an international society in which state 
sovereignty remains the paramount ordering principle, undocumented migrants 
present human rights law with an especially hard case” (Bosniak, 1991:765). 
The treatment of undocumented migrants by the Convention becomes yet 
more ambivalent when the protection of undocumented migrants‟ rights is 
considered in relation to the protection of documented migrants‟ rights. On that 
matter, Bosniak (1991) refers to the following part of the Convention:  
While contracting states must meet the minimum standard of treatment of 
irregular migrants prescribed in Part III of the Convention, the rights provided 
these migrants need not be as extensive as those which must be afforded to 
migrant workers and members of their families who are in regular situation in 
the state of employment. State parties are entitled to discriminate against 
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undocumented migrants with respect to rights to family unity, liberty of 
movement, participation in the public affairs of the state of employment, 
equality of treatment with nationals as regards the receipt of various social 
services, equality of treatment for family members, freedom from double 
taxation, and further employment protections and trade union rights, among 
others. (Part IV and V of Convention, Articles 36-56 and 57-63, and Article 
70.) (741) 
Together with these ambiguities towards the protection of the rights of 
irregular migrants, the ICRMW has one other very important shortcoming:  it was 
signed as of 2009 only by 57 countries, almost all of which are in fact migrant 
sending countries, such as Senegal, Mexico, Ghana, Bangladesh, and Azerbaijan. In 
other words, none of the migrant receiving countries signed it, including the 
European Union member states, the United States, Canada and Australia as of 
August 2011.  
This discussion on international treaties in general and the ICRMW in 
particular challenges the claim that international human rights norms compel states to 
protect the rights of aliens because of the evidence of non-compliance, particularly 
on matters concerning irregular migrants. That is, there are doubts regarding the 
capacity of these norms to oblige nation states to provide social protection for 
everyone within their borders by suggesting that the rights of persons are 
independent of their rights as citizens. Furthermore, the extent of such obligations to 
protect deriving from international norms is even more critical and problematic in 
relation to the rights of irregular migrants, whose presence within the state more or 
less contradicts the laws governing existing aliens in those states. Therefore, Soysal‟s 
and Jacobson‟s works are important as they constitute a reference point that 
legitimizes the protection of the rights of irregular migrants in the international arena. 
However, international human rights norms are incapable of becoming powerful 
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inhibitors that may block the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies 
at the national level so as to make the treatment of irregular migrants more liberal. 
That is, international human rights norms do not explain why and to what extent 
states protect irregular migrants‟ rights.  
 
3.3. Democratic Accountability Mechanisms 
It has been argued that a major polemic in the migration field has emerged 
around the question of to what extent or how effectively liberal nation states can 
control immigration (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2007: 6).  Discussions formulated 
around this „polemic‟ dispute whether there are certain liberal constraints on states 
while they are trying to control or restrict the number of foreigners coming into their 
territories.  Guiraudon and Lahav (2007) argue that, during immigration policy-
making, “policy-makers in liberal democracies need to reconcile security interests 
and traditional concerns of publics with those of liberal norms and free trade” (8).  
They add that, while making these calculations concerning their existing interests, 
state institutions shape various logics (e.g. labour market logic, populism logic, 
security logic).  Additionally, they also influence which actors prevail in the policy 
field (9). Thus, according to Guiraudon and Lahav (2007), variation among countries 
in terms of their migration policies happens as the result of the varying “institutional 
make-up” of these countries (9).   
This study similarly questions whether or not there are any such liberal 
constraints upon nation-states in their treatment of irregular migrants‟ rights, such as 
access to health care and education.  The democratic accountability mechanisms of 
civil society activism and judicial activism are considered as liberal constraints that 
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may positively impact on the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants.  In 
other words, I argue that, rather than variations in the influence of post-national 
structures, such as international human rights norms or Europeanization
15
, it is the 
impact of civil society activism and judicial activism as democratic accountability 
mechanisms that has the potential to improve state policies and political outcomes 
concerning the rights of irregular immigrants.  
The reason for focusing specifically on democratic accountability 
mechanisms rather than any other political variable can be related to broader 
theoretical discussions within comparative politics concerned with the interaction 
between state and society, and parallel discussions on structure versus agency as 
explanatory variables. More specifically, these discussions advance the following 
questions in the comparative politics literature. While explaining a particular policy 
outcome, in this case protection of irregular immigrants‟ fundamental rights, should 
researchers consider the state and its related actions as mere reflections of society 
and societal pressures, or should they treat the state as an autonomous agent, which 
has a certain independence from societal pressures? Additionally, as a parallel line of 
discussion, should researchers consider a policy outcome as a product of individual 
actions, interactions, or a product of broader structural pressures, such as socio-
economic systems? 
Both of these theoretical discussions have their origins in 19
th
 century 
theorizing on society and social change by influential theorists like Auguste Comte, 
Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Concerning the first question, which 
focuses on the interaction between state and society, a tendency emerged, especially 
within the structural-functional, Marxist, and pluralist accounts of the 1950s and 
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 A discussion on the possible effect of the European Union is made in a following section of the 
chapter.  
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1960s, “to reduce politics to society, to see the nature of governments and states 
mainly as the outgrowth of certain social patterns” (Migdal et al., 1994: 2).  These 
accounts of the political were heavily criticised, and in the 1970s and 1980s a rival 
approach emerged that emphasized more Weberian accounts of state-society 
interactions. That is, more „statist‟ accounts of politics were developed that 
considered the state as being more than a simple extension of broader social 
structures. One of the most prominent theories within this rival literature was put 
forward by Theda Skocpol in Bringing the State Back In (1985). Skocpol emphasized 
that there is a certain degree of “autonomous state action” that should lead one to 
consider the state as an “actor” in itself.   
 
Until recently, most work on the determinants of social policies has 
emphasized their socioeconomic roots and has treated states as if they were 
merely arenas of political conflict or passive administrative tools to be turned 
to the purposes of any social group that gains governmental power. Currently, 
however, scholars are exploring ways in which social policymaking may be 
shaped by the organizational structures and capacities of states and by the 
political effects of previously enacted policies. In short, states are being 
reconceptualised as partially autonomous actors and as consequential 
structures and sets of policies. (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 147) 
 
Skocpol‟s argument illustrates how the related literature has sought to 
disentangle the state from society in order to highlight the complexity of the former. 
Migdal reviewed these and similar accounts from the state-oriented literature in order 
to develop a more balanced view of the state-society interaction by formulating a 
perspective of “State in Society” (1994, 2003). While Migdal agreed with previous 
critics that it was misleading to view the state as a mere reflection of society or 
societal pressures, for him it was also misleading to perceive the state as a “holistic” 
and “organic entity” independent of societal structures and pressures. In other words, 
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according to Migdal, some of the studies within the „statist‟ literature had gone too 
far while disentangling the state from society.  According to Migdal et al. (1994), 
“[s]tates are parts of societies. States may help mold, but they are also continuously 
molded by, the societies within which they are embedded” (2).  In other words, “[t]he 
state is not a fixed ideological entity. Rather it embodies an ongoing dynamic, a 
changing set of goals, as it engages other social groups” (Migdal, 1994: 12). He adds 
that “[r]esistance offered by other social forces to the designs of the state, as well as 
the incorporation of groups into the organization of the state, change its social and 
ideological underpinnings” (Migdal, 1994: 12). The way that I study particular forms 
of irregular immigration policies in relation to democratic accountability mechanisms 
carries a similar theoretical orientation in relation to the state-society interaction as 
put forward by Migdal. If protection of the rights of irregular immigrants is 
considered to be a political outcome, I argue that this outcome must be the result of a 
complex interplay between the state and the society, and I think that the concept of 
democratic accountability mechanisms, by including a notion of civil society 
activism, perfectly illustrates this complex interplay as put forward by Migdal. First, 
in this way, I recognise that in the production of this outcome the state should not be 
totally autonomous from the society in which it is embedded. That is, the existence 
of different goals and principles in a society has the potential to “mold” a state‟s pre-
existing goals, principles and priorities.  Although Migdal (1994) did not equate the 
society/societal influence to civil society, I would claim that the activities of pro-
immigrant civil society represent a “social force” that reflects a particular segment of 
society in which the state is embedded, and which has the potential to offer resistance 
to its policies. Thus, the inclusion of civil society activism through the concept of 
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democratic accountability mechanisms in the attempt to understand the development 
of a particular irregular immigration policy also provides the particular stance from 
which I view the interaction of state and society. However, my inclusion of civil 
society activism as a theoretical frame to understand a particular policy outcome is 
rather different from pluralist accounts of politics and state, as I also recognise the 
complex organization of the state as put forward by both Skocpol (1985) and Migdal 
(1994) in rather different ways.  This distinction becomes clearer in relation to both 
Migdal‟s second criticism towards the „statist literature‟ in disaggregating the state, 
and also in later discussions on structure versus agency.  
Migdal (1994) also criticizes the „statist‟ literature for considering the state as 
“holistic” in that it disregarded the existence of multiple layers within the state 
structure, that include officials, bureaucrats, top executives, and also various offices, 
such as legislative bodies, courts, police units and so on.  Thus, Migdal (1994) 
recommends us “to disaggregate the state” rather than treat it as an “organic entity” 
(16).  The use of the concept of democratic accountability mechanisms while 
explaining political outcomes concerning the rights of irregular immigrants is also 
important as the concept includes a recognition of both vertical or bottom-up 
mechanisms of accountability (i.e. civil society activism) and horizontal mechanisms 
of accountability that happen across different institutions, agencies and offices of the 
state structure, such as the judicial review of legislation. Thus, Migdal (1994) argues, 
the state is a complex organization that should be disaggregated. Within the different 
layers of the state structure, different goals and principles may be operating towards 
a particular policy. Based on the existing literature regarding the courts‟ impact on 
immigration policies (such as Joppke, 1998 and Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000) I 
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propose that judicial activism has the potential to push irregular immigration policies 
in different directions. For this reason, I include judicial activism/review within my 
conceptualisation of democratic accountability mechanisms. In this way, I also, like 
Migdal (1994), refrain from treating the state as a “holistic” and “organic entity”.  
This inclusion also distances the theoretical framework of this study from purely 
pluralist accounts of political outcomes, as the democratic accountability concept 
adopted here recognises that there is more to a policy outcome than the mere 
inclusion of different societal interests.  
This last point relates also to the second parallel theoretical debate in the 
comparative politics literature concerning structure versus agency approaches in 
explaining political outcomes. “These two approaches demonstrate two different 
kinds of explanatory strategies in social science - one from structure to action, the 
other from action to structure” (Wang, 2010: 101).  The former approach claims that 
political outcomes are a result of grand socio-economic or political structures of 
some kind. As an illustration, classical Marxists claim that the economic structure of 
a society also determines its political and cultural structures, and various political 
outcomes (Wang, 2010).  On the other hand, the state could also be considered as a 
general, holistic structure that determines the development of particular policies and 
political outcomes. Goldstone (2010), for example, states the following on this 
matter:  
Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, myself, and others of that ilk were just material 
structuralists; we thought that one could build a story of pivotal historical 
moments from a description of the material resources that states, elites, and 
popular groups had, or fought over, and could bring to bear on their conflicts. 
The younger generation turned to culture, but they were for the most part 
cultural structuralists. … [T]hey are talking about how cultural structures 
constrain and drive social behaviour (359). 
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The latter approach pays more attention to the role played by “revolutionary 
leaders”, “different concepts and visions of social and political change”, and to the 
“interactions” of different “personalities and events” operating at both societal and 
state levels (Goldstone, 2010: 366). In other words, complex forms of individual 
action and interaction at different levels of state and society are considered to provide 
the main explanations of political outcomes.  For example, according to pluralist 
theories, which can be considered as providing an agency approach, policy outcomes 
result from the complex interactions between various societal actors and interests, 
with the state being merely a venue for these interactions and negotiations (Wang, 
2010). 
In putting forward his “state in society” perspective, Migdal criticises both 
purely structural theories of the state that perceive it as an organic whole, and also 
purely agency-based explanations such as pluralist theories. In line with Migdal‟s 
arguments, this research also refrains from offering either purely structural or purely 
agency based explanations of the protection of irregular immigrants‟ rights. In other 
words, my study is neither structural nor agency based, but employs an integrated 
view of structure and agency: I do not consider the state as a holistic or organic 
structure that is the source of a totally “autonomous” repertoire of actions.  Instead, I 
also take into account the interactions between state and society during the 
development of policies, together with the existence of diverging goals and 
principles at different levels of the state, specifically, the policy orientations of the 
judiciary. Therefore, I both disaggregate the state and also take into account policy 
resistance coming from the societal level by including in my analysis the activities of 
pro-immigrant civil society organizations. On the other hand, this study also rejects 
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merely agency based explanations because, to a certain extent, I also recognise that 
the state has a certain level of autonomy regarding its policies concerning irregular 
immigration, and may act as a solid structure.  In other words, I also consider the 
state as having a pre-established policy orientation concerning the irregular 
immigration issue that has not necessarily resulted from interactions with societal 
influences. As a result, I think that state can mold societal interests, just as it can in 
turn be molded by these interests, as proposed by Migdal (1994). I therefore argue 
that the concept of democratic accountability perfectly integrates the structure versus 
agency debate, as it allows the researcher to disaggregate the state by taking into 
account different levels of action within it, and also enables the integration of 
societal pressures and resistances to particular policy outcomes into the analysis.   
 
3.3.1. Democratic Accountability as Catalyst for ‘Good’ Treatment of 
Irregular Migrants 
There is a significant number of studies analysing the concept of democratic 
accountability, either at national or global levels (for some examples, see Schedler, 
1999; Held, 2004; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Bovens, 2007; Philp, 2009; Heritier 
and Lehmkuhl, 2011). In this study, I am particularly concerned with the democratic 
accountability mechanisms that operate at the national level.  
For Schedler (1999), accountability has two main connotations: 
“answerability” and “enforcement”. Answerability requires the monitoring and 
justification of policies. Thus, accountability brings with it the obligation to release 
information on one‟s actions, and the duty to offer explanations in order to justify 
them. Enforcement, meanwhile, involves the reward or the punishment for these 
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actions, which not only includes particular policies, but also the overall nature of the 
policies that have been subject to “answerability”.  
Generally, the democratization literature differentiates between two types of 
accountability: vertical and horizontal. According to Schedler (1999), horizontal 
accountability develops among equals. In other words, different state institutions and 
offices hold each other accountable without being involved in a hierarchical 
interaction.  Judicial review is a good example of horizontal accountability. Vertical 
accountability, on the other hand, occurs between unequals, among whom political 
power is unequally distributed. One good example of vertical accountability is 
electoral accountability, where the citizens sit in judgment over incumbent elected 
officials. Diamond and Morlino (2005) add to this definition of vertical 
accountability justification for the actions of government officials, demanded, 
monitored and questioned by civil society organizations. As they put it, “[t]he 
dynamics of vertical accountability extend beyond elections and the interplay 
between voters and their elected representatives, encompassing also the efforts of 
civic associations, NGOs, social movements, think tanks, and the mass media to hold 
government accountable in between elections” (Diamond and Morlino,  2005: xix).  
In other words, civil society participation, or the activism of various civil society 
organizations can be considered as a particular form of democratic accountability.  
This study adopts these definitions of democratic accountability in order to 
question how civil society organizations, operating at the national level as vertical 
accountability mechanisms, manage to influence the treatment of irregular 
immigrants with respect to their rights, and also how these mechanisms influence the 
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rights conditions of irregular immigrants. This research also explores the effect of 
judicial review as a horizontal accountability mechanism on the rights conditions of 
irregular immigrants. In relation to these questions, I propose that, in the domestic 
context, these mechanisms do have the potential to positively influence the rights 
conditions of irregular immigrants because, as put forward in the previous section, 
these mechanisms may have different policy goals and principles and they may have 
the potential to provide social resistance against the state‟s policies and politics. 
Therefore, I propose that the activism of pro-immigrant organizations of civil society 
may improve the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants by the state. In 
addition, I also propose that judicial activism concerning the protection of the rights 
of irregular immigrants, as an activation of a horizontal accountability mechanism, 
also has the potential to improve the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants, 
as it may have different policy goals and principles that are more inclusive of 
irregular immigrants than those of the legislative and executive branches of the state.  
 
3.3.2. National Courts and Jurisdiction as Democratic Accountability 
Mechanisms 
Joppke (1998) is critical of the „globalists‟ arguments, simply because these 
arguments put the sole emphasis on international human rights norms in explaining 
the protection of the rights of migrants and the limits on state sovereignty. He 
believes that such arguments “avoid the „detailed process-tracing‟ by which 
international human rights laws‟ soft power may become domestically effective” 
(269). He further argues that “accepting unwanted immigration is inherent in the 
liberalness of liberal states” (292). Although there has been a „zero-immigration 
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policy‟ in most European states, these states have nevertheless accepted more and 
more immigrants since the 1970s. According to Joppke (1998), this situation is the 
result of legal processes: legal constraints arising from liberal national constitutions 
in combination with moral obligations have produced a “self-limited sovereignty” so 
that European states continue to accept unwanted immigrants. That is, they are 
“bound by the rule of law, which in important respects protects the rights of persons 
and not just of citizens” (268).  Joppke (1998) concludes that “[n]ot globally limited, 
but self limited sovereignty explains why states accept unwanted immigrants” (270).   
I think that Joppke‟s explanation of the liberalness of liberal states refers in 
fact to those horizontal accountability mechanisms operating within a democratic 
state against governmental actions. In his example, European states have sought to 
close the doors to further immigration, but this has proved impossible due to these 
states‟ liberal constitutions, which activate legal processes on behalf of the protection 
of the fundamental rights of both citizens and non-citizens alike. Viewed through the 
lens of the democratization literature, such an emphasis on the protection of rights 
appears to emanate from the presence of horizontal accountability in a democratic 
regime.   
Similarly to Joppke, Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) also ask two important 
questions. “To what extent do international legal instruments constrain the actions of 
national policy makers?” “How have nation-states reacted to international constraints 
and problems of policy implementation?” (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000: 163/ 
abstract). Guiraudon and Lahav recognize the possibility that international norms 
have a certain capacity to restrict and limit shared understandings on treatment of 
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non-citizens. However, they also argue that the influence of international norms on 
human rights should not be overemphasized, as these have certain limitations when it 
comes to their universal application irrespective of citizenship status to all foreigners. 
For example, states reserve political rights mainly to their citizens. I put forward the 
same argument in the previous section on international human rights norms, while 
arguing that the mere existence of these norms is insufficient for providing answers 
to the research questions addressed in this study. Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) also 
emphasise that “the prerogatives of a nation-state when it comes to refusing access, 
residence, or naturalization to its territory have not been put into question” (168) in 
international norms. As a result, according to Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), these 
norms protect the rights of foreigners to a certain extent; however, what actually 
stops these states from imposing more restrictive measures on foreigners‟ rights are 
the liberal domestic norms which are guaranteed by constitutions, legislation and 
jurisprudence. Thus, Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) provide an argument similar to 
Joppke‟s (1998), while acknowledging the rule of the European Court of Human 
Rights as an example of this situation. They suggest that, “rather than breaking new 
ground, the ECHR has confirmed, reinforced, and clarified the pertinence of pre-
existing national legal principles” in relation to the protection of foreigners‟ rights 
(Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000: 171).  In this argument, one observes that the power of 
national level protection is claimed to be stronger than post-national protection at 
both the international and the European level.  In another study, Guiraudon (2000B) 
supports this thesis. She analyses the extent to which the norms of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Justice on non-EU 
nationals (as foreigners and non-citizens) can affect domestic law. She finds that 
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there is only a “limited legal basis on which European courts can apply human rights 
to protect non-nationals” (1114), and that, even when there is such a basis, the ECHR 
is reluctant to use its power. As a result, Guiraudon (2000B) concludes that the 
jurisprudence of the European Courts “followed the development of national laws, 
regulations and court rulings that upheld similar values” (1114). “The building 
blocks had been laid at the national level to be reasserted internationally, 
strengthening the chances that the norms would diffuse downwards again.” (1114) 
        Thus, it is not global human rights regimes that protect aliens‟ rights and 
constrain sovereign state behaviour, but instead it is national democratic human 
rights discourses that constrain arbitrary state behaviour, mainly through national 
legal processes that activate national constitutions. This explanation, similarly 
provided by Joppke (1998), Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), can also be expressed in 
terms of the discussions on horizontal accountability, where national courts, hence 
the national judiciary, emerge as an important democratic accountability mechanism 
through the cases being opened against restrictive government actions for denying 
the rights and freedoms of all people, not only citizens. Therefore, these discussions 
on national courts‟ activism concerning foreigners‟ rights emerge as another possible 
answer to the research questions of this study.  In other words, it is important to 
explore whether or not the judiciary and national courts emerge in practical terms as 
active supporters of the rights of irregular migrants and if they do, whether or not this 
activism could also account for divergences in treatment across countries.  
        The role of the national judiciary in protecting the rights of non-citizens has also 
been put into question through case studies.  For example, Statham and Geddes 
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(2007) argue (with regard to the British case) that the national judiciary has a certain 
potential to check the restrictionist policies of the executive and the legislative, so 
that sometimes they even protect the rights of migrants. However, they go on to 
argue that the courts‟ role and actions are “more ambivalent” than Joppke (1998) 
believes (55): “Our evidence shows a British judiciary that is visible and 
expansionist within limits, but clearly not to an extent that could potentially curb the 
strongly prominent and restrictionist government.” (54-5). That is, national courts 
and judicial review have the potential to protect the rights of irregular migrants by 
monitoring, questioning or even overturning the decisions of the executive for being 
against human rights norms; yet, as Statham and Geddes (2007) show, in practice, 
judicial review may not be as powerful as has been theorized, at least not for each 
and every democratic rule.  In this study as well, it is proposed that the national 
judiciary‟s influence is rather limited as compared to the activism of civil society on 
this matter. Nevertheless, it is still important to question the involvement (or not) of 
the courts to determine how accountability works in a democratic regime in a 
specific policy area.  
         
3.3.3. Civil Society as a Democratic Accountability Mechanism 
Civil society entails the citizens of a state acting in a collective manner in the 
public sphere to articulate and exchange their interests, preferences, ideas, etc.  The 
goal of coming together in this manner is to make demands of the state, to hold the 
politicians accountable and to improve the structure and functioning of the state 
(Diamond 1999). In a democratic regime, civil society organizations, such as civic 
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associations, NGOs, social movements and think tanks, act as significant 
accountability mechanisms.  
        In migration studies, the impact of civil society organizations on the nature of 
policies has been scrutinized in various studies.  Freeman (1995, 2007), for example, 
can be counted as one of those investigating the impact of civil society on migration 
policy-making, although his main concern is not necessarily the role of civil society. 
He depicts the ways in which civil society organizations participate in migration 
policy-making to cause the emergence of different types of policies and politics 
around the issue. His discussions have important implications for the concerns of the 
present research, as they are concerned with the involvement of actors other than the 
government in the policy-making process.    
        Freeman (2007) adopts a rather unusual approach while explaining migration 
policy-making. He starts with the idea that different types of immigration produce 
different types of immigration policies and politics.  Thus, his starting point carries 
similarities with the classical distinction made by Tomas Hammar (1985) between 
immigration policy concerning the management of flows and immigrant policy on 
the treatment of foreigners once they are within the state.  Freeman argues that there, 
different “modes of politics” emerge around different kinds of migration policy. For 
example, permanent residence visa policy has “concentrated benefits” only for a 
certain group of people, such as visa holders, their families and employers.  On the 
other hand, the policy does not have “concentrated costs” for any specific group as 
“[n]o one bears any direct cost for any particular visa granted” (32), but instead it 
might have “diffuse costs” as it is a certain type of distributive policy. As a result, a 
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“client mode of politics” emerges around a permanent residence visa migration 
policy (Freeman, 2007).  
         Freeman also considers the management of illegal immigration flows at the 
borders, although he does not refer to the policies adopted towards irregular migrants 
who are already within the country.  In the present study, I consider the treatment of 
irregular migrants as a specific immigration policy type within the same analytical 
framework as Freeman‟s, and the modes of politics that emerge around it are more or 
less similar to those emerging around asylum policy as described by Freeman (2007): 
a regulatory kind of policy with diffuse benefits and concentrated costs, producing 
entrepreneurial politics. 
        According to Freeman, asylum politics is a relatively recent development 
featuring “agitated publics, mobilised interest groups, partisan conflict, and, in some 
instances, activist national courts.” (2007: 38).  For him, asylum policy has two 
distinct parts: management of asylum seekers who are on their way, and resettlement 
of refugees. “Asylum and refugee policies exhibit characteristics of concentrated 
distributive, redistributive, and regulatory politics” (39). Client politics emerge more 
around the granting of refugee status than the management of asylum-seeking. 
However, the main clients are not possible refugees, but rather “humanitarian groups 
promoting a generous programme” such as human rights organizations, international 
NGOs, and churches, whereas the national courts “„have emerged as arbiters of 
refugee rights” (39).  Freeman also makes the point that these groups are not very 
powerful and are unable to exert as much of an influence in the policy-making 
process as “those actors organised around migrant streams where significant material 
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interests are at stake”(39).  
        On the other hand, the management of asylum seeking or the processing of 
asylum applications occurs within a different atmosphere in which the political 
discourse is more contentious and securitized, where “the costs of asylum seeking 
overshadow its benefits” (Freeman, 2007). Therefore, it must be treated as having a 
mixture of redistributive and regulatory politics. There are public costs of the asylum 
process, for instance, for welfare benefits. On the other hand, there is also a system 
of regulation in which “individual citizens benefit only marginally, whereas those 
whose claims are denied or delayed bear the costs of enforcement” (Freeman, 2007: 
40).   
I would argue that the treatment of irregular migrants already within the 
country, including the recognition of their fundamental human rights by providing 
certain social services, exhibits certain characteristics of asylum politics. The 
granting of certain rights to irregular migrants, such as access to health care and 
education for their children, leads to “concentrated benefits” (Freeman, 2007) only 
for the migrants themselves. However, there are also public costs, as in the case of 
the asylum process directly for welfare benefits. Additionally, the political discourse 
around irregular migration is much more contentious and securitised than for the 
asylum process, as these migrants‟ presence within the state is problematic in relation 
to existing aliens‟ laws, and they are perceived and referred to as “illegal” most of 
the time. Thus, irregular migrants are usually a relatively narrow and powerless, 
although distinct and disadvantaged, group. Furthermore, their being regarded as 
“illegal”, means they lack the capacity to interact legally with national institutions to 
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access the resources necessary to mobilize, organize and influence policy makers. 
Nevertheless, in the case of irregular migrants too, humanitarian groups, international 
NGOs, churches, sometimes trade unions, and various other civil society 
organizations become “clients” who advocate the rights of irregular migrants.   
        Adopting Freeman‟s analytical framework (1995, 2007) reveals who might be 
the stakeholders in the policy-making process concerning irregular migrants, while 
also providing certain insights into the nature of the relationship between these actors 
and the government. However, Freeman does not investigate the impact of such non-
governmental actors, onto the liberalness of the policies being adopted towards 
foreigners, although his analysis provides certain hints on this matter. Therefore, it is 
important to explore to what extent these actors have the power to compel states to 
recognise the rights of irregular migrants, and following that, whether they can bring 
about a divergence among the countries in terms of the degree that they recognise 
irregular migrants‟ human rights.  Taking this into account, this study considers those 
clients, and the activism of pro-migrant organizations, human rights groups, trade 
unions and other civil society organizations and movements, as democratic 
accountability mechanisms at the national level that have the potential to influence 
policy-making on irregular migration. 
Statham and Geddes (2007)
 
also examine the role of civil society, or the  
“organized public”, in immigration politics, and question “to what extent the „public‟ 
- i.e., organised sectors of civil society – exerts influence over policies, and whether 
it pressurises them toward restrictionism or expansionism” (50).  They criticise 
Freeman‟s (2007) explanation of immigration politics and civil society participation 
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through objective interests, and the objective cost and benefit calculations of 
immigration politics. As they put it: 
Collective mobilisation is not a direct outcome of the distributed costs and 
benefits of immigration policies, but of the extent and way immigration is 
politicised and publicly mediate, and how certain positions are made to 
appear more feasible, reasonable and legitimate, compared to alternative 
definitions of political reality. Particularly important is how powerful political 
elites, acting through institutions and discourses, shape opportunities for other 
collective actors to perceive their material and symbolic interests, and see 
themselves as sufficiently affected to collectively mobilise, or not. (Statham 
and Geddes, 2007: 51-2) 
Their findings suggest, firstly, that civil society in Britain is in favour of 
expansionist immigration policies that support the rights and interests of the 
constituency of migrants, while extreme right and anti-immigration organizations 
have only a rather very small scale presence. Secondly, they show that the NGOs 
concerned specifically with migrants‟ rights and welfare are the dominant actors 
within the pro-migrant civil society, rather than employers and ethnic minorities, as 
had been claimed by Freeman (1995, 2007).  Finally, their findings indicate that 
trade unions, churches, professional groups, solidarity, human rights and welfare 
NGOs, and anti-racist organisations also share the same interests with specifically 
immigrant-focused NGOs, although they are less vocal in their claims. 
Utilising a social movement research approach, Laubenthal (2007) seeks to 
explain the development of pro-regularization movements at the civil society level in 
France, Spain and Switzerland through a comparative perspective.  The goal of her 
research is to identify certain preconditions in domestic contexts that enable the 
emergence of irregular migrants‟ pro-regularization movements. Laubenthal (2007) 
argues that immigrant and civil society organizations are at the centre of the pro-
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regularisation movements. In the Spanish case, she argues that “the core supporters 
of the protests were newly founded actors. These were anti-racism and human rights 
groups that represented a new segment of civil society, which criticised Spanish 
immigration policy from a human rights and/or anti-globalisation perspective and 
endorsed an unconventional action repertoire” (125).  
        That is, civil society organizations appear as the main supporters of the cause of 
irregular migrants in national settings. Acting as important democratic accountability 
mechanisms, they appear to have the potential to attract attention to the strict and 
undemocratic nature of existing policies concerning irregular migration. However, 
this raises one important question: Once these organizations have the ability to put 
pressure on the policy makers, are they also effective enough to change the nature of 
policies toward irregular migrants and alleviate the rights and conditions of irregular 
migrants?  
        The studies by Freeman (1995, 2007), Statham and Geddes (2007), and 
Laubenthal (2007) all illustrate that civil society activism already includes a pro-
migrant stance before governmental actions and civil society organizations emerge as 
important stakeholders pressing for less restrictive policies.  My research also 
follows the same line as these studies, as it examines the impact of civil society 
organizations on the protection of the rights of irregular migrants.  However, as an 
important extension to these studies, the present research takes their discussions one 
step further by also questioning whether or not civil society organizations are 
actually active enough in practical terms to bring about a more liberal policy in the 
relatively less-researched policy area of irregular migrants. Additionally, by focusing 
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on three different cases, I also question whether or not civil society organizations 
have the capacity to bring about divergence among different countries in terms of the 
protection of irregular migrants‟ rights.   
 
3.4. Europeanization as a Background 
In Europe there is an increasing trend toward harmonization and convergence 
of laws and regulations concerning irregular migration due to European integration in 
the areas of justice, freedom and security. However, these policies are mainly 
concerned with the management of irregular migration at Europe‟s borders. Thus, 
Europeanization in this policy field dictates certain types of policies that mainly aim 
to stop or prevent illegal border crossings. Some of the main policies of the European 
Union (EU) on irregular migration are as follows: cooperation with third countries on 
issues such as joint patrols and surveillance; further strengthening of the borders; 
fighting against human trafficking; tackling illegal employment; developing a return 
policy; improving information exchange between member states.
16
  When it comes to 
those irregular migrants who are already within the country, EU countries do not 
have a fully developed position and policy in terms of fundamental social and human 
rights. Some of the suggested measures relating to these migrants concern tackling 
illegal employment through employer sanctions and developing an effective return 
policy. Regarding regularisations, the EU has proposed that:  
[g]iven the limited information available on practices, effects and impacts of 
regularisation measures, a study will be conducted which would constitute the 
basis for future discussions on this issue, including on whether there is a need 
                                                     
16
 A more detailed summary of the EU policies on irregular immigration is available on the official 
website of “Justice and Home Affairs” Retrieved December 26, 2011 from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/illegal/fsj_immigration_illegal_en.htm#part_2 
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for a common legal framework on regularisations at EU level. (EU Home 
Affairs, n.d.)
17
 
 
Overall, when it comes to the categorization, recognition (or not), and 
treatment of irregular migrants in relation to their fundamental human rights, the EU 
does not have a clearly developed position.  
As the countries under study include two European Union member states and 
one candidate country, it is easy to observe an EU effect interacting with each 
country‟s domestic ways of dealing with immigration.18  However, the EU does not 
have a common position regarding the recognition and/or protection of irregular 
migrants‟ fundamental social rights yet. The relevant EU acquis mainly covers 
policies concerning identification, detention, readmission and expulsion. At the 
beginning, in the 1970s, the European Commission adopted a dual approach towards 
irregular migration: on the one hand, it aimed to prevent irregular migration, while 
on the other, it aimed to address the abusive conditions facing irregular migrants 
(Cholewinski, 2000). In the 1990s, the Commission retained this dual approach, 
although protecting the rights of irregular migrants was rather neglected in 
intergovernmental meetings in favour of a more developed control and security 
policy. The main concern was to block illegal employment, to facilitate expulsion 
and readmission, and to combat smuggling. Later on, the Tampere Conclusions of 
1999 brought about a more security-oriented agenda for managing irregular 
migration, emphasizing the prevention of irregular migration and the punishment of 
those who supported it (Cholewinski, 2000: 368).  As a result, the EU acquis on the 
“fight against illegal migration and return” covers various areas, such as information 
                                                     
17
 The quotation is taken from the EU webpage titled “Wide-ranging common actions to combat 
illegal immigration at EU level and promote return of illegal immigrants”, No page number is 
available.  
18
 For review of interaction between Europeanization studies and different nation states see Bolukbasi 
et al. (2010). 
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and coordination exchange on irregular migration, coordination and cooperation 
concerning the removal and expulsion of irregular migrants, a penal framework for 
the supporters of irregular migration, coordination of immigration liaison officers, 
readmission agreements with third-countries, and international agreements on human 
trafficking, which have been implemented through certain Council, Commission, and 
Parliament decisions, Council directives, regulations, recommendations and 
resolutions (Acquis of the European Union, 2009).  
This approach means that EU common decisions do not explain much when it 
comes to the categorization, recognition or protection of the basic social rights of 
those irregular migrants who continue living within the receiving country.  However, 
there are certain other decisions/positions at the EU level which might be related to 
irregular migrants‟ human rights. These mainly relate to social inclusion/exclusion in 
general; as a natural consequence of these decisions one could expect to observe a 
general EU discourse within which domestic concerns operate in relation to the 
recognition (or not) of irregular migrants‟ rights. It is not possible (nor necessary) to 
go through all such decisions at the EU level, taking into account the general concern 
of this chapter. Yet, it might be useful to refer to the European Social Model 
specifically as it has relevance for migration as well, and can give us an idea of what 
kind of a background Europeanization provides in terms of social inclusion. 
 
3.5. The European Social Model 
The EU described the 1994 European Social Model “in terms of values that 
include democracy and individual rights, free collective bargaining, the market 
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economy, equal opportunities for all, and social protection and solidarity” 
(Eurofound, 2011).  During the Nice Summit of 2000, the EU adopted a new 
European Social Policy Agenda (SPA) to be the basis of the European Social Model, 
and later on, in 2005, the EU came up with a new Social Agenda to run until 2010. 
The key role of the agenda was defined as “promoting the social dimension of 
economic growth”, stating that the social agenda “supports the harmonious operation 
of the single market while ensuring respect for fundamental rights and common 
values” (EU, Communication from the Commission, 2005). The Commission 
Communication on Social Agenda (2005) also identifies two priority areas. The first 
concerns achieving full employment and “making work a real option for all, 
increasing the quality and productivity of work, and anticipating and managing 
change”. In order to reach full employment, among other suggested actions, two are 
worth noting here. One is increasing the adaptability of workers and enterprises; the 
other is attracting more people to enter and remain in the labour market. The other 
priority area is attaining equal opportunities for all and, by this way, to address 
poverty and discrimination, and provide social inclusion and diversity.  
 At this point, it is important to refer to the EU‟s understanding of social 
inclusion and exclusion. In the 1980s, the term social exclusion within the EU had 
certain specific connotations, although these had been transformed by the 1990s 
(Schierup et al., 2006). In the 1980s, social exclusion used to refer more to the 
process of being left outside the protection of the welfare system. Thus, the 
understanding had more to do with the boundary between the people who could 
receive welfare protection and those who could not for various reasons, such as 
unemployment, irregular immigration status, and so on. In other words, social 
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exclusion/inclusion entailed a “redistributive welfare policy”. However, with the 
signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, EU policy changed so that the previous 
focus was soon superseded by an alternative notion of social exclusion which 
stressed labour market integration as a precondition for social cohesion (Schierup et 
al., 2006: 55). In other words, exclusion signified exclusion from paid work, and 
achieving solidarity did not retain any relation to a redistributive welfare state 
(Schierup et al., 2006). 
       This transformation of the understanding of social exclusion, as described by 
Schierup et al. (2006), also tell us a lot about the degree to which the European 
Social Model prevents the social exclusion of migrants. As social exclusion is 
understood more in terms of employability rather than being excluded from social 
protection, the migrants‟ only social problem appears to be exclusion from the labour 
market, which implies that the main solution appears to be integration into the labour 
market.  Therefore, when the 2005 Communication of the Commission on the Social 
Agenda stated that all the thinking behind the agenda should be linked to the whole 
question of migration, it was referring to how migrants could be integrated into 
European labour markets, although the document does not elaborate further on how 
and where exactly this thinking should be linked to the „whole question of 
migration‟. As the social exclusion understanding has not signified the exclusion 
from welfare protection and citizenship rights anymore, highlighting labour market 
integration as the sole solution for migrants‟ social problems leaves out the direct 
protection of their rights or their positive integration, and for that reason, the 
European Social Model cannot entail solidarity, anti-discrimination and poverty 
reduction for this group of people.  This situation is much more common when it 
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comes to protecting the rights of undocumented labour migrants, who exist in large 
numbers also in two of the case studies in this research.   
        In Spain and Greece (as well as in Portugal and Italy), migrants are replacing 
native labour in the informal economy, and the very survival of certain economic 
sectors now depends on cheap labour, which is most of the time provided by migrant 
workers. Such informal work is present particularly in textiles-clothes, repair 
workshops, transport, entertainment (in Italy), and also in agriculture, tourism, 
construction, domestic services, and small manufacturing firms (in Greece). The 
employment of irregular labour migrants is greatest in those sectors where informal 
work is more common (Toksöz, 2007). Therefore, in some European Union member 
states, integration into the labour market is very easy for migrants, as they work 
informally and without documentation. However, there appears to be no positive 
integration included within the European Social Model that directly protects the 
rights of migrants who happen to be „integrated‟ into the labour market in this 
manner.  Instead, with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the European Union has 
clearly stated its position towards undocumented migration by discursively creating 
it as a social threat. This securitization discourse seems to have led to greater success 
in taking common EU decisions concerning immigration as intended by the 
Amsterdam Treaty in contrast to any other field (Samers, 2004: 31). As a result, it 
can be expected that the European way of doing things provides a more restrictive 
backdrop to discussions on the protection of irregular migrants‟ rights.  
        From a different perspective, Guiraudon (2000A), among others, argues that the 
internationalization of migration policy-making at the EU level has led to “venue 
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shopping”, and enabled national law and order ministries to pursue their security- 
and control-oriented migration policies much more easily in this venue, where they 
have been able to remain safe from the pressures of national courts, other ministries, 
governmental actors, and pro-migrant NGOs. Therefore, the EU decision level 
indirectly leads to the adoption of more restrictive policies as nationally elected 
officials can easily blame the EU for their political decisions as well as limit 
democratic accountability mechanisms operating at the national level.  
 
        3.6. Concluding Remarks 
        Within this review, I have focused on existing theoretical studies that explore 
and explain the protection of the rights of non-citizens, particularly migrants, in order 
to understand what might lead nation-states to recognize the rights of irregular 
migrants and hence offer them certain services, or not. The discussions so far lead to 
a number of important conclusions and explanations related to the main questions of 
this study. 
         First, international human rights treaties or global human rights regimes are 
considered as legitimizing grounds for the fact that “Undocumented Migrants have 
Rights!” (Biocchi and LeVoy, 2007).  However, there are some ambiguities 
regarding their effectiveness in protecting the rights of irregular migrants, and 
actually constrain state behaviour. Moreover, the claim that international human 
rights regimes constrain states from adopting more restrictive migration policies 
(Soysal, 1994; Sassen, 1996; Jacobson, 1997) has been criticized, in the sense that it 
is national legal systems and jurisprudence rather than international human rights 
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regimes that actually secure the rights of aliens (see among others, Joppke, 1998; 
Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Guiraudon, 2000B). Therefore, as national 
jurisprudence, and in particular court rulings, appear as important processes 
protecting the rights of aliens in liberal states in the existing literature, one need to 
explore whether these mechanisms are really effective in protecting the rights of 
undocumented migrants as well. To put it differently, in order to understand the 
protection of irregular migrants‟ rights it is necessary to examine the democratic 
accountability mechanisms at the national level that also include the efforts of civil 
society organizations, together with judicial review. 
         As a result, the main proposition of this research is that democratic 
accountability mechanisms, as described in the democratization literature, are one 
such factor determining the way in which irregular migrants are treated in a country. 
I also propose that it is mainly the organization or state of being of these 
accountability mechanisms that makes a difference among the states.  Additionally, 
as the cases under consideration are either EU member states or a candidate country, 
the possible effect of supranational policy making is also important.  However, I 
think that, on this issue, the effect of the EU is more one of providing a general 
backdrop, or opportunities for “venue shopping”, as argued by Guiraudon (2000A), 
rather than having a direct and decisive impact on the way in which policies are 
developed. In other words, in relation to the Europeanization effect, I argue that 
democratic accountability mechanisms and the rule of the government interact with 
each other on a scene whose backdrop is supranational policy-making.  
My research contributes to the existing theories and explanations in the 
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following ways:  
First, the theoretical explanation I adopt with a review of democratic 
accountability mechanisms provides a re-examination of the existing explanations 
through the lens provided by the democratization literature. It thereby offers a new 
perspective by bringing together comparative politics and migration studies.  
Secondly, this democratic accountability framework offers a more coherent picture 
of a “detailed process-tracing” (Joppke, 1998) concerning the protection of the rights 
of aliens in a nation-state. By adopting this theoretical framework I am better able to 
examine the explanatory value of two important factors (national courts‟ activism 
and civil society activism) together in a meaningful manner. In other words, the 
involvement of the courts and civil society organizations in policy-making regarding 
foreigners‟ rights becomes meaningful as regular procedures of a democratic regime 
that has the goal of holding elected officials accountable for their decisions on 
foreigners‟ rights.  
Lastly, the literature on civil society activism in promoting the rights of 
irregular immigrants is rather limited in its depiction of the results of such activism. 
There are very few studies that have clearly shown the nature of civil society 
involvement in irregular immigrants‟ rights issues and the effects of such 
involvement on policies.  Taking this into account, one of the most important 
theoretical contributions of this research is to depict the results of civil society 
activism in a specific policy area while exploring the extent to which these civil 
society organizations have the potential to negotiate with state officials for irregular 
migrants‟ rights. The comparative analysis of three countries will also contribute to a 
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better understanding of this role of civil society activism by identifying patterns of 
divergence and/or convergence among the cases. This will increase our 
understanding of the extent to which civil society activism is important for the 
protection of irregular migrants‟ rights.  
  
 
94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes in detail how the research for this study was 
conducted, providing information on the methods and techniques employed.  By 
explaining the methodology used, this chapter also makes clear the scientific 
contribution of this research to the literature on irregular migration. 
  
 
4.1. Method: Comparative Case Study 
This study primarily employed case study methodology in order to collect 
data to answer the key research questions highlighted in Chapter 1.  Case study 
methodology has been a popular focus of studies scrutinizing research methods in 
social sciences, and as a result a huge literature exists on case study research (for 
some examples, see Stake, 1978; Lijphart, 1975; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; 
Ragin, 2004; McKeown, 2004; Yin, 2009)    John Gerring offers a very concise 
definition of the case study method (2004): “A case study is best defined as an in-
depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar‟s 
aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena” (341).  Such a 
definition emphasises that the case selected is not studied for its own sake, but 
  
 
95 
instead is studied in order to develop knowledge about a broader subject.  That is, the 
case under concern is not studied solely for the purpose of providing a unique 
account of a specific phenomenon independent of broader and more general 
understandings of similar phenomena.  Rather, a case study is “an intensive study of 
a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” 
(Gerring, 2004: 342).  To help achieve this larger aim, I explored the key questions 
of this research through three different cases, i.e. in three different countries, using a 
comparative approach in order to provide answers that might be applicable in 
relation to the subject under concern to other countries with similar characteristics.  
Thus, my case studies are also studies of a broader population.  
As the above suggests, this research was also an example of a comparative 
case study in which I sought to answer the key research questions by looking for 
answers from within more than one unit of study. The intention behind such 
comparisons was to gain a fuller understanding of relevant processes by observing 
recurring patterns across the cases.  In other words, the reason for comparison was to 
be able to identify whether or not the explanations proposed in this research held in 
the three different settings.  Additionally, through the use of this method, I sought to 
address and analyse the basic similarities and differences between the cases in 
relation to the main concerns of the research.  
Lijphart (1971) considers the comparative method as a basic method of 
inquiry.  He argues it resembles a statistical model except for the crucial difference 
of having too small a number of cases “to permit systematic control by means of 
partial correlation” (684).  The present research was also a „small-N‟ study, in 
contrast to „Large-N‟ studies using statistical methods.  According to Lijphart, Small-
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N studies are typical of research into political systems.  He states that “where the 
cases are national political systems … the numbers of cases are necessarily restricted 
[such] that the comparative method has to be used” (685).  Therefore, for Lijphart, 
certain studies naturally require small-N analysis. The main goals of this study, 
through the questions it posed, also required a small-N study in order to be able to 
scrutinise relevant political processes in a detailed manner. 
Peter Hall (2003) provides another example of a clear explanation of the 
comparative method:  
Instead of viewing comparison primarily as an exercise in correlating a few 
independent variables with a dependent variable, we should understand the 
comparative method as a technique in which inspection of this kind is 
combined with systematic process analysis of the cases. Precisely because 
such research designs cover small numbers of cases, the researcher can 
investigate casual processes in each of them in detail, thereby assessing the 
relevant theories against especially diverse kinds of observations. … As a 
method, it is especially appropriate to the ontologies of comparative politics 
in recent years (397). 
 
 There are a considerable number of studies like Hall‟s that refer to the 
potential of case studies in developing causal inferences (for some well-discussed 
examples, see Gerring, 2004; Rueschemeyer, 2003; Mahoney, 2003).  Although a 
case study can be employed in order to develop cause and effect relationships, the 
overall analysis of this study aimed to explore correlations rather than causal 
relationships.  In other words, the main goal was first, to provide a description of the 
relationship between democratic accountability mechanisms and the protection of the 
rights of irregular immigrants.  However, the analysis was not designed to suggest a 
direct causal mechanism between democratic accountability mechanisms and the 
protection of the rights of irregular immigrants. This was a consequence of the 
formulation of the main question of the research. In the analysis section, the main 
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questions posed ask “What kind of?” and “To what extent?” rather than “Why?”19  
This makes the answer more similar to a descriptive inference than a casual one. 
On the other hand, the discussions derived from the case chapters, as 
explained in the analysis chapter, also seek to come close to forming a 
“probabilistic” casual argument; that is, an explanation in which “a cause increases 
the likelihood of an outcome and/or the magnitude of a (scalar) outcome” (Gerring, 
2004: 349). In other words, the analyses made here did not aim to demonstrate 
invariant causal relationships in the sense of offering necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions; rather, I aimed to reveal those political mechanisms that increase the 
likelihood of the emergence of a particular policy orientation.
20
  Therefore, I sought 
to develop my descriptive narrative and tried to link it to a possible causal 
mechanism. In doing so, I aimed to follow a sound observation of King, Keohane 
and Verba (1994): “Some scholars set out to describe the world; others to explain. 
Each is essential. We cannot construct meaningful causal explanations without good 
description; description, in turn, loses most of its interest unless linked to some 
causal relationships” (34).  Furthermore,  “[i]n fields such as comparative politics or 
international relations, descriptive work is particularly important because there is a 
great deal we still need to know, because our explanatory abilities are weak, and 
                                                     
19
 The research questions are formulated in the following manner: (1) Is there a divergence or 
convergence among Greece, Spain and Turkey in the way they treat irregular migrants in relation to 
the recognition of these migrants‟ fundamental human rights? (2) What is the role of democratic 
accountability mechanisms (i.e. civil society activism and judicial review) in the protection of rights 
of irregular immigrants who are already living within the receiving country? (3) To what extent do 
democratic accountability mechanisms at the national level (such as the activism of pro-migrant 
organizations, human rights groups, trade unions and other civil society organizations together with 
judicial review) impact on the treatment of irregular migrants - especially against a backdrop of 
„Europeanization‟?  
 
20
 The substantive details of these arguments are discussed in more detail in the analysis chapter 
(chapter 8). 
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because good description depends in part on good explanation” (King, Keohane and 
Verba, 1994: 44).  
 
 
4.1.1. Case Selection: Why compare these particular cases? 
Lijphart (1971) defines comparable as “similar in a large number of important 
characteristics (variables) which one wants to treat as constants, but dissimilar as far 
as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other” (687).  If 
the cases are comparable then a comparative method can be more easily applied 
since the cases “allow the establishment of relationships among a few variables while 
many other variables are controlled” (687).  Therefore, in a comparative case study, 
selection of the cases emerges as an important part of the methodology that requires 
careful consideration.  
In this research, I aimed to compare select comparable cases, while also 
selecting those cases that present the most fruitful contexts in terms of offering 
different answers to the key questions of the research.  However, the most important 
reason behind the case selection was that these countries demonstrate both certain 
similarities concerning some of the important contextual variables, but also 
diversities on other aspects that are significant while investigating the study‟s main 
research questions. I elaborate further on the major similarities and differences 
between the cases in the following paragraph.  
The first similarity among the cases concerns the geographical area in which 
the countries are located: they are all southern European countries.  Their 
geographical proximity also relates to their similar political significance in relation to 
the European Union‟s geography: Spain and Greece are member states at the 
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southern external frontiers of the European Union, while Turkey is a neighbouring 
candidate country on the EU‟s southeast borders. That is, all three countries mark the 
external borders of the European Union in some way.  This characteristic gives them 
an important similar significance, and also pressures, in relation to migratory 
movements across the European continent.  As a result of their geographical location, 
the countries are considered as the entrance points to the European continent and, 
more importantly, to the European Union.  To put it in terms of the jargon of 
migration studies, their geographical locations make these countries all transit zones 
for immigrants heading for central and northern European countries. Such 
geographical proximity is important in migration studies as one can claim that they 
receive relatively similar types of flows, which are in this case transit migration 
flows. Along with transit migration, irregular immigration emerges as another 
defining characteristic of the region, as immigrants who seek to travel to central and 
Northern Europe stay in Greece, Spain and Turkey with irregular statuses, which 
further increases the number of irregular immigrants within these countries.  Thus, as 
a consequence of their geographical position, transit and irregular immigration turn 
out to be defining characteristics of Greece, Spain and Turkey, when considering 
them in terms of migratory flows across the region.  This means that the case studies 
reported here are investigating irregular immigration in three settings where it puts 
more or less similar pressures upon the states involved.  In other words, this 
geographical proximity helped the study with increasing the three cases‟ 
comparability by providing more similarity.  
Therefore, irregular immigration is a second similarity between the selected 
cases. Within Greece, Spain, and Turkey there are significant numbers of irregular 
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immigrants who work in the informal market.  As a result, these countries experience 
problems associated with irregularity in the labour market as well.  For example, 
Turkey attracts a certain number of irregular immigrants, most of whom use its 
territory as a transit zone to other European countries; during their waiting period in 
the country these immigrants work in “3D jobs” (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) in 
the informal sector.  This situation creates problems first and foremost for the 
protection of the rights of the immigrants in general and irregular migrants in 
particular in the face of serious human rights violations against them.  Additionally, 
it also creates problems for the state in terms of its territorial sovereignty and its 
management of immigration in general. This situation faced by all three countries 
investigated here.  All three have developed various policies to manage irregular 
immigration. While most of which target the protection of the „rights‟ of the state 
rather than the rights of the immigrants, they have also ranged from tolerance or 
benign neglect to regularization and deportation, which all affect the fundamental 
rights of irregular immigrants in various ways. This complex situation provided a 
rich empirical context for studying the major research questions of this research.  
A third similarity among these countries concerns their very similar 
immigration histories in contrast to central and/or Northern European countries. 
Spain, Greece and Turkey have all been countries of emigration before also 
becoming countries of „immigration‟.  Large numbers of Spanish and Greek people 
migrated to central and northern European countries as labour migrants in the post-
war period, as did a considerable number of Turkish workers, who moved primarily 
to Germany in order to find jobs.  As well as becoming emigration countries during a 
similar period, all three countries also became immigration countries at relatively 
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similar times. Spain and Greece became destination countries for immigration in the 
1980s, while Turkey started to receive immigrants mainly from the 1990s onwards, 
becoming increasingly identified as a “transit” and “receiving” country in addition to 
its traditional role of being a “sending” country (Kirişçi, 2007: 91).  Comparable 
immigration histories helped the research to control to a certain extent the contextual 
variables, which may also have an impact on the research topic under concern that is 
the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants.  
As well as these three similarities, the three countries display divergences in 
certain characteristics that are particularly relevant to the main priorities of this 
research.  First, divergences in the nature of the immigration policies each country 
creates a background, against which the main research question becomes more 
meaningful.  In Greece, immigration policies are highly restrictive.  To give a few 
examples, the 1991 immigration law made illegal migration an offence punishable by 
a jail sentence, while the 2000 immigration law severely restricts irregular migrants‟ 
access to public services such as health and education.  The combination of such 
restrictive policies, laws and hostile public opinion in Greece creates a negative 
perception of immigrants in general and intolerance of irregular migrants in 
particular (Geddes, 2003).   
In contrast, Spain shows striking differences on these matters compared to 
Greece.  For example, in 1991, Spain officially accepted that it had become an 
immigration country, which led it to implement policies towards immigrants that are 
fairly liberal compared to those of other countries in the region. At the same time, 
there is also a certain degree of hostility towards immigrants in Spain as in Greece, 
although, unlike in Greece, Spain has a stronger “pro-migrant counter mobilization” 
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(Geddes, 2003: 164). For example, in 2000, leftist trade unions and pro-migrant 
NGOs mobilized in support of the regularization of irregular migrants. Again in 
contrast to Greece, Spain granted irregular migrants and their children access to 
health and education services, and granted certain political rights that enable union 
membership and mobilization (Geddes, 2003).
21
  All these are clarified in detail in 
case chapters 5, and 6.   
Turkey, also exhibits certain differences to the other two countries concerning 
immigration policy.  Legal immigration to Turkey was limited to ethnic Turks until 
the 1980s. The Law of Settlement (1934) lists the main rules of immigration to 
Turkey. The law primarily considers the movement of ethnic Turks, and as a result 
favours Turkish ethnicity and culture, while rules governing the permanent 
settlement of foreigners are more restrictive. On the other hand, when it comes to 
visa policy, Turkish policies are fairly liberal (İçduygu, 2007A: 206). However, 
Turkey‟s immigration policies have recently been revised, both because of its 
growing role as an immigration and transit country, and also as a result of the EU 
accession process. In particular, the European integration imposed by the 
„conditionality‟ of the accession process, has had a significant influence on migration 
policy-making in Turkey (İçduygu, 2007A).  This has led policies on immigration in 
general, and on irregular immigration in particular, to experience a process of 
revision under the influence of both the European Union and Turkish national 
interests.  To conclude, the three cases display important differences in terms of the 
way in which the rights of immigrants are protected within their jurisdictions; this 
situation provided a fruitful basis for analysing this study‟s main research questions.  
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 However, these political rights were later revoked as a result of pressure exerted by right-wing 
political parties. 
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4.2. Data Collection 
In this study, I utilized qualitative research techniques, in-depth interviewing, 
together with an analysis of related policy documents (e.g. immigration related laws 
and regulations, policy reports by civil society and international organizations).  The 
research focuses on the last immigration regulations of Greece, Spain and Turkey 
until the end of 2010.  However, it also covers supporting evidence from documents 
and interviews that relate to the last decade.  
According to Ritchie (2003), qualitative data can be divided into two broad 
categories: “naturally occurring data” and “generated data”. In the former case, data 
is collected in its natural setting without the intervention of the researcher in its 
creation.  In other words,  such data “is an „enactment‟ of social behaviour in its 
social setting, rather than a „recounting‟ of it generated specifically for the research 
study” (Ritchie, 2003: 34).  Documentary analysis, participant observation, discourse 
analysis and conversation analysis are all considered as methods for collecting 
naturally occurring data. In contrast, generated data means to „reconstruct‟, „re-tell‟ 
and/or „re-process‟ certain ideas, attitudes, beliefs, behaviours with the goal of 
generating data that fits with the goals of the research. Some methods used to 
generate data are biographical methods, focus groups and interviews (Ritchie, 2003:  
36-37).  The data collected in this research included both “naturally occurring data,” 
as I analysed documents, and also “generated data,” as I conducted in-depth 
interviews.  
 
 
4.2.1. Interviews 
According to Weiss (1994), “[i]nterviewing gives us access to observation of 
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others. Through interviewing we can learn about places we have not been and could 
not go and about settings in which we have not lived” (1).  This description, although 
very simple, very accurately explains why social sciences employ interviewing as a 
technique to collect data.  In this particular study too, I employed interviewing as a 
research technique in order to learn more about political environments and settings 
“that would otherwise be closed” (Weiss, 1994: 1) to me.  More specifically, I 
employed in-depth interviewing, or “qualitative interviewing” in Weiss‟ terms. One 
of the key reasons for using qualitative interviewing is for “developing detailed 
descriptions” of an event, a process or a development, or “integrating multiple 
perspectives” on an organization, an event or a development (Weiss, 1994: 9).  These 
functions of qualitative interviewing perfectly fitted with the goals of my research, 
namely to gain a fuller picture of the management of irregular immigration in three 
cases, and to explain how democratic accountability mechanisms interact with the 
problem of protecting irregular immigrants‟ rights.  I therefore conducted in-depth 
interviews, for all three cases, with experts of immigration in general and irregular 
immigration in particular in order to acquire detailed descriptions, and various 
accounts of the irregular immigration policy-making process and the official 
treatment of irregular immigrants. This allowed me to develop my own explanation 
of the subject by integrating these various perspectives. The precise form of 
interviews I conducted can be categorized further as “elite interviewing”, a type of 
interview conducted with interviewees “considered to be influential, prominent, 
and/or well-informed … in an organization or community; they are selected for 
interviews on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research” (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1999: 113).   
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To further elaborate on the respondents that I interviewed, I can refer to 
Weiss‟s study once more. Weiss (1994) distinguishes two distinct sets of respondents 
in interviewing: respondents who provide information from their being experts in an 
area or witnesses to an event; and respondents who reflect or represent the shared or 
general experiences of a group that is affected by a certain development.  The group 
of respondents I worked with belong to the former category.  Weiss describes well 
the value of such respondents to a research project like the one reported here: 
Suppose the aim of our study is to describe an event or development or 
institution: the management of a political convention, the operation of a 
nursing service, or the system governing the granting of divorce. We would 
do best to interview people who are especially knowledgeable or experienced. 
To enrich or extend our understanding, we might also want to include as 
respondents people who view our topic from different perspectives or who 
know different aspects of it. Our aim would be to develop a wide-ranging 
panel of knowledgeable informants [author‟s italics]. Each member of the 
panel would be chosen because he or she could significantly instruct us 
(Weiss, 1994: 17). 
 
As the goal of my research was first to understand and describe the official 
treatment of irregular immigrants within the country and how the system of 
protecting their rights operates within the framework of immigration policy-making 
in general, the views of the respondents who were informants through their expertise 
constituted the main source of knowledge in this research.  Through this information 
I also sought to analyse the possible contributions of democratic accountability 
mechanisms to the system protecting the rights of irregular immigrants. More 
specifically, I sought to arrange interviews with immigration experts who were 
working either within the civil society as members and activists of various 
organizations, or in official posts as policy practitioners.  It turned out to be difficult 
to reach the latter group
22
 so instead I included researchers and scholars working or 
                                                     
22
 I was only able to arrange an interview with an expert from the Secretary of State for Immigration 
and Emigration in Spain. In Turkey, I also arranged an interview with an expert and researcher from 
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studying on immigration related issues, in order to widen the range of perspectives. 
According to Weiss, a panel of informants should also include people who are 
studying the particular social institution that the research is carried out in order to 
provide greater knowledge about different forms of the institution concerned (Weiss, 
1994: 20).  
In the end, I chose the majority of the respondents specifically from among 
the members of civil society organizations, since one of the major goals of this 
research was to depict the nature of the relationship between civil society 
organizations and state regulation relating to the protection of irregular immigrants‟ 
rights.  Therefore, I sought to acquire as much inside information on civil society 
participation as possible. In order to gain a more accurate and complete picture of the 
relationship, I selected the informants from diverse institutions of civil society, such 
as human rights organizations, migrants‟ organizations, international organizations, 
and trade unions. Another important reason for including researchers and prominent 
scholars working on irregular immigration as respondents was the need to balance 
the dominance of views from civil society organizations as the main source of 
information with information provided by scholars and researchers.  In other words, 
by interviewing scholars and researchers, I sought to avoid any possible biases about 
the significance of civil society participation that can emerge while interviewing civil 
society members. Thus, including scholars and researchers allowed for a fuller, more 
diversified and representative account of the main topics of inquiry. A mapping of 
the respondents‟ organizations or institutions is provided in Appendix B. 
As Kvale (1996) suggests, a qualitative research interview tends to be semi-
structured, as is the case in this study. That is, “it is neither an open conversation nor 
                                                                                                                                                      
the Police Academy. Except for these interviews, this research, in its current form, is not 
representative of the views of experts from governmental offices. 
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a highly structured questionnaire. It is conducted according to an interview guide that 
focuses on certain themes and that may include suggested questions” (Kvale, 1996:  
27).  The main goal of the interviews with the respondents selected for this study was 
to collect information on the key research questions concerning the relationship 
between democratic accountability mechanisms and state regulation concerning the 
rights of irregular immigrants.  To achieve this, the interview plan included a 
discussion of the overall picture of immigration politics and policy-making, followed 
by various questions about topics ranging from the policies adopted towards irregular 
immigrants to the nature of the immigration policy-making process.  For example, I 
asked the respondents to describe the immigration policy-making process by 
referring to the actors involved in the process.  I also asked the respondents to 
discuss how authorities manage or treat the issue of irregular immigration, and which 
rights irregular immigrants enjoy in the country concerned.  I then encouraged 
discussion on the ways in which civil society organizations participate or intervene in 
matters concerning both the rights of irregular immigrants in particular, and other 
immigration related matters in general.  The interview plan also included questions 
concerning the role of judicial activism in this matter, and whether the judiciary is 
influential or not in matters concerning the rights of irregular immigrants.  Appendix 
A presents the interview question schedule, although in use the questions were 
revised slightly according to the specific circumstances of each country.  The 
interviews took approximately 45 to 60 minutes each.  
 
 
4.2.2. Notes on the field research 
The field research in Greece was conducted in Athens between February 22 
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and March 5, 2010; the Spanish field research was conducted in Madrid between 
April 12 and 23, 2010. The planning of the Turkish field research was more flexible 
as I am a permanent resident so interviews could be scheduled across a longer time 
period. I conducted interviews first in Istanbul between June 7 and 11, 2010, and 
then in Ankara between June 21 and 25, 2010.  Interviews that could not be arranged 
during that time were rescheduled for various days in July 2010, both in Ankara and 
Istanbul; I also continued to make new interviews as I proceeded with the analysis of 
the results. For example, I conducted new interviews in both Ankara and İzmir in 
April 2011.    
I adopted a mixed strategy while identifying the respondents for the 
interviews. First, I carried out a broad internet search in order to identify all the 
experts working on both immigration and irregular immigration. I corresponded with 
the most relevant institutions via e-mail and telephone, asking for experts on 
irregular migration, and then contacted these individuals for interviews. At the same 
time, I also contacted researchers working specifically on irregular immigration in 
certain research centres in Athens and Madrid. I extended my research cooperation 
with these individuals in order to identify other possible contacts that I might have 
missed during the internet search.  The researchers whom I contacted during the field 
research generously offered their help in securing further interviews and collecting 
research material.  In addition to an internet search, while I was conducting the 
interviews in Greece, Madrid, Ankara and Istanbul, I also employed the snow-ball 
method. That is, I asked the respondents to name other key experts that they 
recommended for further interviews.  This strategy was used to complement the 
previous strategy (internet search and recommendations by the affiliates during the 
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field research).  One disadvantage of relying solely on the snow-ball method is that it 
might only yield informants of largely similar perspectives because of informants‟ 
recommending others within the same circles.  Thus, in order to obtain as diverse a 
set of perspectives as possible, I tried to give preference to those respondents 
suggested by the results of the internet searches and by the recommendations of other 
researchers. 
One concern while selecting the respondents was to select organizations and 
people that would be more or less comparable across all three cases.  Before 
conducting an interview in one country, I tried to determine whether or not I would 
be able to interview equivalent experts with more or less similar organizational 
backgrounds in the other two countries as well. As I only had a very limited time in 
Greece and Spain for conducting field research, I had to be rather careful about 
whether or not interviews would be comparable. For example, if I interviewed an 
expert from an international organization in one case, I sought to arrange an 
interview in an international organization with possibly similar functions in the two 
other cases as well.  More specifically, in each case, I tried to arrange interviews with 
experts from trade unions, international organizations, international non-
governmental organizations, and other non-governmental organizations, namely 
human rights organizations, aid organizations, and migrant organizations.  However, 
there were also three particular respondents whose institution or organization was not 
comparable across all the cases; I interviewed them nevertheless since I judged that 
they were important informants on the topic for that specific country.  First, in 
Greece and Spain, I interviewed experts from the Ombudsman‟s office since they are 
significant actors in migration policy-making in these two countries. However, it was 
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not possible to find the equivalent interviewee in Turkey, since Turkey did not have a 
functioning Ombudsman office during the period of the field research. Second, in the 
Turkish case, I could not arrange any interviews with members of trade unions or 
migrant organizations since the latter are almost non-existent in Turkey while the 
former have not yet developed a working agenda on immigration comparable to 
those in Greece or Spain.  Third, I was only able to arrange an interview with an 
official expert from the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration in Spain, 
and an interview in Turkey with an expert working in the Police Academy.   
There were certain informants that I was unable to reach, although I had 
planned to conduct interviews with them to ensure a broad range of informants.  For 
example, although migrant organizations are influential actors in immigration 
politics in Spain, I was unable to interview an expert from any Spanish migrant 
organizations.  One person had originally agreed to provide written responses to 
interview questions, but in the end failed to respond to repeated attempts to contact 
them.  
The interviews in Greece and Spain were mostly conducted in English 
although it was necessary to arrange for an interpreter in a few cases as the 
respondents did not speak English. 
  
 
4.2.3. Documentary Analysis of Policy Texts 
Another method employed in this research was documentary analysis of 
policy texts, including immigration related laws and regulations, and reports by civil 
society and international organizations.  As already outlined at the beginning of this 
section on data collection, documentary analysis is a qualitative research method 
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through which “naturally occurring data” is collected.  In other words, data is not re-
generated by the intervention of the researcher, but it is already out there.  Through 
documentary analysis, researchers study already existing texts with the aim to either 
understand the texts‟ “substantive content” or to interpret “deeper meanings” 
(Ritchie, 2003: 35). In this study, policy documents were analysed with the former 
goal in mind, i.e. to understand the particular policy orientation or attitude towards 
the protection of rights of irregular immigrants expressed through the document.  The 
texts utilised in a documentary analysis can be public or personal. Public documents 
may include texts such as media reports, government papers, minutes of meetings or 
formal letters, whereas personal documents can include diaries, letters or 
photographs. In this research, I analysed public documents, specifically immigration 
laws, governmental decrees, reports from civil society organisations and the 
Ombudsman (for Greece and Spain).  A listing of the legal documents utilized in the 
research is available in Appendix C.   
Mason (2003) offers the following categorisation of the different motivations 
behind the use of documentary analysis: 
[I]f you choose to use documents … you may have an ontological position 
which suggests that written words, texts, documents, records … are 
meaningful constituents of the social world in themselves … or you may 
believe that they act as some form of expression or representation of relevant 
elements of the social world, or that I can trace or „read‟ aspects of the social 
world through them (Mason, 2003: 106). 
 
 The motivational perspective I adopted in this study was that the documents I 
analysed constitute a relevant material element of the social world in which I am 
interested.  I defined this social world as the “official state level”, which has a 
particular reaction or reflex to the fact that irregular immigrants are individuals who 
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naturally have (or should have) certain social rights. Thus, I utilised document 
analysis in order to collect data on the dependent variable of the research, i.e., the 
degree of state regulation of the protection of irregular immigrants‟ rights, or the 
liberalness of the state‟s treatment of irregular migrants with respect to their 
fundamental social rights.  Through analysis of the documents, I “traced” this official 
attitude towards irregular immigrants.  More specifically, as I was looking for rights 
granted on paper; I selected „papers‟ on that topic for my analysis in order to depict 
the formal picture of the conditions of irregular immigrants‟ rights through the 
information existing (or not) within the documents relating to the fundamental social 
rights of irregular migrants.   
 
 
4.3. Concluding Remarks 
Research reported in this study asked the following question:  What kind of 
role do democratic accountability mechanisms play in the protection of the rights of 
irregular immigrants who are already living within the receiving country?  
Answering this question entailed investigating the relationship between democratic 
accountability mechanisms and the protection of certain rights, such as access to free 
health care and education for irregular immigrants. The method employed to answer 
this question was a comparative case study, involving Greek, Spanish and Turkish 
settings so as to both observe common patterns between them and to explain the 
relationship between protection of irregular immigrants‟ rights and democratic 
accountability mechanisms.  However, this study also aimed to explain differences 
between the cases as well.  This study used in-depth interviewing and documentary 
analysis techniques to collect the data needed to answer the study‟s research 
  
 
113 
question.  Determining the extent to which the immigrants‟ rights are protected relied 
mainly on the analysis of policy documents, while the analysis of the democratic 
accountability mechanisms operating in relation to the protection of immigrants‟ 
rights was based on the information gathered from the in-depth interviews.  In the 
following three chapters, I analyse the cases of Greece, Spain and Turkey within the 
methodological framework set out in this chapter.  
 
  
 
114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
GREECE 
 
 
 
 
5.1. History of Immigration in Greece 
Similar to other Southern European countries, Greece was a country of 
emigration until the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Between 1945 and 1973, 
approximately a million Greeks left for countries such as West Germany, the United 
States, Canada and Australia, for various economic, family or political reasons. 
Emigration started to decrease in the mid-1970s, and there was a period of return 
migration between 1974 and 1985.  Towards the end of this period, emigration and 
repatriation figures fell to insignificant levels, bringing the net migration rate closer 
to zero (Fakiolas, 2000: 58).   
Immigration to Greece was also taking place alongside emigration, but on a 
rather smaller scale.  Post-war immigrants came mainly as refugees from the then 
Socialist countries of Eastern Europe.  Later on, in the late 1960s, Greece started to 
receive unskilled labour immigrants as seasonal workers from Spain, Egypt and 
South Asian countries in response to a demand for immigrant labour in agriculture, 
industry and domestic service (Fakiolas, 2000).  In the 1970s, refugees started to 
arrive from countries such as Lebanon, Vietnam and Middle Eastern countries, and, 
  
 
115 
after 1985, in large numbers from Eastern European countries (Baldwin-Edwards, 
2009: 41). Especially in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Greece faced an 
unexpected immigration influx mainly from neighbouring countries. For example, 
Albanian immigration in the early 1990s was one of the main markers of Greece‟s 
new status as an immigration country. For Albanian families, emigration during that 
time was the “single most important means of survival” (Lazaridis and 
Koumandraki, 2007: 92). In the 1990s, the number of economic migrants and asylum 
seekers from the Middle East and certain Asian and African countries also started to 
grow (Maroukis, 2009: 5). As a result of these various developments, “[t]he situation 
changed dramatically in the early 1990s, due above all to the rapid influx of 
immigrants from Albania. Greece quickly became transformed from a traditional 
emigration country into one of mass immigration from the former socialist countries 
and the developing world, despite about 1.3 million deportations (mainly of 
Albanians) since 1991” (Fakiolas, 2000: 59). Up until the first regularisation program 
of 1998, a large majority of the incoming migrants had no papers, and hence were 
working irregularly (Kanellopoulos et. al., 2006: 13).   
 The reasons for such a transformation, from a country of emigration to 
immigration, were more or less the same in Greece as in other southern European 
countries.  On the one hand, there was a demand for unskilled labour power in 
certain sectors of the economy in these countries, so immigrant workers could be 
accommodated in these sectors.  On the other hand, Northern European countries had 
started to adopt increasingly restrictive policies on immigration, which re-shaped the 
migratory routes so that immigrants heading towards Northern European countries 
changed their routes towards Southern European countries, either for transit purposes 
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or for permanent settlement (Tsoukala, 1999). Developments in neighbouring former 
Socialist countries also affected to a great extent the immigration movements across 
Greek territory, which in turn changed the composition of the migrant population in 
Greece. Albanians emerged as the largest migrant group, representing more than 50 
per cent of the total migrant population.  Today, after Albanians, Poles, Bulgarians 
and Romanians constitute the largest immigrant groups in Greece (Maroukis, 2009).  
 
Table 1: Migration Related Statistical Information on Greece 
 
 
Source:  The data in this table was produced from multiple secondary sources: the 
figures in the first three rows were gathered from the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) data (available at 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/europe/southern-europe/greece, retrieved on 
07.10.10).  The data on the number of asylum seekers comes from OECD-
International Migration Data 2010 (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33931_45634233_1_1_1_37415,
00.html, retrieved on 07.10.10).  Estimates of the number of irregular foreign 
residents data is from Kovacheva and Vogel‟s (2009) study, which reports the results 
of  the „CLANDESTINO: Counting the uncountable – data and trends across 
Europe‟ project (2007-2009), which is funded by the European Commission, DG 
Research, Sixth Framework Programme. Finally, the number of apprehended 
irregular migrants is taken from Maroukis (2009), which is also a report of the 
CLANDESTINO project.   
                                                     
23
 IOM defines the net migration rate as “[t]he difference between the number of persons entering and 
leaving a country during the year per 1,000 persons. An excess of persons entering the country is 
referred to as net immigration (e.g., 3.56 migrants/1,000 population); an excess of persons leaving the 
country is referred to as net emigration (e.g., -9.26 migrants/1,000 population).” Retrieved July 23, 
2010 from 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/sources/s
ource_turkey.htm  
Population (2010) 11.2 million 
Net Migration Rate
23
 (2005-
2010) 
2.7 migrants/1,000 population 
Immigrants as a percentage of 
the population (2010) 
10.1 % 
Number of asylum seekers 
(2009) 
15,930 
Estimates of the number of 
irregular foreign residents 
(2008) 
172,000 (minimum estimate) 
209,000 (maximum estimate) 
Number of apprehended 
irregular migrants (2008) 
57,623  
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Table 1 above provides some migration related figures and statistics for 
Greece, which can contribute to our understanding of the context of irregular 
immigration. Immigrants constitute a very large portion of the Greek population, and 
net migration rate, which is the difference between incoming immigrants and 
outgoing emigrant, is also rather high. All these figures support the fact that Greece 
has become an immigration country. Looking at the number of rather high asylum 
seekers in Greece is also important for trying to understand the volume of irregular 
immigrants within the country because those whose asylum applications have been 
either rejected or remain uncompleted for a long time may decide to stay and/or work 
irregularly in the country. For example, when large numbers of Eastern Europeans 
arrived as asylum seekers in 1985, Greece did not grant them work permits and 
housed them in camps and hotel rooms while they waited to be transferred to another 
country. However, as their stay became prolonged, many of these asylum seekers 
began working in the informal economy, thereby adding to the volume of irregular 
foreign workers in Greece (Baldwin-Edwards, 2009).     
The link between irregular migration and the asylum process requires more 
attention in Greece since the distinction between an asylum seeker and an irregular 
immigrant is rather blurred in this country. That is, just as there are rejected asylum 
seekers who continue to stay as undocumented immigrants, there are also asylum 
seekers who do not apply for asylum in Greece, but rather prefer to stay 
undocumented until they can move on to another European country where they have 
a greater chance of being granted refugee status. The regulations of Dublin II 
Convention contribute a lot to this situation in Greece.  According to the Dublin II 
regulation, an asylum application must be processed in the country where the asylum 
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seeker first entered European territory. Therefore, if an asylum seeker first enters 
European territory through Greece, whether legally or illegally, his/her application 
must be processed in Greece, even if he or she has subsequently moved to another 
European country. That is, Greece is “obliged to take back its applicants who are 
found to enter or reside irregularly in another member state. This is a major reason 
why refugees would rather not lodge an asylum application in Greece but wait in 
order to make their claim in another member state, where chances for obtaining 
asylum may be higher” (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008: 6).  In other words, there 
are cases in which asylum seekers choose to remain underground, avoid any contact 
with the authorities and hence seek to conceal that they had entered the European 
territory through Greece while they look for better prospects from applying for 
asylum in another member state.  
The way in which Greece handles the asylum system also affects the decision 
of asylum seekers a lot in such cases. Specifically, its asylum system contains 
multiple flaws, such as the lack of proper information about procedures and about 
asylum seekers‟ rights; lack of interpretation and interpreters; lack of access to 
sufficient legal aid; the extremely poor conditions in most of the reception centres; 
low rates of recognition of refugee status; and very long processes (Papadopoulou-
Kourkoula, 2008: 5). In 2008, the Norwegian Immigration Appeal Board stopped the 
return of asylum seekers to Greece under the Dublin II Convention since the Board 
feared that the protection of the rights of refugees was not guaranteed and that 
reception conditions were extremely poor (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008: 6). 
Similarly, again in 2008, a court in Sweden prevented the deportation of an asylum 
seeker from Iraq, who had been found to entered through Greece, on the grounds that 
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“his access to a fair hearing could not be guaranteed” in Greece (Papadopoulou-
Kourkoula, 2008: 6). Such cases illustrate how the processes of asylum seeking in 
Greece contribute a lot to the blurredness between the statuses of asylum seeker and 
irregular migrant, while also highlighting how these categories emerge as a result of 
the way in which states (mis)treat and (mis)manage foreigners. In Greece, the way in 
which the implementation of the asylum system interacts with the provisions of the 
Dublin II regulation create a distinct irregular migrant population of its own because 
asylum seekers in Greece choose to remain undocumented because of the previously 
mentioned flaws of its asylum system.       
Table 1 provides us with approximate figures for the irregular migrant 
population. However, one should be very cautious with these figures, as it is almost 
impossible to be more exact because of the clandestine and undocumented nature of 
this type of immigration. Thus different sources estimate differing population sizes 
from basing their estimations on different „evidence‟.  One piece of evidence shown 
in Table 1 from which to estimate the population size of irregular immigrant 
residents is the number of apprehended irregular immigrants. Table 2 below provides 
a breakdown of the number of apprehended irregular migrants at land and sea 
borders, or within Greek territory from 2000 to 2008.  It shows how the number of 
apprehended irregular migrants decreased a lot until 2002 before increasing again in 
2006 and 2007.  Although knowing the number of apprehended irregular migrants 
can provide some evidence about the actual total volume of irregular migratory flows 
into a country, one cannot be sure if any increase or decrease in the apprehensions is 
due to a change in the numbers of migrants trying to cross borders illegally or border 
control measures are having more success.  Despite these uncertainties, the numbers 
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do suggest the presence of an important volume of irregular immigrants in Greece. 
 
Table 2: Number of apprehended irregular immigrants in Greece between 
2000 and 2008 
 
 
Source: The data in this table is a partial copy from Table 15 „Totals of 
apprehended irregular migrants‟, from Maroukis (2009; 70). 
 
As already mentioned, in the 1990s, Albanians formed the largest group of 
irregular migrant workers, while Bulgarians, Ukrainians and Romanians also became 
a significant proportion at the beginning of the 21
st
 century. In addition, in contrast to 
earlier periods, by the 2000s, migrants from Asian, Middle Eastern and African 
countries also constituted a significant share of this population (Maroukis, 2009: 23).  
More specifically, a 2004 report of the Ministry of Public Order determined that a 
large majority of irregular migrants came from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, FRYOM, Pakistan, Georgia, Egypt and Palestine (Kanellopoulos 
et al., 2006: 54), while the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine listed the 
nationalities of migrants apprehended at Greek sea borders in 2007, in descending 
order, as Afghan, Iraqi, Palestinian, Somali and Egyptian (Maroukis, 2009: 23). 
As is common in other immigration settings, irregular migrants in Greece are 
employed mainly in the informal sector, where they perform unskilled and labour-
YEARS TOTAL APPREHENSIONS (land, dea 
and in the mainland) 
2000 228,421 
2001 192,144 
2002 50,161 
2003 51,031 
2004 44,987 
2005 66,351 
2006 95,239 
2007 112,364 
2008 (1st half) 57,623  
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intensive work. Information gathered from regularisation programs indicate that 
irregular migrants usually work in construction, domestic care, agriculture, repair 
works, tourism, catering, and peddling (Kanellopoulos et al., 2006). According to a 
labour force survey conducted in the early 2000s, irregular migrants working in the 
domestic care work constitute the largest percentage (31.3 percent), followed by the 
construction sector (with 29.32 percent).  In contrast, only 13.9 percent of the 
migrants with legal documentation, and just 0.54 percent of native Greek citizens, 
work in domestic care.  In construction, almost the same proportion of migrants with 
valid documentation work in this sector (28.51 percent), whereas only 6.91 percent 
of native Greek citizens do so (Kanellopoulos et al., 2006: 80-81). In some cases, 
Greece is not the final destination, but merely a transit country for irregular migrants 
who are heading to Northern European countries. However, there is also a group of 
migrants who have been served with a deportation order by the Greek authorities, 
who add to the existing migrant population in Athens who work in the informal 
market. 
Greece‟s borders are difficult to effectively monitor for migratory 
movements. As Kenellopoulos et al. (2006: 51) put it, “Greek territory, in particular, 
includes a vast coastline (approximately 16,000 km) and a multitude of greater or 
lesser islands and rocky islets (over 3,000), the majority of which lie close to the 
Turkish coast, so they constitute the “gate of entrance” of thousands of immigrants 
and refugees into Europe annually”. Consequently, clandestine entry constitutes a 
significant part of irregular migration into Greece. For example, during the 1990s, 
many migrants, most of whom were Albanians, entered clandestinely on foot across 
the mountainous Greece-Albania border (Maroukis, 2009: 20), while the land and sea 
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borders with Bulgaria, FYROM and Turkey were the other frequently used 
clandestine entry points. The border between Greece and Turkey, particularly the 
many Greek islands (such as Samos, Chios and Leros) lying between the two 
countries‟ mainlands, attracted a lot of attention as clandestine entry points 
(Maroukis, 2009: 20).  
 
5.2. A brief overview of Immigration Policies of Greece  
  The welfare services offered to non-European immigrants are rather less 
developed in Greece when compared to other European states (Ribas-Mateos, 2005).  
In relation to that, Ribas-Mateos (2005) even argues that “the analysis of new 
immigration flows demonstrates that they constitute one of the clearest expressions 
of social inequality in the context of the European Union. This is particularly true in 
the case of Greece” (Ribas-Mateos, 2005: 41-2). According to the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index, Greece ranks 16
th
 among 31 migrant receiving countries, in 
terms of best practiced on integration policies, such as anti-discrimination, political 
participation and labour market access (MIPEX, 2011).  For example, Greece does 
not have any provisions regarding the education of immigrants, and when it comes to 
immigrant children they cannot receive their grades unless they provide residence 
permits or birth certificates (Petronoti, 2001: 52). Regarding labour market 
integration, Albanians, one of the largest immigrant groups, mostly work in the 
informal sector under poor working conditions and with low wages (Lazaridis, 
2004). In short, the integration of immigrants into Greek society is mostly 
problematic. As Petronoti (2001: 55) describes the situation, “[e]xisting laws do not 
encourage their mobilization, no initiatives are developed by the state regarding self-
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determination, officials only provide ad hoc solutions and there is lack of 
institutional means for confronting ethnic demands”.  
The first immigration law of 1991 mainly aimed at controlling inflows by 
imposing strict measures in line with the Schengen priorities (Triandafyllidou, 
2000A). Both the entry and residence of labour immigrants were made almost 
impracticable, and it disregarded the presence of large numbers of immigrants in the 
country; instead it concentrated on restricting further immigration (Triandafyllidou, 
2009).  Thus, since the 1990s, Greece has strengthened its border control 
mechanisms. For example, cooperation between the different police departments that 
manage controls on the land, sea and air borders has been enhanced. The state has 
also established 58 different departments of border guards. In addition to controls on 
the borders, inspection within Greek territory has been increased and intensified as 
well. Sanctions on those who employ or provide any assistance in general (such as 
housing) to irregular migrants have been made heavier. Police have the authority to 
check the immigration status of immigrants on the streets and to make arrests when 
necessary (Kanellopoulos et al., 2006: 15). In the first half of 2009, the Greek 
government started a large scale operation of arresting and, when possible, deporting 
irregular immigrants. These operations have taken place in various public places, 
such as metro stations, squares and inner-city neighbourhoods.  These operations led 
to, 28,350 irregular immigrants being arrested and deported from Greek territory in 
the first six months of 2009 (Triandafyllidou, 2010: 2).  Overall, the state has 
developed strict control measures for incoming immigration, but without addressing 
in a systematic manner the settlement of incoming immigrants (Petronoti, 2001).  For 
example, the 1991 law included rather restrictive provisions regarding family 
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reunification rights and labour market integration. Specifically, family unification 
rights were only granted to those who have been living in Greece at least for five 
years, while work permits were only granted for a specific job category in a specific 
place with a specific employer.  If any of these conditions changed, the permit 
became invalid (Tsoukala, 1999).  Petronoti (2001) summarizes the situation of 
immigrants in Greece at the beginning of the 2000s in the following manner:  
[I]mmigrants accommodate themselves without any help from the state. … 
Neither birth in Greece nor marriage to Greeks automatically entitles a person 
to citizenship; so few immigrants have citizenship rights that they are 
analytically irrelevant (45).   
 
The restrictive tone which emerged with the 1991 law did, however, soften a 
little as of 2001.  Political parties on both the right and left of the political spectrum 
realized the problems immigrants encountered and, began to include measures in 
their party programs relating to regularisation, immigrant workers‟ rights, 
naturalization, and integration in general (Triandafyllidou, 2009). Likewise, the 2001 
immigration law was not only concerned with border control measures but also had 
provisions relating to labour immigration, family reunion, return migration of ethnic 
Greeks, immigration for purposes of study, and asylum seeking (Triandafyllidou, 
2009).  Nevertheless, during this period, the two major political parties, the Socialists 
and the Conservatives, still adopted and supported similarly restrictive and 
reactionary policies while in power (Triandafyllidou, 2009).  The law adopted in 
2005 (3386/2005) also did not very much alter the restrictive tendencies of Greece‟s 
immigration policy, as its main goal was to incorporate the EU acquis on 
immigration and asylum, rather than to reform the conditions of immigrant 
integration.  
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Geddes (2003) argues that these restrictive immigration policies have opened 
up lots of space for irregularities in migratory movements across Greece. Because 
official routes to enter Greece are either “malfunctioning” or “hardened” most 
immigrants enter Greece illegally (Maroukis, 2009: 13).  For example, entering 
Greece with a visa for dependent work purposes, metaklisi
24
, requires a very lengthy 
and thoroughly bureaucratic process, which starts with an employer applying to his 
or her municipality to invite a foreign worker. The application then goes through 
various cross-checks and reports in a variety of bureaucracies, such as the 
Organization for the Employment of the Labour Force, the Regional Directorate of 
Foreigners and Immigration, the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection, 
Greek consular authorities abroad, and so on.  Research into this issue indicates, 
unsurprisingly, that few employers prefer to hire immigrants through this procedure; 
instead they hire from among immigrants who are already in the country, which, 
contrary to the intention of the legislation, encourages immigrants in the Greek 
labour market to take on an irregular status. Additionally, delays in the metaklisi 
process have the potential to harm Greece‟s economic activity, especially in the 
tourism and agricultural sectors, where fluctuating demand for workers requires 
immediate flexible supply of labour (Maroukis, 2009).  
On the other hand, Greek immigration law is relatively more favourable 
towards co-ethnics. For example, after 1989, and especially in 1993, ethnic Greeks 
began returning from the former Soviet bloc. In order to facilitate the arrival of these 
repatriates and their naturalisation, various laws were enacted (Baldwin-Edwards 
2009; 41).  For example, an significant proportion of Albanians in Greece are co-
ethnics and identify themselves as Greeks, and they hold an identification card called 
                                                     
24
 Maroukis (2009) provides a brief but comprehensive explanation of metaklisi. 
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EDTO, which is called the Special Identity Card for Omogeneis (co-ethnics). EDTO 
holders are relatively more privileged than other immigrant groups as they are only 
required to renew their permit every three years instead of each year (Maroukis, 
2009). However, they are not privileged as much as Pontic Greeks, who are the co-
ethnic returnees from the ex-Soviet countries (Maroukis, 2009).  
Regularisation of the status of irregular immigrants is another important 
policy tool for immigration management in the Greek context. The first 
regularisation in Greece was implemented in 1998 following legislation in 1997. 
Three more regularisation programmes were approved in 2001, 2005 and 2007.  The 
first regularisation of 1997 was not a response to a popular movement but it rather 
emerged as “an emergency measure or admission of policy failure” (Baldwin-
Edwards, 2009: 42) because, although there had been massive expulsions of irregular 
immigrants, large-scale immigration could not be prevented, and thus a need for 
regularisation emerged. Unfortunately, however, the design of the regularisation 
programme created a bureaucratic mess, both for the state itself and for immigrant 
applicants. For example, among other documents, immigrant applicants were asked 
to provide a certificate of health from a Greek state hospital and a criminal record 
from the Ministry of Justice. However, the lack of communication between the 
relevant ministries created massive delays. As a result, the deadline for the 
application had to be extended three times. “These extensions were necessitated 
entirely through the inability of the Greek state to produce appropriate 
documentation as it had obliged itself to do” (Baldwin-Edwards, 2009: 46). 
Additionally, in another requirement, Greek was the only language used in 
information and application forms, which made things very difficult for many 
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applicants. Newspapers, and various civil society organizations, had to come to the 
help of the immigrants in the process (Baldwin-Edwards, 2009). Subsequent 
regularisations entailed similarly challenging bureaucratic contradictions and 
impossibilities. According to Baldwin-Edwards (2009: 52), the 2001 regularisation 
was characterized by the “lack of planning of any sort”, which was not unexpected 
given that it had been prepared in only five working days as a result of public 
pressure.  As for the 2005 regularisation, similar Kafkaesque bureaucratic 
contradictions occurred.  For example, for the regularisation of those irregular 
immigrants who had held a permit, the state required, among other documents, the 
provision of a VAT number and a certificate of a social security institution. 
However, in order to receive a social security certificate, the immigrant had to be 
registered for tax, but in order to have a tax registration, the immigrant had to have a 
residence permit. That is to say, immigrants had to have a residence permit at one 
point in order to apply for regularisation, although the stated objective of that 
provision was to legalize immigrants who had never held a residence permit 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2009: 54).  As a final example, during the 2007 regularisation, 
immigrants could buy their own social insurance stamps (although this was in fact 
the duty of the employer). Yet, although the legislation allowed immigrants to buy 
them, “the social insurance agencies refused to allow immigrants to purchase social 
insurance stamps on the grounds that they had not been informed of the Law” 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2009: 60). In short, regularisations in Greece have not been very 
promising, either for the state itself or for the irregular immigrants.  Baldwin-
Edwards (2009) describes the Greek regularisation processes as situations within 
which 
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neither the state nor the immigrants have much idea of how to manage the 
situation. The result is an overburdened state and immigrant applicants left in 
limbo, which is greatly to the benefit of lawyers, mafia operators and corrupt 
state officials (62). 
 
Taken as a whole, it might be concluded that Greek immigration policies have 
a rather restrictive mode. The goal of the policies have mainly prioritized the defence 
of the state‟s „security‟ and the welfare of Greek citizens in the first place, instead of 
establishing a framework that protects and guarantees the interests of immigrants 
(Petronoti, 2001: 41).   
 
 
5.3. Irregular Immigration Policies and Rights of ‘Irregulars’ in Greece 
 
  In Greece, there is more than one pathway leading to the status of being an 
irregular immigrant.  First, there are immigrants who have crossed the borders 
clandestinely. Second, there are those who have entered in compliance with existing 
visa requirements, for example by obtaining a tourist visa, but have overstayed their 
visa by continuing to stay in Greece instead of leaving. Third, there are those who 
were once asylum seekers but whose applications have been rejected, most of whom 
also continue to stay in the country as irregular immigrants.  Finally, there are those 
who had previously regularized their status through regularisation programs but 
whose immigration status has somehow fallen back into „illegality‟ (Maroukis, 
2009).   
The 1991 immigration law made irregular immigration an offence punishable 
by a jail sentence (Geddes, 2003), and according to Law 3386/2005 (article 83, 
para.1), illegal border crossing is still an imprisonable offense:  
Third-country nationals who exit or attempt to exit Greece or enter or attempt 
to enter Greece without legal formalities shall be punished by imprisonment of 
at least three months and a fine of at least EUR one thousand five hundred 
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(€1,500).  
 
The same article also opens the way for an immediate repatriation of the 
offender, or detention and deportation if immediate return is not possible. Law 
3386/2006 allows detention to continue until deportation, unless this period exceeds 
6 months. However, 
[i]f deportation is delayed because the alien refuses to cooperate or the 
documents necessary for his deportation are not sent timely from the home 
country or the country of origin of the alien, his detention may be extended for 
a limited time which cannot exceed twelve (12) months (para.3, article 76).   
 
Although this is how the law outlines the measures related to detention and 
expulsion, in practice    
[i]n most of the cases deportation is not concluded neither within the period of 
detention nor afterwards. Then the irregular immigrant is released and receives 
an order to leave the country within a period of a month (Spathana, 2009: 3). 
 
Thus, many irregular immigrants who have been issued with a deportation 
order add to Greece‟s irregular immigrant population.  What happens to these 
immigrants if they do not leave the country is an important and worrying question, as 
it is unclear how they can satisfy their basic needs, such as shelter, work or health. It 
is also unclear to what extent the system recognises them as persons who are eligible 
for basic human rights.  
The 2000 immigration law created a situation in which irregular immigrants 
had very limited access to public services, such as health and education (Geddes, 
2003).  In fact, Law 3386/2005 (article 71, para.1) states that “[t]hird-country 
nationals legally residing in Greece shall be insured with the relevant insurance 
organizations and all have the same insurance rights as Greek nationals”. Law 
2910/2001 also states this right in a similar fashion. However, this provision makes a 
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clear distinction between „legal‟ and „illegal‟ immigrants by explicitly stating that 
social security will be provided only for legally residing third-country nationals, 
thereby excluding irregular immigrants from such protection.  When it comes to the 
right to education, the relevant law on the education of minors is more generous.  
Law 3386/2005 (article 72, para.1) states that “[m]inor third-country nationals 
residing on Greek territory shall be subject to mandatory schooling, just like Greek 
nationals”. Note that, in this case, the „legal‟ attribute before residence is not 
included, so it can be concluded that this provision guarantees the right to education 
for immigrant minors regardless of their immigration status. This is confirmed by 
paragraph 3 of the same article, which clearly states that  
[b]y way of exception, children of third-country nationals may enrol in public 
schools with insufficient documentation when: … (case d.) They are third-
country nationals residing in Greece, even if their legal residence therein has 
not been regulated.  
 
Thus, the Greek state recognizes the right to education as a fundamental 
human right and guarantees it for all minor immigrants, although not to non-minors, 
regardless of the legality of residence.   
Two other provisions, which regulate the obligations of agencies and officers, 
are also important for better understanding the degree of official recognition of the 
fundamental rights of irregular immigrants. The first, Article 84 in Law 3386/2005, 
states that  
[p]ublic agencies, legal entities in public law, local authorities, public utility 
organizations and corporations and social security organizations shall not 
provide their services to third-country nationals who do not hold any passport 
or other travel document recognized by international conventions, or visa or 
residence permit and, generally, cannot prove that they have legally entered 
and reside in Greece, with the exception of hospitals and clinics, in case of 
third-country nationals urgently admitted for treatment and minors (para.1).   
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In addition, the following paragraph (4) states that  
[a]ny officer of the above agencies and bodies who violate the provisions of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall be subject to disciplinary proceedings 
and shall be punished, according to the provisions of the Penal Code, for 
breach of duty.   
 
Clearly, these provisions block irregular immigrants‟ access to any kind of 
social service except emergency health care offered in hospitals and clinics. 
However, even access to emergency health service is compromised by another 
provision which requires service providers, including hospital personnel, to inform 
the police about the arrival and departure of irregular immigrants.  
The second law, Article 51 of Law (2910/2001), states the following:  
Managers of hotels, holiday resorts, clinics and infirmaries shall inform the 
police service or the aliens‟ and immigration service about the arrival and 
departure of any aliens they lodge (Article54; para.2).   
 
Thus, the 2001 immigration law indirectly restricted access to emergency 
health care by obliging the service provider to inform the police or the immigration 
service about the presence of an irregular immigrant. In other words, for irregular 
migrants, going to clinics, even for emergency matters, carried a serious risk of 
detention and deportation.  However, in the new immigration law of 2005, this clause 
was rewritten in a manner that no longer obliged hospital personnel to report on the 
arrival and departure of irregular immigrants, softening the previously very 
restrictive attitude towards irregular immigrants‟ access to emergency health; 
however, other restrictive measures have remained in play, meaning that irregular 
immigrants‟ access to any type of social service in Greece is almost totally restricted, 
including, most importantly, health care provision beyond emergency services.  
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5.4. Democratic Accountability and Irregular Immigration  
   In this section, I analyze the role of two democratic accountability 
mechanisms, civil society participation and court rulings, in the protection of the 
rights of irregular immigrants. To do this, I describe the patterns within which mainly 
civil society, but also to some extent the courts, are involved in matters concerning 
irregular immigrants‟ access to fundamental rights. This analysis builds on the 
theoretical discussions set out in the Chapter 3, and it relies heavily on the data 
gathered during the in-depth interviews conducted in Athens in February 2010. I 
interviewed a trade union representative, three academic researchers, two experts 
from the Ombudsman‟s office, three NGOs (two national and one international) 
representatives, a representative from an international governmental organization, 
and two migrants‟ organization representatives. 
 
 
5.4.1. Civil Society in Migration Policy-Making 
Both national and international NGOs play the role of intermediary between 
the state and immigrants, arguing for the interests of the latter on humanitarian 
grounds, particularly by defending and lobbying for their fundamental human rights. 
These NGOs also provide specific services to immigrants, such as food, shelter, 
material aid, legal counselling (Petronoti, 2001: 46).  Left-wing NGOs, and also 
recently emerging migrant associations, actively lobby to put immigration onto the 
political agenda (Triandafyllidou, 2009). Greek trade unions, on the other hand, have 
not been very effective in protecting the rights of immigrants, partly because of Law 
1264/1982, which restricts trade union participation on cases without a work permit, 
and partly because immigrants prefer to remain silent in the public sphere (Petronoti, 
  
 
133 
2001: 45). Thus, in the 1990s, trade unions demonstrated an ambivalent attitude 
towards immigration. At first, they were puzzled by the sudden influx of immigrants, 
and couldn‟t decide whether or not an ideology of working-class solidarity also 
included immigrants. However, during recent years they have adopted a more pro-
immigrant attitude (Triandafyllidou, 2009). For example, GSEE, the General 
Confederation of Greek Workers, has become active on matters concerning 
immigrant admission and bureaucratic obstacles facing immigrants. The Greek 
church has also not been particularly interested in the area of immigration 
(Triandafyllidou, 2009: 166).  
It is important to analyze the actions of such organizations because, according 
to Petronoti (2001: 57), bottom-up activities originating within civil society “open up 
space for rethinking” on (multi)culture, homogeneity and heterogeneity, even when 
the state does not seem to be committed to radical changes. My analysis of the 
interviews I conducted in Greece further develops this point, raised in the existing 
literature, and contributes to the arguments developed there concerning civil 
society‟s interaction with immigration related matters in general, and the rights of 
irregular immigrants in particular.  
In order to better understand the role and actions of civil society regarding the 
rights of irregular immigrants I pose two questions:  
 Is civil society active in offering certain social assistance to immigrants in 
general and irregular immigrants in particular? 
 
 Does civil society have the capacity to put pressure on the government on 
matters concerning the rights conditions of immigrants in general and 
irregular immigrants in particular?  
 
Concerning the first question, the findings I gathered from the interviews 
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indicate that there is a general awareness within Greek civil society that there are 
large numbers of irregular immigrants in the country, and that these people are in 
need of help as the Greek state does not provide much in terms of such services. 
Thus, civil society organizations fill a rather large gap by offering specific social 
services to immigrants, especially to those who lack any legal documents. Although 
this help may not be as systematic, regular and guaranteed for all as would be the 
case if it were offered by the state, still these services offered by NGOs make a huge 
difference for the lives of those who lack any type of security and/or social 
insurance. One interviewee‟s account illustrates the type of services that NGOs 
provide to irregular immigrants: 
We have polyclinics. And we provide with doctors, dentists, a gynecologist, 
and organized psycho social services. We provide medical treatment, exams for 
free, without any fee… And we give also drugs without any fee. Because most 
of immigration they do not have any legalization in Greece. So they are totally 
excluded from the medical system. For this reason we give them this support. 
We do not stop on that only. We have organized law services and we try to 
give them the support they need in order to legalize. On the other hand, we 
have councillors and we try when they are already legalized to provide to them 
help in order to be integrated in the labour market. Apart of that we have teams 
that they are very experienced with doctors, nurse, social worker, and 
psychologist, and we call them mobile units, and we try to reach marginalized 
immigration population at the several parks or abandoned houses they are 
going to find shelter. … What we are doing in order to give them to provide 
them emergency medical treatment, and on the other hand, in order to give 
them support for the hygiene and all the other [needs], because the situation is 
terrible. (NGO representative-II, personal communication, March 4, 2010) 
This particular NGO carries out its work right in the centre of Athens, in a 
district called Omonio, which is the hub of Athen‟s immigrant population. The above 
description of its work is important for a two primary reasons. First, it clearly 
underlines the point that the status of „illegal‟ immigrant totally excludes a person 
from access to even very basic emergency healthcare in Greece. It also shows that 
there are civil society organizations seeking to fill that gap. That is, despite the 
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state‟s restrictive regulation of the rights of irregular immigrants, certain civil society 
organizations have developed opposing policies and actions in order to provide the 
social assistance that is prevented by the Greek state, with the potential to influence 
the actual rights conditions of some of the irregular immigrants in the country.  
However, it should also be underlined that social assistance provided by NGOs 
cannot totally compensate for the state‟s violation of the human rights of irregular 
immigrants; neither can it fully alleviate the rights conditions of irregulars, although 
it may at least reduce the gravity of their problems.  
Another interviewee, a representative of an international NGO, confirms that 
the state relies heavily on such services offered by the NGOs. However, the 
respondent emphasizes that it is not very easy for these organizations to offer social 
assistance, as the funding they receive from external sources does not come 
regularly.  Consequently, sometimes they have put in a lot of money themselves, 
which can cause situations where the workers of these organizations could not get 
their salaries for months:  
For example, we have been paid for this program until not the whole 2009. We 
have been paid for half 2009, but the program is running and the ministry 
knows that our organization will run this program. And this is not only our 
case; this is also the case of Praksis, of the Doctors of the Borders... And of 
course we are lucky because we are being paid or you know… the expenses of 
the program is covered. But the other organizations that do not have many 
means, we know that our colleagues are not being paid for months. They have 
forgotten what was the last time they were paid. And the ministry knows this. 
(International NGO representative, personal communication, February 22, 
2010) 
This supports the argument that the social assistance offered by civil society to 
immigrants cannot be as regular as it would be if offered by state agencies. It also 
shows that NGOs themselves are in need of material aid, without which they cannot 
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continue the services they offer to the immigrants. Despite these problems, it is also 
clear that various national and international NGOs operating within Greek civil 
society have been able to provide significant social services to irregular immigrants; 
certainly, they have been able to make a difference in the lives of those immigrants 
that they have been able to reach.         
Regarding the second question, whether or not civil society has the capacity to 
put pressure on the government on matters concerning the rights of irregular 
immigrants and can trigger the emergence of more protective measures, the picture is 
much more blurred. Civil society‟s influence on government has not been as 
developed as their activities concerning voluntary social services offered to irregular 
immigrants. Most of my respondents agreed that civil society cannot exert much 
pressure on governments on matters concerning the rights of immigrants, even 
though there are certain organizations that specifically seek to do this.  On the other 
hand, one respondent stated that there are also cases where the government appoints 
NGO experts or an Ombudsman onto immigration related committees. Such 
inclusion might be considered as providing an opportunity with the potential to 
incorporate the rights-based approach of civil society into the decision-making 
processes.  Although the interviewees overall depicted a rather pessimistic picture 
concerning NGO influence on government, I would still argue that there is not 
enough evidence to conclude that Greek civil society organizations are completely 
inactive or ineffective in influencing their governments on matters concerning the 
rights of irregular immigrants. There are various examples of times when civil 
society activism has created a more inclusive atmosphere. The first shows how 
pressure from civil society caused the government of the time to refrain from 
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enacting rather restrictive legislation that would have limited the right to education of 
immigrant children: 
There was a ministry circular about schools, that migrant children should 
provide the papers of their parents. The circular was drafted in 2002 or 
something, but it never came into force because the federation of teachers 
refused to obey. It was an example of civil disobedience. (Researcher-III, 
personal communication, February 25, 2010) 
 
Another example suggests that regulations on health services were opposed by 
a similar kind of civil disobedience within civil society: 
There was another circular, in 2000 ... the minister of health then, saying that 
undocumented migrants should be accepted and treated in public hospitals only 
in cases of emergency. But this also, doctors do not really, medical associations 
of Greece reacted and said we cannot do that, we cannot refuse someone 
healthcare, and how we can define an „emergency‟ case? I mean, is pregnancy 
an emergency case or not...? (Researcher-III, personal communication, 
February 25, 2010) 
  
As these examples show, even if civil society organizations were not able to 
stop a restrictive measure from being introduced, they were able to impede their full 
implementation.  In both of the above examples, government decisions were opposed 
by civil society, and implementation of the policies was matched by civil 
disobedience, which in turn disrupted their implementation. 
For a long time, ironically, among all the pro-migrant organizations within 
the civil society, migrants‟ associations were the least influential actors when it 
comes to influencing government decisions concerning the protection of the rights of 
irregular immigrants. Triandafyllidou (2009) recalls that  
up until 2007 Greek governments had only allowed for human rights‟ NGOs 
to be heard in Parliament when discussing migration legislation. It was only 
in 2006 that selected representatives of migrant organizations were invited to 
speak to the Parliamentary Committee preparing the new law voted in 2007 
(171).  
 
The inferior position of migrant organizations in the so-called „social 
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dialogue‟ was highlighted by most of the interviewees. The participation of these 
organizations in policy-making was especially discussed in relation to the work of 
the Committee for the Social Integration of Immigrants. Various respondents noted 
the way in which this committee was established, as they considered that this had had 
implications for the influence of migrants‟ organizations on government policies. 
The rest of this section provides examples of these remarks in relation to the 
committee. However, I first describe the remit of the committee itself.  
Law 3386/2005, as amended in 2007 by Article 1 of Law 3536/2007, 
provided for the establishment of a “National Committee for the Social Integration of 
Immigrants” in the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation. 
Regarding its composition, according to the said provision, other than governmental 
and other official bodies, the committee would include representatives from the 
Central Association of Municipalities and Communities of Greece (KEDKE), the 
Association of the Prefectures of Greece (ENAE), the Church of Greece, university 
scientific teaching staff, each parliamentary group, the Supreme Administration of 
Civil Servants Association (ADEDY), the General Confederation of Workers of 
Greece (GSEE), the General Greek Trade Confederation (ESEE), the Athens 
Chambers Commerce and Industry (EBEA), the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and the Athens Bar Association.  Paragraph 4 of the same article 
lists the tasks of the committee as 
(i) to make recommendations and actions relating to the social integration of 
immigrants to the Interministerial Committee…, (ii) to conduct social 
dialogue and dialogue with the civil society for the establishment of policies 
that promote the integration of immigrants in all areas, pursuant to 
international law and the European acquis, (iii) to prepare and monitor 
operational programmes relating to the implementation of social integration 
policy for immigrants. 
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Some of my respondents criticised the committee‟s composition for not 
including any representatives from any migrants‟ organization. As one put it, 
 
[i]n the Commission of Social Inclusion of Migrants there are no 
representatives of migrants. There are the Greeks that decide how to include 
and how to legislate on the matter of migration in Greece. We don‟t have the 
opportunity to listen the opinion of migrants. (Trade Union representative, 
personal communication, February 26, 2010)  
 
The same respondent continued: 
[a]nd in this commission, we proposed, the trade unions proposed that five 
members of the biggest migrants‟ organizations have to be represented in this 
commission. Our proposition have been voted for the majority unanimously 
of the other 24 members in this commission. And the minister of interior, 
which is inside of this commission, insisted on the fact that we don‟t need to 
listen the migrants. Simple. Listen, even the church here, because church here 
- all over the world - but here especially in Greece, the Greek Orthodox 
Church is very, very conservative. They voted for our proposition. The 
representative of the Greek Church is this commission voted for the rights of 
Muslims to have their own church… The state is more conservative than the 
Greek Church. (Trade Union representative, personal communication, 
February 26, 2010) 
 
This respondent‟s account of the composition of the Committee for the Social 
Integration of Immigrants highlights the rather weak position of migrants‟ 
organizations in relation to the state.  According to the respondent, the government 
does not consider migrants‟ organizations as relevant actors that should be called 
upon while making policy decisions concerning immigrants.  This supports the 
argument that migrants‟ organizations in Greece do not have much of an influence on 
state regulation on immigration in general, and irregular immigration in particular, at 
least during in formal decision-making forums.  On the other hand, one respondent 
from a migrants‟ organization noted that there are indications that the government is 
now willing to open negotiations with his organization. This suggests that, in the 
future at least, migrants‟ organizations may gain greater influence on policies 
  
 
140 
concerning immigrants. 
One final remark on migrants‟ organizations that should be made concerns 
the material conditions under which they continue their operations. It is relatively 
much harder for them to continue their existence as they have to struggle hard for 
material support and funding.  This lack of support and funding was emphasized by 
my respondents as an important factor weakening migrants‟ organizations compared 
to other civil society actors in Greece, and impeding their capacity to participate in 
the policy process. As one respondent said,  
 
They don‟t have any support. We expect that they should have financial 
support and this is very important because they don‟t have support. Actually 
there is no way of financial support of any NGOs or whatever if it is Greek or 
not. (Migrant Organization representative-I, personal communication, 
February 28, 2010) 
 
However, respondents also mentioned another problem, which is the 
insufficient support given by the migrants themselves to their own organizations, as 
noted in the following statement:   
 
Migrant organizations are weak because first of all there is not any kind of 
support. There is lack of experience. Most of them, they are coming from 
countries such activities, such organizations are not part of their tradition. 
You know you can see this from the numbers. Almost 80% of immigrants are 
coming from ex-communist systems so they don‟t have this self organizing 
organization. This democratic, non-governmental schema is not part of their 
tradition. (Migrant Organization representative-I, personal communication, 
February 28, 2010) 
 
Although this argument is hard to verify, this and financial problems faced by 
migrants‟ organizations calls attention to the fact that, currently, these organizations 
simply do not have the capacity to influence state regulation on the rights of those 
they seek to support, particularly irregular immigrants. Additionally, these 
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organizations are in no position to offer them enough social assistance to more or 
less compensate for their losses arising from the restrictive state policies that deny 
them access to their fundamental rights. The following respondent illustrates this 
point, albeit indirectly from a different perspective:  
Migrant organizations they are trying to fight for the right immigrants that 
they are legal in Greece. They do not have the opportunity or the possibility 
to force for the illegal immigrants. (NGO representative-II, personal 
communication, March 4, 2010) 
 
This admission underlines the problem that, when migrants‟ organizations are 
pressing for the cause of the immigrants, most of the time it is „legal‟ rather than 
„illegal‟ immigrants that they work for.  When it comes to supporting the rights of 
irregular immigrants, the migrants‟ organizations are much less active and 
influential, and they choose to (or have to) confine their activities within the limits of 
legality. 
My respondents clearly demonstrate the rather weak influence of migrants‟ 
organizations over immigration policy making, and they consider this to be a 
problem.  However, one migrants‟ organization representative claimed that this will 
change, as they have been working in that direction. On the other hand, the 
interviewees were unable to point to any particular type of organization in Greek 
civil society that is better able to lobby for the rights of irregular immigrants. 
Whereas, as I analyse in the next chapter, Spanish trade unions emerge as the type of 
organization having the most potential to lobby for the rights of irregular immigrants, 
in the Greek context, one cannot identify any such effective organization in civil 
society. My interviews in Greece also revealed that the pro-immigrant actions of 
Greek civil society tend to focus more on civil disobedience against existing 
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legislation rather than lobbying activity during the making of legislation concerning 
the rights of immigrants. In other words, civil society, mostly in the case of doctors 
and teachers, protests the restrictive and illiberal decisions of the governments in the 
form of not obeying them. However, civil society does not emerge as very influential 
in terms of pressuring government to draft more liberal legislation. One respondent 
explained this by referring to the culture of politics within Greece that is unaware of 
or uninterested in the views of civil society:   
But this culture here in Greece – the state, the government, every government 
– do not want to listen the opinion of NGOs, of trade unions, of migrants. 
They consider that they know everything. They don‟t consider that they have 
to listen the opinion to decide of migrants. (Trade Union representative) 
 
Although I think that one should be cautious before explaining a specific 
situation by reference to an overall culture (or at least it is beyond the scope of this 
study to argue whether this is the case), I can nevertheless conclude that this 
respondent‟s identification of a patterned relationship between the Greek state and 
civil society has a potential to explain civil society‟s inability to exert its influence on 
state legislation.   For example, Koumandaraki (2002) argues that, during the 
modernization of the Greek state in the 20
th
 century that involved the reinforcement 
of the central state‟s rule over the country‟s regional nobility, civil society became 
obedient to the central government (Koumandaraki, 2002: 40). Thus, using 
Koumandaraki‟s argument, the particular weakness of Greek civil society in 
lobbying for the rights of (irregular) immigrants may reflect a deeper problematic 
relationship between the state and civil society in Greece.   
In the interviews, I also asked questions concerning the Greek public‟s 
overall attitude towards irregular immigration and immigrants. While the information 
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I gathered in this way is obviously not a substitute for public opinion survey data, 
which more accurately represent the overall attitude of the public on a particular 
topic, it is important as it gives us an idea about the public sphere within which civil 
society organizations operate concerning irregular immigration. If there is a 
relatively more receptive public atmosphere towards irregular immigrants then I can 
expect that this also helps, or least would not hinder, the development of the pro-
immigrant actions of civil society. However, as Maroukis (2009: 28) notes, irregular 
migration has rather negative connotations in Greek society. Lathrometanastefsi, 
which means “smuggle-migration”, is the name given to irregular migration in 
Greece.  Recently, irregular immigration is generally understood mainly in terms of 
the human smuggling activities operating across the Greek-Turkish border 
(Maroukis, 2009: 30). Similarly, some of the respondents pointed out that there is a 
certain degree of anti-immigrant sentiment in Greece, and most of them argued that, 
with the current economic crisis, public attitudes towards immigrants will become 
more and more negative.  More importantly, concerning the social rights of irregular 
immigrants, one representative stated that the social security system in Greece has 
collapsed, which will badly affect the situation of irregular migrants: 
Our security system is collapsed. We have to renovate all the system and 
unfortunately public opinion considers that we have to exclude the migrants 
from having access to social services, for free public social services. This is a 
transitory period for our country concerning the irregular migrants. (Trade 
Union representative, personal communication, February 26, 2010) 
Although this respondent implies that Greek people in general are against 
providing free public health and education services to irregular immigrants, a clear 
conclusion about this can only be made from the data from a representative public 
opinion survey on the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants. Nevertheless, 
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earlier research, based on interviews with public officials, NGO representatives and 
trade unionists, concluded that, in Greece, “claims to human rights, the principle of 
equality and working class solidarity are overall weak and tend to be subsumed to the 
prevalent nationalist discourse of „Greeks first‟” (Triandafyllidou, 2000B: 384). 
Therefore, based on the information I gathered through my interviews, and that 
provided by earlier research, I conclude that the public sphere, and the overall 
atmosphere in Greece, is not very receptive towards irregular immigrants, and that 
the public in general do not seem to support the protection of the rights of irregular 
immigrants. However, to reiterate, reaching a more nuanced and certain conclusion 
on this topic would require further research, including comparative public opinion 
surveys.  
 
 
5.4.2. Courts 
In this study, I focus on the impact of democratic accountability mechanisms, 
and, together with the civil society activism, judicial activism is considered as a 
democratic accountability mechanism that can act as a liberal constraint on 
regulations concerning the rights of irregular immigrants. In other words, by ruling 
according to national liberal constitutions, and within the parameters of international 
human rights regimes, courts can prevent the human rights violations of irregular 
immigrants. For this reason, during the interviews in all three countries, I wished to 
discuss with my respondents any incidences where a court had reviewed and blocked 
the implementation of restrictive measures concerning the rights of irregular 
immigrants, such as access to public health care and education. That is, I asked 
whether or not there were any incidences where irregular immigrants had gone to the 
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courts to demand their rights.   
In Greece, based on the responses, I can conclude that court rulings are not an 
important factor that might put pressure on governments to revise measures that 
restrict irregular migrants‟ access to their social rights. When I asked what might be 
the possible causes of such a situation, one respondent gave the following 
explanation:  
They [irregular immigrants] are afraid [to go to courts]. In fact there are not 
many cases even from documented migrants as far as discrimination. 
Because, you know, there are two directives for the establishment of the 
principle of equal treatment, the European Directives, against discrimination 
in the administration and in the workplace. They have been transposed to 
national legislation but we don‟t have so many cases of migrants. We have 
addressed to competent authorities of these two directives. One is the 
ombudsman and the other one is the labour inspectorate board, as far as 
workplace is concerned. Even documented migrants, as far as I know, they do 
not address the court so easily. (Researcher-III, personal communication, 
February 25, 2010) 
 This response introduces two important points. First, it suggests that, even 
though a legal framework for protecting the rights of immigrants exists, there are not 
many applications to it complaining about discrimination. Secondly, it highlights that 
even documented migrants are afraid to go to courts, let alone irregular immigrants. 
When I asked the same respondent why immigrants would be reluctant to apply to 
the courts in defence of their rights, he gave as important reasons immigrant 
applicants‟ lack of practical knowledge about their rights and about how to ask for 
their rights:  
They do not know their rights, for example if someone is discriminated upon, 
for example if he takes less money than a colleague who is Greek, this is 
discrimination. And you know, according to these directives and according to 
law, it is not the victim, the burden of proof goes to the boss, for example, 
who discriminates. Not to the victim. Mostly migrants do not know, and here 
is one of the democratic accountability mechanisms who don‟t work maybe 
so efficiently. I mean they don‟t provide some practical information, even to 
migrant. In my opinion, ok? I am talking about how I see. I am working for 
  
 
146 
more than 10 years, I have also worked for NGOs. I think one thing is that 
mostly practical information is not provided about when I have a problem, 
when my boss does that, or in the administration if they don‟t serve me or 
something, there is no this practical knowledge. (Researcher-III, personal 
communication, February 25, 2010) 
 Together, these two responses demonstrate that Greek courts are not 
functioning as effective democratic accountability mechanisms in relation to 
immigration, especially in the case of irregular immigration. The most important 
reason behind this is that irregular immigrants, as well as immigrants with valid 
documents, are afraid to go the courts, or they do not even know their rights. For 
irregular immigrants, another reason may be the uncertainty of their status in law. 
That is, every immigrant has certain rights deriving from democratic liberal 
constitutions and international human rights regimes; however, at the same time, 
their presence within that particular territory is legally problematic in terms of that 
country‟s national legislation concerning migration. Therefore, the national courts 
have remained more or less outside the struggle to protect the rights of irregular 
immigrants. 
 
5.5. Concluding Remarks 
Starting by the 1980s the number of immigrants in Greece has grown very 
dramatically, and today immigrants constitute a very large portion of the Greek 
population.  More specifically 10.1 % of the 2010 population is constituted of 
immigrants who are mainly Albanians, Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians.  Numbers 
of asylum seekers and irregular immigrants are especially high and increasing in 
Greece.  The main reason for this situation is the country‟s geographical location 
within the European Union:  Greece emerges as an entry door for immigrants who 
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are heading to central and Northern European countries of the European Union.  
 Irregular immigrants in Greece work mainly in construction, domestic care, 
agriculture, repair work, tourism, catering and peddling in Greece.  Concerning the 
latter type of work, during the time of the field research in Athens, I found the 
chance to observe that street seller immigrants mainly from African countries make a 
long queue that started from the central Sintagma Square to the historical district 
Plaka.  Existing research states that Greece has adopted rather strict measures 
towards both the entry and residence of immigrants and as a result legal routes of 
labour immigration has turned out to be almost impracticable (Triandafyllidou, 
2000A; Triandafyllidou, 2009; Petronoti, 2001).  However, certain sectors of the 
Greek economy are dependent on immigrant labour and once immigrants enter the 
country, they are easily integrated into the informal market.  As a result, immigrants 
continue to come through illegal routes and they continue to live under “illegal” 
statuses in Greece.  Immigration rules and regulations of the state are rather 
intolerant towards the existence of immigrants without papers.  Irregular immigrants 
have very limited access to public services; hence official protection of their 
fundamental human rights is very much restricted.  Children of irregular immigrants 
have a right to benefit from public education according to the legislation.  A specific 
clause of the law grants this right especially to those minors who lack a regular legal 
residence. When it comes to health care provision, irregular immigrants could have 
an access only to emergency health care services.  Thus, the law does not block 
access to emergency health care; however the protection of this fundamental human 
right is complicated by other provisions which forbid public officers to offer their 
services to irregular immigrants and oblige them to inform the police when they 
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come across irregular immigrants.  Therefore, access to health care services in the 
country carries a certain risk of deportation in the case of irregular immigrants.   
 Findings of the interviews point out that there are various civil society 
organizations in Greece that offer very basic social assistance to irregular 
immigrants, and by this way they indirectly compensate for the lack of official 
protection of irregular immigrants‟ fundamental human rights.  These services cover 
most importantly health care assistance as the thin line between an emergency and a 
non-emergency situation may be rather complicated.  Adding to that there are also 
various civil society organizations that are protesting the rather restrictive nature of 
the treatment of irregular immigrants, and supporting a better protection of irregular 
immigrants‟ rights.  However, interview findings show that civil society activism on 
this matter does not have much of an impact on the state while decisions are being 
made in relation to the situation of irregular immigrants in the country.  In relation to 
the involvement of courts to the protection of irregular immigrants‟ rights, interview 
findings point out that irregular immigrants are reluctant to go to courts in order to 
revoke restrictive measures on fundamental human rights that block the application 
of universalistic measures.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
SPAIN 
 
 
 
 
6.1. History of Immigration in Spain 
 
Until the mid-1980s, similar to Greece (and other Southern European 
Countries), Spain used to be a country of emigration. The first significant wave of 
emigration took place between 1880 and 1930 when more than three million 
Spaniards emigrated to countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and 
Cuba.  The second wave of emigration came in the period between 1950 and 1970. 
This time, more than a million Spanish people moved to Northern European 
Countries, such as Switzerland, Germany and France. At the same time, there were 
of course immigration inflows to Spain within each of these periods; however, the 
number of incomers was not sufficient to change the balance from a negative net 
migration (Serrano et al. 2009). For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, Spain received 
tens of thousands of European retirees, who were looking for a warm climate, 
coupled with good amenities and low living costs. Additionally, a few thousand 
Moroccan workers and Latin American refugees arrived, who were running away 
from military dictatorships in their countries of origin (Arango, 2000). As Arango 
(2000: 255) explains, “until the mid-1980s, Spain could hardly be seen as an 
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immigration country. In the early years of that decade, the number of resident 
foreigners did not exceed 200,000 – two-thirds of them from Europe”. 
By the mid-1980s, however, Spain had become a country of immigration: and 
in the following 15 years, the number of immigrants trebled or quadrupled; annual 
immigration flows became regular; and the number of immigrants from Africa, Latin 
America and Asia increased strikingly. As a result, immigration has become an 
interest for public opinion and an important area of public policy (Arango, 2000: 
255).  “In 1999 there were fewer than 750,000 foreign residents in Spain, 
representing only 1.86% of the population. The latest data, from the beginning of 
2009, indicate that just ten years later there are more than 5.5 million immigrants, 
which is  12% of the population” (Lopez-Sala and Ferrero-Turrion, 2009: n/a). 
According to data from the National Statistics Institute, the largest group of 
immigrants in 2007 was Moroccans with 12.9 %, followed by Romanians and 
Ecuadorians with 11.7% and 9.5% respectively (Serrano et al., 2009). However, by 
the beginning of 2009, Romanians constituted the largest group of immigrants. Of 
non-EU citizens, Moroccans constituted the largest group, followed by Ecuadorians 
and Columbians, and Spain continues to attract non-EU immigrants from a diverse 
set of countries, such as Paraguay, Brazil, Ukraine and Pakistan (Lopez-Sala and 
Ferrero-Turrion, 2009).   
In the 1980s, during the initial stages of becoming a country of immigration, 
Spain was mainly a transit zone for immigrants, who were mainly from Latin 
America and Africa, and heading for Northern European countries. Later on, and 
gradually, immigrants came to settle within Spain turning it into a destination 
country for immigrants from various places, although it also retained its role as a 
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transit country. Various ways can be offered to explain Spain‟s transformation into 
an immigration country. One such explanation concerns the restrictive European 
migration policies of the mid-1970s and 1980s, which almost ruled out immigration 
to Northern European countries. Thus, instead of moving towards Central and 
Northern European countries, immigrants came to settle in Spain. In addition, 
Spain‟s entry into the European Union in 1986 can also be considered as an 
attraction for immigrants aiming to settle in an EU country. Thirdly, rapid economic 
growth also contributed to Spain‟s emergence as a destination country. Fourth, one 
can add the demand for immigrant labour for certain jobs in certain sectors of the 
Spanish economy, as these jobs were being turned down by the natives of the 
country.  Specifically, a need emerged in the Spanish labour market for low-paid „3D 
work‟ (dirty, dangerous and demeaning). For various reasons, Spaniards had become 
more and more reluctant to work in these types of jobs, which had created a demand 
on the part of employers for foreign workers. Thus, immigrant workers have 
gradually come to fill this „gap‟ in the Spanish labour market (Serrano et al., 2009: 
93).  Finally, one should also bear in mind the ever growing economic, social and 
political problems and hardships that prevent many people from living a decent life 
in Africa and Asia, which has pushed more and more people to migrate to European 
countries, including „new‟ countries of immigration such as Spain. According to a 
national survey conducted among migrants in 2007, the main reason for immigration 
to Spain was “searching for better quality of life”, with unemployment in the home 
country being commonly mentioned as one reason for moving to Spain (Serrano et 
al., 2009: 97).  Whether or not immigrants are actually able to achieve a better 
quality of life in Spain is questionable; however, the ever-deteriorating living 
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conditions in non-Western countries has certainly contributed a lot to the emergence 
of Southern European countries in general, and Spain in particular, as destination 
countries for non-EU migrants. 
As noted in the previous paragraph, immigrants tend to occupy low-paid jobs, 
which are usually turned down by Spanish natives. This means there is not intense 
competition between immigrants and natives concerning job vacancies, and that 
immigrant work does not have a negative effect on the wages of the natives (Lopez-
Sala and Ferrero-Turrion, 2009). Immigrants tend to work in unskilled jobs, mainly 
in construction, hotel services, intensive agriculture, and domestic service (Lopez-
Sala and Ferrero-Turrion, 2009). Although it is clear that immigrants come to Spain 
mainly for reasons of employment, Spain, similar to other countries of immigration, 
has been unable to successfully regulate foreign labour demand and supply through 
legislation (Arango and Finotelli, 2009: 83). As a result, “[t]he mismatch between 
inadequate policy regulations and strong demand for labour in the economy [has] 
fuelled irregular migration flows” (Arango and Finotelli, 2009: 83). 
Geographically, immigrants in Spain are mostly concentrated in certain areas, 
particularly Catalonia, Valencia, Madrid and Andalusia, in a “highly concentrated 
spatial distribution” (Ribas-Mateos, 2005). The conditions of the labour market, 
migrants‟ networks, and factors concerning housing and cultural practices all 
influence immigrants‟ preferences to settle in these regions. As a result of this 
unequal distribution across the country, in certain regions, immigrants constitute a 
significantly higher proportion of the total population. For example, according to 
2008 statistics in the Madrid region, immigrants make up 13.3% of the total 
population, and in Catalonia they constitute 12.81% whereas in other areas like 
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Asturias and Galicia they constitute 4.2 % and 2.67 % respectively (Serrano et al., 
2009: 96). 
Table 3 below gives specific descriptive statistics related to immigration in 
Spain. To help provide background information for contextualising the research 
question, the data here can be compared to the data in Table 1 in chapter 5 and Table 
5 in chapter 7, on Greece and Turkey respectively.  
 
 
Table 3: Migration Related Statistical Information on Spain 
 
Population (2010) 45.3 million 
Net Migration Rate (2005-2010) 7.9 migrants /1,000 population 
Immigrants as a percentage of total 
population (2010) 
14.1 % 
Inflow of asylum seekers (2009) 3,000 
Estimates of number of irregular 
foreign residents (2008) 
280,000 (minimum estimate) 
354,000 (maximum estimate) 
Number of apprehended irregular 
migrants at sea borders (2007) 
18,057 
 
Source: The data in this table is produced from multiple secondary sources: the 
figures in the first three lines are gathered from the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) data (available at 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/europe/southern-europe/spain, retrieved on 
07.10.10).  The data on the inflows of asylum seekers is from OECD-International 
Migration Data 2010 (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33931_45634233_1_1_1_37415,
00.html, retrieved on 07.10.10).  Estimates of irregular foreign residents is from 
Kovacheva and Vogel‟s (2009) study, which reports the results of  
"CLANDESTINO: Counting the uncountable – data and trends across Europe" 
project (2007-2009), funded by the European Commission, DG Research, Sixth 
Framework Programme. Finally, the number of apprehended irregular migrants is 
from the study of Arango and Finotelli (2009), which reports on the results of the 
project REGINE: Regularisations in Europe Study, on practices in the area of 
regularisation of illegally staying third country nationals in the member states of the 
EU. 
 
Table 3 shows that, at 14.1 percent, immigrants make up a slightly larger 
proportion of Spain‟s population than in Greece, which was 10.1 percent. The net 
  
 
154 
migration rate is also higher in Spain (7.9/1,000 people) than Greece for the same 
period.  However, Spain received far fewer asylum seekers in 2009 than Greece 
(3,000 compared to 15,930).  
In general, Spain does not attract asylum seekers as much as other European 
countries. According to 2008 data from CEAR (Comisión Española de Ayuda al 
Refugiado-the Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid), the number of asylum 
applications was 7,581 in 2007. Multiple reasons could be given for this. First, this 
may be because of low acceptance rates for asylum applications. According to 
CEAR‟s 2008 data for Spain, only 204 people were granted refugee status in 2007, 
while 90 percent of applications were turned down. Another explanation may derive 
from the specific conditions of Spain. Most asylum seekers find it easier to remain 
irregularly in the country and look for other ways of legalizing their stay, such as 
through regularization (Serrano et al., 2009).  In other words, rather than officially 
applying for refugee status, thereby putting their prospects of staying in the country 
at risk, asylum seekers prefer to remain irregularly and wait for regularization in 
order to legalize their status. Thus, most of the asylum seekers stay as irregular 
immigrants in Spanish territory, which increases the number of irregular immigrants 
in the country and lowers the rates of asylum applications.  
Like Greece, Spain attracts a large number of irregular immigrants: between 
300,000 and 1,800,000, depending on the source providing the figures (Serrano et al., 
2009: 101).  In Table 3, the highest estimate of the number of irregular foreign 
residents in Spain for 2008 is Kovacheva and Vogel‟s (2009) figure of 354,000. 
Other sources, depending on different methods of calculation, provide considerably 
larger estimates. For example, in 2005, there were 3.73 million foreigners registered 
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with local municipalities.
25
 However, only 1.98 million foreigners had a valid 
residence permit at that time, implying a difference of 1.75 million people, who may 
be considered as irregular immigrants (Serrano et al., 2009: 102).  
 
 
Table 4: Number of detected migrants at Spanish sea borders between 2000 
and 2007 
 
YEARS TOTAL APPREHENSIONS 
(at Sea Borders) 
2000 15,195 
2001 18,517 
2002 16,670 
2003 19,176 
2004 15,671 
2005 11,781 
2006 39,180 
2007 18,057 
 
Source: The data in this table is reproduced from Table 4.6, „Detected migrants at the 
Spanish sea borders‟, from Arango and Finotelli (2009: 91). 
 
Table 4, which shows the number of apprehended irregular immigrants (at sea 
borders) across the years, provides us with an estimate of the number of irregular 
immigrants within Spain. As with the Greek case, the figures fluctuate over the 
years, but one cannot discern the real cause of this variation. For example, it could be 
argued that, as a result of the current economic crisis, and the consequent decrease in 
job opportunities, both the number of irregular immigrants within the country and the 
number of those who intercepted at the borders decreased in 2008. However, one 
could also surmise that border control and effective expulsion procedures contributed 
to such a decrease (Serrano et al., 2009: 101). 
                                                     
25
 Registration is obligatory in Spain in order to have access to free social services, anyone can 
register themselves in the local padrón without the need of a residence permit. In the following 
sections, there is more information on these local padróns. 
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As a final remark, it should be noted that illegal entrance constitute a very 
small percentage of irregular immigration in Spain because most irregular migrants 
in Spain are visa-overstayers, whereas illegal sea arrivals constitute only 10 percent 
of the irregular presence in Spain. Nevertheless, ironically, it is the latter kind of 
immigrant that attracts media attention (Serrano et al., 2009: 102). As Serrano et al 
(2009: 102) note, “[i]n 2003, 19,000 people were apprehended trying to reach 
Spanish coasts in pateras (small boats). Yet 1 million people arrived in Spain via 
Barajas airport with tourist visas and then failed to leave the country”.  
 
 
6.2. A Brief Overview of Immigration Policies of Spain 
Since the 1980s, the main goals of Spanish migration policy have been 
controlling the movement of immigrants and irregular immigration, while matters 
concerning the social integration of immigrants were not considered initially 
(Serrano et al., 2009: 107).  Rather, in the 1980s, immigration to Spain was mainly 
considered to be a temporary process, concerning only employment motivated 
immigration, and policies were adopted accordingly. Until the end of the 1980s, there 
was no major parliamentary debate, and no participation of civil society in 
discussions on possible legislation. In the 1990s, however, various new regulations 
were developed for the management of immigration, such as entry and visa 
regulations, border security strategies, permanent work permits, and a tighter asylum 
policy in line with that of the EU‟s asylum policy.  The rationale for an integration 
policy was also formulated in these years. It was not until the first half of 2000 that 
Spain finally recognized the permanent character of immigration, and adopted new 
laws with a specific focus on integration and the social and political rights of 
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immigrants. However, using its absolute parliamentary majority, the centre right 
Popular Party still restricted certain rights and freedoms in the first law of 2000 that 
largely governed irregular immigrants (Serrano et al., 2009: 107-9). In the following 
paragraphs, the immigration policies and the policy-making process in Spain is 
described more in detail, especially by paying particular attention to the first 
immigration law of 2000, and the second one (in the same year), known as the 
“counter” law.  
The first Spanish legal framework on immigration was prepared in 1985. 
Before that, the country did not have any formal law on immigration. The Ley 
Organica 7/1985 de 1 de Julio sobre los derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en 
Espana (Organic Act 7/1985, of July 1, on the rights and liberties of foreigners in 
Spain and their social integration) came into force right before Spain became a 
member of the European Union.  The goal of harmonizing Spanish law on migration 
with EU regulations determined most of the efforts at this time in the management of 
migration (Laubenthal, 2007; Lopez-Sala, 2005). With this law, the Spanish 
government sought to soothe the fears of central and Northern EU states that Spain 
would become an entry point of irregular immigration into the EU (Gonzales-
Enriquez, 2009A: 140). With such concerns in mind, Spain‟s first immigration law 
was very restrictive.  
To start with, the 1985 law made legal entry into, and stay in Spain very 
difficult. Family reunification and permanent residency were ruled out and legal 
channels for labour immigration were also more narrowly and strictly defined 
(Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009A). Residence permits would only be granted for short 
periods, and were not subject to renewal (Laubenthal, 2007). According to Lopez-
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Sala (2005: 38), “[i]t was a restrictive law which did not consider the immigrants as a 
person with rights but rather as manpower for the economy”. The 1985 law had 
another negative consequence on the rights of Spain‟s existing North African 
population by turning one third of them, who were living in the Spanish colonial 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Africa, into irregular immigrants because 
they had Moroccan origins.  This caused such severe protests and mobilizations for 
naturalization that, in the end, the Spanish state developed a special process of 
naturalization in both Ceuta and Melilla, allowing Spanish citizenship to be granted 
to most of the applicants (Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009A: 141).   
Apart from the protests concerning the Moroccan population in Ceuta and 
Melilla, the 1985 law was passed without public discussion or dissent, or even any 
sustained concern on the part of pro-immigrant political parties or other political 
associations. This situation may be explained by immigrants‟ rather uneven 
distribution within Spanish territory at the time, which reduced their visibility and 
contributed to the lack of interest on the part of the civil and political community 
(Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009A).  After the 1985 law was enacted and implemented 
there were local tensions and concern in areas such as Catalonia and Madrid, where 
immigrants were large in numbers, however immigration policy-making was not an 
issue at the top of the political agenda at that time. As a matter of fact, it was the 
main Catalan nationalist party that first proposed to amend the 1985 law, criticizing 
it, both as an obstacle hindering immigrants‟ successful integration into Catalan 
society, and for its lack of concern for their social rights. The United Left and some 
other small parties joined the Catalan nationalist party‟s efforts to amend the law, 
proposing a new version whose goal was to better integrate immigrants (Gonzales-
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Enriquez, 2009A).   
Given Spain‟s recent history, Gonzales-Enriquez (2009A) argues that the 
atmosphere of the time suggests that Spanish society did not wish to deny 
fundamental rights to immigrants, but instead had other concerns: 
Few dared deny these rights, which were recognized in the law not just out of 
humanitarian duty but also as a defence mechanism for the rest of the society: 
the argument was to control the possibility of immigrants spreading 
contagious diseases (there was talk of tuberculosis reappearing), and avert 
juvenile delinquency among adolescent immigrants not enrolled in school 
(142).   
 
Thus, advocacy of immigrants‟ rights at the time was not made solely out of 
humanitarian causes but instead out of concern for the well-being of Spanish society. 
Indeed, public opinion surveys indicated that Spaniards held rather positive attitudes 
towards immigrants (Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009A), and a compassionate attitude 
towards immigrants also emerged in the media, while NGOs were active concerning 
immigrants‟ rights. Together with pro-immigrant human rights NGOs, trade unions 
and migrants‟ organizations also played an important role in pressing for measures 
concerning social integration in the late 1990s against the restrictive measures of the 
1985 law (Lopez-Sala, 2005).  Thus, whether out of humanitarian or pragmatic 
reasons, support for the rights of immigrants and demands for policies that would 
enhance integration started to be spoken out loud.  Following that, proposals were 
made to draft a new law offering full social rights for immigrants and measures 
ensuring better social integration into Spanish society (Lopez-Sala, 2005). 
In 2000, rather more liberal legislation establishing rights and freedoms on 
the same basis as Spanish nationals for immigrants, including irregular migrants, 
replaced the Organic Act 7/1985 (Laubenthal, 2007). Unfortunately, this new law, 
  
 
160 
Law 4/2000, on the Rights and Freedoms of Immigrants in Spain and their Social 
Integration, was soon amended when the right-wing Popular Party gained an absolute 
legislative majority in the parliament, and so became able to reflect its discontent 
with the liberal nature of the original law. Accordingly, in the second half of 2000, 
Law 4/2000 was amended by including more restrictive provisions. The bulk of these 
particularly concerned irregular immigrants, taking away some of the rights 
previously granted to them, such as the right to trade union membership, the right to 
join demonstrations and the right to strike. 
In the second half of the 2000s, with the Socialists again in power, a more 
liberal attitude towards immigration was readopted. For example, a regularization 
campaign (2005) was conducted, and certain funds provided to autonomous 
communities and municipalities for the civic and social integration of foreigners. 
However, since 2008, in the context of the global economic crisis, a more restrictive 
approach towards immigration has begun to replace this liberal attitude, both in the 
discourse and policies of the current Socialist government (Serrano et al., 2009: 107-
9).   
In Spain, before the latest economic crisis, during times of economic growth, 
the flow and integration of foreign labour had been regulated solely by the 
mechanisms of the market (Lopez-Sala and Ferrero-Turrion, 2009). The system was 
coined by some scholars as a “cheap model”, within which immigrants were allowed 
to come irregularly, before being regularised and integrated into the labour market 
(Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009A). “In the meantime, in order to make their lives easier 
and prevent problems related to public health or public order, irregular immigrants 
[were] granted health care and schooling for their children” (Gonzales-Enriquez, 
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2009A: 144). This system was considered „cheap‟ as it was the lowest cost solution 
for the management of immigrant labour flow.   
However, the global economic crisis hit Spain hard and affected immigrants 
much more than it did natives. The statistics for mid-2009 record that there were 
more than 4 million unemployed, 17.92 % of the active population. Whereas 16% of 
Spain‟s native population were unemployed, 28% of the immigrant population were, 
and this immigrant unemployment rate has continued to increase. In order to manage 
immigrant labour within the changed context of economic crisis, new programs have 
been designed to promote state sponsored repatriation programs for immigrants.  
Through these special programs, the Spanish government have sought to reduce the 
number of unemployed immigrants within the country. For example in 2003, the 
Spanish government launched a “voluntary return program for immigrants in socially 
precarious situations” (PREVIE - Programa de retorno voluntario de imigrantes 
desde España). The program covers non-EU immigrants who lack the resources to 
integrate into the Spanish society, and who end up in precarious social situations. 
Most of the applicants have relatives in their home country whom they need to take 
care of so the program covers all the travel expenses of these immigrants to get back 
to their country of origin. The immigrants‟ legal status did not matter in the 
application for this program (Lopez-Sala and Ferrero-Turrion, 2009). Originally, 
mostly female immigrants applied for this program. However, with the deepening of 
the economic crisis, the number of men applying to the program has increased as 
well. In 2008 and 2009, the number of applications increased significantly compared 
to 2003. Regarding nationality, mainly, Argentineans, Bolivians, Brazilians and, less 
frequently, Ecuadorians and Columbians have used the program (Lopez-Sala and 
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Ferrero-Turrion, 2009). Another measure designed to encourage immigrants to return 
to their country of origin is the “Early Payment of Benefits to Foreigners Program” 
(APRE - Plan de Abono anticipado de Prestación a Extranjeros). In contrast to 
PREVIE, this program only applies to immigrants with legal statuses. In this 
program, immigrant workers can receive a lump payment of their accumulated 
unemployment benefits if they return to their country of origin and promise not to 
return for three years. They are also entitled to free transportation back to their 
country of origin. Immigrants receive 40% of their unemployment benefit before 
departure from Spain and the remaining 60% after they arrive to their country of 
origin.  
Even though it was the immigrant labour which was hit hardest by the 
economic crisis in Spain, applications to voluntary return programs remained rather 
low, and had little impact on encouraging immigrants to return to their country of 
origin, and hence on reducing the number of unemployed immigrants within Spain. 
For example, the APRE program outlined above attracted only 5% of the potential 
beneficiaries in the initial stages of its implementation. One such explanation for 
immigrants‟ reluctance to participate in these programs may be the much worse 
living conditions awaiting many immigrants in their country of origin.  In addition, 
there are other factors involved: although the state can design such repatriation 
programs that successfully encourage some immigrants to return home, others keep 
coming as there is a global structural problem of pull and push factors. That is, as 
long as problems of (under)development in migrants‟ home countries remain 
unresolved, programs like those of the Spanish government are destined to make 
little impact on migration patterns.  
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To complete this section, a specific focus on the nature of regularization 
programs is also useful in order to provide a complete overview of Spanish 
immigration policies. In Spain, six regularisation programs (1985/1986, 1991, 1996, 
2000, 2001, 2005) were held between 1985 and 2009 (Arango and Finotelli, 2009). 
There have also been other individual regularisations as well, concerning various 
migration conditions, such as family reunification and humanitarian protection. 
However, it has been mainly the mass regularisations that have considerably affected 
the level of immigrant irregularity within the country. A general condition for 
application to the regularisation programs has been proving residence in Spain before 
a certain reference date. For example, previous employment in Spain has been 
considered desirable in most of the programs, although it is not essential. In the 2005 
regularisation program, however, employment in Spain was declared to be a crucial 
condition for application.  Regarding the effectiveness of the regularization 
programs, they can be criticized for times when administrative practices have fallen 
behind schedule for the necessary steps for their implementation. Nevertheless, 
“about 1.2 million foreigners were regularised in Spain since 1986 – half of them 
after the regularisation of 2005” (Arango and Finotelli 2009; 84). Although 
regularisations could not totally eliminate immigrant irregularity in Spain, still the 
programs have contributed a lot to the inclusion of irregular immigrants within the 
social system and to the protection of their rights; most regularised immigrants have 
been able to renew their permits in the years following their initial regularisation 
process (Arango and Finotelli, 2009).  In short, in comparison to Greece‟s experience 
with regularization, in Spain it has worked more efficiently in integrating irregular 
immigrants into Spanish society on a more stable and regular basis. 
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6.3. Irregular Immigration Policies and Rights of Irregulars in Spain  
 
Irregular migration has turned out to be rather regular in Spain. That is, there 
is a high percentage of immigrants who spend a certain part of their time in Spain 
under irregular statuses (Lopez-Sala and Ferrero-Turrion, 2009). The reasons for this 
regularity of irregular immigration are similar to the reasons in other Southern 
European countries. For example, when pathways towards irregularity are 
considered, a very similar pattern to the Greek case can be observed in Spain as well. 
According to existing research and statistics on irregular immigration, one way into 
irregularity is illegal entrance, as in any other receiving state; hence, there are 
foreigners who are trying to get into Spain without any official permission to enter 
(Serrano et al., 2009).  However, this route towards irregularity is not as common in 
Spain as it is in Greece, and it does not constitute the main cause of „illegality‟ in the 
country.  Rather, according to existing research, most irregular immigrants in Spain 
are visa-overstayers, who originally arrived as tourists (Serrano et al., 2009: 102), 
while another group experience “befallen irregularity” (Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009B).  
This term is used to describe a situation where immigrants are unable to renew their 
permits (work and/or residence) because of problems arising within the state 
bureaucracy, such as the slow processing of documents that cause immigrants to miss 
deadlines. Befallen irregularity is very common in Spain, creating a considerable 
segment of the irregular immigrant population in the country (Gonzales-Enriquez, 
2009B; Lopez-Sala and Ferrero-Turrion, 2009).  In order to prevent this situation, as 
of 2000, the immigration law of Spain declared that, when there is no official 
response after three months following an immigrant‟s permit application, this lack of 
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answer will be considered as a positive answer (Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009B: 9). 
 Spain has sought to reduce this strong pattern of irregularity, and 
consequently large number of irregular immigrants, by launching multiple 
regularisation programs, which have legalised the statuses of around 1,200,000 
irregular migrants in the country since 1985.  Spain also introduced an annual quota 
system for labour immigration in 1993. This system was originally designed to 
recruit foreign workers in their countries of origin, but it has also turned out to be a 
useful mechanism for reducing the number of irregular immigrants by legalising the 
statuses of those irregular immigrants already present within the country 
(Laubenthal, 2007: 114).    
Various explanations, focusing on why Spain has become an attractive 
destination for irregular migratory flows, have been proposed to explain Spain‟s 
regular pattern of irregular immigration. For example, Gonzales-Enriquez (2009B: 6) 
identifies four reasons: (1) the existence of a large informal economy where irregular 
migrants can easily find jobs; (2) the existence of relatively positive public attitudes 
towards immigrants; (3) the existence of a “traditional tolerance” towards illegality 
in political culture; (4) the granting of social rights to irregular immigrants.  
Gonzales-Enriquez‟s last point is rather interesting, as she considers granting 
of social rights as a pull mechanism for irregular immigrants, and in fact Spain is the 
only country in the European Union where irregular immigrants can register 
themselves with the local register of inhabitants, called the padrón (Gonzales-
Enriquez, 2009B: 6). Thus, in theory, undocumented immigrants (irregular 
immigrants) can in fact be documented. This padrón is kept by all municipalities, 
and it is essential for access to free social services, such as health care or education, 
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offered by the Spanish state. In other words, irregular immigrants as well as 
immigrants with a legal status have an equal right to services as Spanish citizens, but 
only if they register themselves with the padrón of their Local Councils. In order to 
be registered, it is sufficient merely to show a document such as an electricity, gas, 
telephone or a similar utility payment receipt, an accommodation rental contract, or a 
declaration by another resident stating that the applicant shares accommodation with 
him/herself. While there are general requirements applicable in each municipality, 
administrative practices concerning registration to the padrón may diverge from 
municipality to municipality (Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009B: 20-1).  For example, some 
municipalities do not require any documentation at all, whereas others are stricter. 
Until 2003, registration to the padrón did not carry any risk of identification and 
deportation because the Ministry of Interior, i.e. the police, was not allowed to check 
it. However, as of 2003, amendments made to the Foreigners‟ Law of 2000 removed 
this restriction on the police, giving them the right to access the Padrón. 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Interior has not yet utilized this power, and the number 
of registered immigrants in the padrón has not declined since 2003 (Gonzales-
Enriquez, 2009B: 16).  
Other aspects of the original Foreigners‟ Law of 2000, the Ley Organica 
4/2000 sobre los derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en Espana y su integracion 
social, are worth considering, as it contained some important provisions protecting 
the rights of irregular immigrants. Specifically, although illegal entrance to Spain 
remained an unlawful punishable act, the law ruled out automatic deportation of an 
illegal resident. In addition, it granted rights of assembly, demonstration, 
unionization, and strike, as well as the right to public healthcare for irregular 
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immigrants. However, as discussed earlier, certain provisions of this law were 
quickly amended the Partido Popular, came to power. As well as the changes 
outlined earlier, the new amendments drew a clear line between legal and illegal 
immigration (Laubenthal, 2007: 114). In this way, Laubenthal (2007: 115) reports, 
“the law reintroduced deportation as a consequence for illegal residence and 
introduced high employer sanctions for employers recruiting irregular immigrants.  It 
also revoked the rights granted to illegal migrants by the Ley 4/2000, including rights 
of assembly, demonstration, unionization, and strike action. On the other hand, 
certain rights remained protected: irregular immigrants retain the right to free 
healthcare, and their children also have the right to free education on the same basis 
as other immigrants with legal statuses and Spanish citizens. The only requirement 
for realising these rights is to register in the padrón (Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009B).   
Access to education has been further clarified in another amendment, 
specifically Article 9 (para.1) of the Organic Act 2/2009 of 11 December 2009 
(reforming the Organic Act 4/2000 of 11 January 2000, on the rights and liberties of 
foreigners in Spain and their social integration):  
Foreigners aged under sixteen years of age have the right and duty to attend 
education, including access to basic, free, compulsory education. Foreigners 
aged under eighteen years of age also have the right to post-compulsory 
education. This right includes the right to obtain the corresponding academic 
qualification and access to the public system of grants and bursaries under the 
same conditions as Spanish citizens. Should they reach the age of eighteen 
years during the course of the academic year, they shall retain this right until 
conclusion thereof.  
  
This article indicates that there are no restrictions concerning the access to 
education rights provided by public services due to a lack of legal status (except for 
not having registered with the padrón). In other words, the article does not directly 
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require proof of legal residence within the country in order for immigrant children to 
have the right to education. The third paragraph of the same article (9) encourages 
public authorities to provide such services to foreigners: 
(para. 3) The public authorities shall make efforts to ensure that foreigners are 
able to receive education in order to further their social integration. 
 
Note that this provision carries the opposite wording to its equivalent in 
Greek legislation, which obliges the public authorities to notify the police once they 
come across irregular immigrants during the provision of their services.  
As with the right to education, the right to free health care is also regulated in 
the same manner. Article 12 of the same legislation states the following: 
(para.1) Foreigners in Spain registered on the municipal register of residents 
[i.e. the padrón] for the municipality where they have their regular abode are 
entitled to health care under the same conditions as Spanish citizens. 
 
(para.2) Foreigners in Spain are entitled to emergency public health care as a 
result of serious illness or accident, whatever the reason, and to ongoing care 
up until their medical discharge. 
  
Note that, both in Article 9 and 12, the wording of the legislation is 
“foreigners” rather than “legal residents” or “legal immigrants”, although in some 
other provisions of the law, such as the one regulating housing rights (article 13), this 
right is granted to “foreign residents” rather than to all “foreigners” in the country.   
When it comes to detention, Spanish law says that irregular immigrants can 
be held in detention centres for only up to 40 days
26
. If the police, administrative, and 
judicial systems cannot identify and return the migrant to his or her country of origin 
within this period, then the person must be freed from the detention centre 
(Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009B: 8). Gonzales-Enriquez (2009B) argues, for several 
reasons, that this indicates an ambivalent attitude towards irregular immigrants on 
                                                     
26
 Spain is in the process of introducing legislation to prolong this detention time as a result of EU 
pressure.  
  
 
169 
the part of the Spanish state. First, she considers that public attitudes toward 
foreigners influence the official authorities when they are enacting policies 
concerning detention, in that political leaders tacitly “understand” that, to a large 
extent, public opinion is opposed to the idea of mass expulsions of immigrants 
(Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009B: 16). For example, she points out that, as opposed to 
other receiving countries, there aren‟t very many cases in Spain of private citizens 
reporting the presence of irregular immigrants to the authorities (Gonzales-Enriquez, 
2009B: 16). Second, she argues that there is strong pressure against deportations 
from the economic sector, where irregular immigrant labour is very important, 
making this another factor encouraging the state to preserve an ambivalent attitude 
towards the presence of irregular immigrants within Spain.  
 
 
6.4. Democratic Accountability and Irregular Immigration 
The findings and the analysis reported here on democratic accountability and 
irregular migration are based on the interviews I conducted in Spain. The 
interviewees included a trade union representative, four scholars, two experts from 
the Ombudsman‟s office, two NGO representatives (one national and one 
international), a representative from an international organization, and an expert from 
the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration. A more detailed listing of 
these organizations is available in Appendix B. 
 
 
6.4.1. Civil Society in Migration Policy-Making 
My analysis of the involvement of civil society in migration policy making in 
the Spanish case follows a similar route to the Greek case. In order to better 
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understand the role of civil society in relation to the rights granted to irregular 
immigrants, I pose two main questions in this section in relation to the involvement 
of civil society on irregular immigration: first I investigate whether or not civil 
society is active in offering social assistance to immigrants; secondly, I ask whether 
or not civil society has the capacity to put pressure on the government to enhance the 
rights of irregular immigrants.  
Concerning the first question, the findings I gathered from the interviews 
show that, although the Spanish state provides particular social services to irregular 
immigrants, there are still civil society organizations providing social assistance to 
irregular immigrants. For example, Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World) 
provides free health services to irregular immigrants, while SOS Racismo provides 
legal counseling.   
As explained in the previous section, in contrast to the Greek state, the 
Spanish state offers some basic social services to irregular immigrants, such as free 
health coverage and education. This free access to public health and education 
services diminishes the need for the provision of these services by civil society 
organizations, and civil society action in Spain on these matters is relatively less 
developed than in Greece. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, there are organizations 
that offer social assistance, especially health care and legal counselling, to 
immigrants in irregular legal situations. As one of the academic interviewees 
reported, 
[f]rom time to time it is quite common this kind of informal provide system, 
which I think also very common in Italy and Greece. The government for 
example or the local government for example they don‟t provide services but 
they pay money to NGOs to do that. So from time to time this is how things 
have been working for example for legal assistance - to apply for 
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regularizations… (Scholar-I, personal communication, April 12, 2010) 
 This informal provision of social services to irregular immigrants also applies 
to health care. The same respondent draws our attention in particular to the work 
being carried out by Médecins du Monde:   
They are going to Doctors of the World. This is for like basic assistance but 
this organization has like personal agreements with some Spanish doctors 
working in the public system so they have something not an emergency but 
something important, they phone to this people. … This is an informal 
mechanism but lots of Spanish people are against this system. But you know 
why? Because for example when you go to a specialized doctor, you are on 
the list, but when somebody phone them, to tell them there is something 
important, this people go and they are the first one. So everybody who was 
waiting is like… [disappointed]. This is one of the reasons why a lot of NGOs 
they are asking the governments to do something more universal because in 
that way people will not be against this. (Scholar-I, personal communication, 
April 12, 2010) 
This comment forms part of a discussion on the strategies that irregular 
immigrants follow in cases where they cannot access the public health care system.  
It allowed me to understand why there are still civil society organizations working in 
the field as service providers, even though the state officially allows irregular 
immigrants access to certain public services. Another important point the respondent 
makes is that these services should actually be provided more universally by the state 
in order to prevent the emergence of antipathy on the part of Spanish people towards 
irregular immigrants‟ apparently queue jumping as a result of the current informal 
provision of health services. Médecins du Monde has personal agreements with some 
Spanish doctors who are working in the public system.  If there were a more 
universal system of public service provision then such tensions would not arise. The 
respondent raises an important point because it highlights the fact that it is the state 
rather than civil society that can (or should) offer social services on a more 
systematic, regular and equal basis to all members of the society, since it has the 
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requisite human and material resources, and the organizational capacity to provide 
such services in an equal manner to all. Civil society, on the other hand, can only 
offer these services only to those manage to reach the organization, and only in an 
inconsistent, unequal and irregular manner, as it does not always have the necessary 
resources. 
The discussions with the respondents raised another point that attracts 
attention in the Spanish case, which is the emphasis put on civil society‟s role in 
increasing irregular immigrants‟ awareness about their rights.  Legal counselling is 
considered to constitute the major part of the civil society organizations‟ activities 
for irregular immigrants. Since the Spanish state already provides certain 
fundamental rights for irregular immigrants (in contrast to the Greek case), civil 
society also engages in awareness raising activities for these rights among the 
immigrants. The following comment illustrates this situation:  
The service we give is by one side related with aliens‟ legislation. How to get 
residence permit; how to get work permit… We inform people about the 
rights. We explain how to proceed; how to appeal; which documents have to 
be presented… (NGO representative, personal communication, April 20, 
2010) 
 
This particular organization is situated in the centre of Madrid, and the 
respondent explains how through their own networks immigrants learn that the 
organization offers these services:  
The irregular migrants that come to our office, they had been arrested because 
they are undocumented. So they were taken to the police station and come out 
from the police station with expulsion procedure. Even though they are not 
deported but they have this procedure. …They come to our Office to know 
about their rights. What they can do; because sometimes for example they 
have difficulties to consult to a lawyer. Because when you are arrested 
everybody has a right to have a government lawyer, free lawyer. Sometimes 
you have difficulties to contact to a free lawyer they have. Because 
sometimes they are not always really professional. So we are between these 
lawyer and person in order to put them in contact. ... But in order to generally 
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inform people. We are not barristers; we are informing people about their 
rights for free. (NGO representative, personal communication, April 20, 
2010) 
The respondent feels the need to emphasise that the organization does not do 
the work of a lawyer or a barrister, but instead it only informs immigrants about their 
rights in Spain.  This is important in illustrating how such NGOs are knowledgeable 
about the rights granted to irregular immigrants, and how they can act as 
intermediaries between the state and the immigrant by helping the latter to learn what 
he or she can legitimately demand from the former. This means that such NGOs in 
Spain have a significant potential to increase irregular immigrants‟ awareness of their 
rights, and about what they can and should demand from the state. 
Currently, the state offers certain services on paper, but in reality not 
everyone is able to access these rights. The previous respondent notes, for example, 
that there can be some difficulties in accessing a lawyer free of charge. The 
immigrants‟ lack of information about their own rights is one of the most important 
obstacles to their access those rights, so civil society in Spain performs an important 
function in informing immigrants on their rights. One NGO representative stated 
that:  
He thinks he has no rights. That is important because the question is not only 
if irregular migrants have rights or no rights. They think that they don‟t have 
rights. (NGO representative, personal communication, April 20, 2010) 
 
During our discussion about his trade union‟s work with irregular 
immigrants, the union representative noted that 
[t]here are more people, irregular people, coming to consult about their rights 
than regular people now at this moment to here [the trade union]. (Trade 
Union representative, personal communication, April 21, 2010)  
 
The remark implies that it is irregular immigrants in particular who feel the 
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need to consult organisations like trade unions in order to learn about what rights that 
they can enjoy in Spain. 
Thus, although the Spanish state provides relatively more rights to irregular 
immigrants than the Greek state, there is still a need for civil society organizations to 
intervene and provide social assistance. This need relates particularly to cases when 
irregular immigrants cannot access public social services such as health coverage, or 
when immigrants need legal counselling and information on their rights. To conclude 
this discussion concerning the first question, in the Spanish case, civil society acts as 
an intermediary between the state and the immigrant, but specifically in order to 
inform the latter on the degree to which the state recognizes or should recognize their 
rights. 
Turning to the second question, of whether or not civil society has the 
capacity to put pressure on the government to improve the rights conditions of 
irregular immigrants, I argue, based on the interviews, that civil society in Spain is 
rather influential, and also that it is more influential than its Greek counterpart. The 
rest of this section will discuss this claim with relevant extracts from the interviews. 
However, before doing this, I should note that one respondent argued that civil 
society is less relevant  than any other possible factor for the official protection of the 
rights of irregular immigrants:  
If you think that the social rights irregular migrants enjoy in Spain are much 
higher than in any other European country and that this was attained – 
achieved - in the 2000. You can see that NGOs there is speaking in the 
benefit of irregular immigrants were not very important then in the 2000. 
Catholic church had more to do with that than NGOs I think. But of course 
there were also NGOs. But the final result had more to do with sympathy 
feeling about immigrants than NGOs. (Scholar-II, personal communication, 
April 13, 2010)   
 The respondent‟s comment relates to 2000, when, as outlined in an earlier 
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section, a very liberal law on immigration was enacted, granting certain important 
social rights to irregular immigrants. Based on developments at that time, the 
respondent argues that this was not the result of civil society pressure, but mainly 
because of a “sympathy feeling” on the part of the public. Thus, this respondent 
rejects the idea that the Spanish government is more liberal towards these migrants 
because of civil society mobilization in favour of the rights of irregular immigrants. 
However, based on the other responses, I would still maintain that Spanish civil 
society, and especially its trade unions, have been rather influential over the state in 
matters concerning the rights of immigrants. In addition, my interview material 
suggests that civil society in Spain is more active during decision making on 
immigration than Greek civil society.  
 Regarding situations where Spanish civil society actively participated in, and 
influenced the decision-making process on immigration, my first example actually 
concerns regular migrants. However, the point is still relevant to the issue of irregular 
migration as it demonstrates how major organizations within civil society have the 
potential to put pressure on the government.  
The quota system is to provide foreign workers for several sectors, especially 
domestic service, agriculture, construction and service in general - for 
example in the tourism sector… In 1993, the government implemented this 
quota system. And this system was the result of kind of consensus between 
trade unions, regional governments - I mean the regions, business 
associations and immigrants‟ organisations. (Scholar-I, personal 
communication, April 12, 2010) 
Thus, the policy-making process in Spain seems to be more open than in 
Greece to the participation of civil society organizations concerning migration 
related matters in general. One expert, who works in the office of the Secretary of 
State for Immigration and Emigration, notes that contact with civil society actors is a 
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priority of the current government, and that this is one of the characteristics of the 
policy-making process in Spain:  
In the case of this new government, a priority is the contact with the civil 
society in general. So the participation… For example in the case of 
immigration topics, we have spent a lot of time promoting dialogue with 
social agents - you know trade unions, employers associations, NGOs, 
experts, academia, so on. So this involves lots of actors to participate. And I 
think it is one of the characteristics. (Expert at the office of the Secretary of 
State for Immigration and Emigration, personal communication, April 21, 
2010) 
 
The same respondent justified this official position of affirmatively involving 
“social agents” in the following manner:  
I think that participation of civil society gives you or makes you to take 
account of question of fundamental rights. So maybe this kind of participation 
gives you a more sensitive perspective or approach to social rights topics. So 
very, very logical and correct if you open your dialogue and your capacity of 
building policies with civil society you acquire a lot of more inputs to take 
into consideration - you know - rights obligations and freedoms… (Expert at 
the office of the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration, personal 
communication, April 21, 2010) 
Thus, in his capacity as an official representative of the government, this 
respondent praises the participation of civil society in policy-making. I also find her 
viewpoint important as she relates the importance of civil society‟s participation to a 
rights based discourse. That is, the respondent argues that, when civil society 
participates in policy-making, then the state engages in a discussion or dialogue that 
relates more to social rights and freedoms than it otherwise would. Thus, this 
argument may also be interpreted as saying that the involvement of civil society is 
necessary for the better protection of the rights of immigrants in general.         
Another important finding from the interviews is that it is the trade unions 
rather than migrants‟ organizations or other human rights based NGOs that are the 
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most influential organization during the policy-making process. Almost all of the 
respondents confirm that, while NGOs are not very strong when faced by the 
government, this is not the case for the trade unions. The interviews reveal that trade 
unions emerge as important actors, whose opinion the governments take into 
account, and who are able to promote and negotiate for the rights of immigrants, 
including irregular immigrants.  A couple of examples from the interviews can 
illustrate the way in which trade unions are involved in the policy-making process. 
First,  
the Unions are pretty powerful and very protective in favour of migrants in 
Spain. They are not against the migrants at all. So they protect them. So it is 
difficult to produce the law without taking care what the Unions says. 
(Scholar-III, personal communication, April 14, 2010) 
 Second,  
[t]rade Unions for the whole period or most of it at least have had very 
positive approach towards immigration. I mean their main aim was to 
integrate legally with the quality immigrant to the labour force I think. They 
have been defending the immigrants the whole period. (Scholar-II, personal 
communication, April 13, 2010) 
 This second comment also suggests another significant role of trade unions in 
Spain of helping to legally integrate immigrants into the labour force, which can be 
interpreted as positively contributing to the labour market conditions of irregular 
immigrants, as it helps to open the way for their right to have fair labour conditions.  
The information I gathered from my interview with a trade union 
representative confirms this information and emphasises the influential role of trade 
unions concerning immigration policies in Spain. As this respondent put it, “they 
[trade unions] think and they fight for the social and labour rights for both: for 
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irregular and regular.”27 (Trade Union representative, personal communication, April 
21, 2010)  In addition, this respondent lists the following activities of his 
organization relating to immigrants: participation in the forum for the integration of 
immigrants in order to give proposals and make comments on the law and different 
aspects of integration measures for immigrants; explaining to immigrant workers all 
the measures taken by the government and the union‟s own opinion about 
immigration matters; distributing brochures containing information on immigrant 
labour; and preparing informative journals for immigrant workers.  Finally, the same 
respondent also reported that this year, for the first time, the union has been asked by 
the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration to contribute to the work 
which is being carried out to prepare implementation related regulations of the 
existing immigration law.  
Another point that emerges repeatedly during the interviews concerns the 
relatively more tolerant attitude towards immigrants in Spain. Respondents noted 
that, although Spain is not totally free from racist and/or xenophobic attitudes, there 
is still a much more tolerant attitude towards immigrants in Spain than some other 
European states. For example, judged solely from what was said in the interviews, as 
attitudes in Spain contrast sharply with those in Greece. However, this distinction 
might be exaggerated, and definitely needs further research, which should utilise 
comparative public opinion surveys. Bearing this caveat in mind, however, most of 
the respondents in the Spanish case report attitudes that respect the rights and 
liberties of immigrants, irrespective of their legal status. I find these comments worth 
quoting here, as it is important to remember that liberal constraints operate with 
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 The interview with the trade union representative was conducted in Spanish with the assistance of 
an interpreter. The quotations used here were translated into English by the interpreter. 
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either a receptive and tolerant public discourse or within an excluding and intolerant 
one.  
…if you compare the surveys and these things on racism and xenophobia we 
don‟t have such a high rates compared to other countries. On the contrary it is 
very funny when you ask people about immigrants everybody is against 
immigrants but not against my immigrants, people I know, and the people I 
met before in my district, in the school… (Scholar-I, personal 
communication, April 12, 2010) 
 According to this respondent, social interaction with an immigrant, and 
familiarity with immigration and/or immigrants‟ lives, creates a more favourable and 
receptive atmosphere for immigration. It indicates that, although people might be 
against the idea of immigration and immigrants in general, when they get to know 
immigrants personally, their previous general ideas on immigration and immigrants 
change in a positive direction. Although it was not stated during the interviews, this 
may also be perfectly true for the Greek case as well. However, it is also likely that 
such social interaction and familiarity does not always bring about a more positive 
attitude towards immigrants; it naturally depends on the nature of the interaction 
among other factors. 
A further finding that also emerges repeatedly during the interviews is more 
specific to the case of Spain. This is that the relatively more positive attitudes 
towards immigrants within Spain may be an extension, or consequence of, a broader 
political culture which prioritizes individual rights above all other things. One 
example of this argument runs as follows:  
Having been deprived of rights in the past has conferred tremendous value 
over rights. Therefore if you ask, should migrants have the same rights? Of 
course they should have the same rights. For instance, you know that in Spain 
irregular migrants have full right to free health coverage. No one contests 
that… Maybe privately some people some individuals in private terms could 
say „well I am unhappy because you go to the hospital and then there are 
plenty of immigrants you have to queue and wait‟ or complain some people 
could say, „immigrants have more rights than we do and they are preferred 
  
 
180 
and this is unfair‟ they could say that, but in public no one could say that. 
(Scholar-IV, personal communication, April 19, 2010) 
 This statement refers to the Franco regime and how living through that period 
has influenced the current political culture. According to this statement, Spanish 
people value and prioritize individual rights in general, which creates a more 
favourable atmosphere for the protection of the rights of immigrants.   
These comments about fully respecting individual rights are also supported 
by the arguments of scholars. Encarnacion, for example, claims that “political 
behaviour in post-Franco Spain shuns political extremism, from either the Right or 
the Left, and emphasizes political consensus and moderation across the political 
spectrum” (2004: 178). A study by Triandafyllidou finds that political discourse on 
rights and integration is more pronounced in Spain than in Greece (2000B: 384).  
Based on the data she gathered from interviews with public officials, NGO 
representatives, and trade unionists, she argues that, in the Spanish context, “[t]he 
need to integrate immigrants into the reality of the host society empowering them to 
act themselves as cultural mediators and also the necessity for a public response to 
immigrants‟ needs for health services, schooling and accommodation are the 
prevalent arguments in the Spanish discourse” (Triandafyllidou, 2000B: 384). 
However, as already mentioned, sound conclusions about public attitudes towards 
immigrants in any national context require data from public opinion surveys, 
preferably comparative ones, that not only asking respondents if they think 
immigration is good or bad for their country, but also some other questions that 
would give a broader account of the nature of their attitudes. At present, based on the 
interview findings reported here, public attitudes towards irregular immigrants seem 
to be more positive in Spain than in Greece. However, this is just an interpretation 
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based solely on the opinions of a small sample of experts, although it is a valuable 
interpretation as it highlights a point which requires further inquiry.   
 
6.4.2. Courts 
Parallel to the questions I posed in Greece, I also asked in the Spanish context 
if the respondents recalled any incidents where a national court gave a favourable 
opinion about an irregular migrant‟s access to a social right. As in the Greek case, the 
responses of the interviewees in Spain indicated that court rulings do not appear to be 
an important factor pressurizing governments to revise certain measures that restrict 
irregular migrants‟ access to their social rights. On the other hand, based on the 
response of the experts at the Ombudsman‟s office, courts do get involved in the 
migration policy-making process through the various appeal applications presented 
by various civil society organizations on matters of migration in general. 
You have to think not only several NGOs who had played an important role 
but also a very important active group of lawyers who really has a big impact 
not only in the negotiating with the government but even by submitting an 
appeal to before the supreme court that has already changed some 
immigration rules. So of course it has a deep impact. In fact all these 
migration regulation, from the first Spanish foreigner‟s law in democracy was 
in 1985, so from this very first one to this last one I can say each one of the 
regulation was submitted an appeal before the court, but not only the Supreme 
Court by the NGO but even before the constitutional court. … The 
ombudsman has already presented a several appeal before the constitutional 
court in some things about migration. So of course it has a big impact. 
(Expert-II at Ombudman‟s office, personal communication, April 14, 2010) 
 
This illustrates two important aspects in relation to the involvement of 
Spanish courts in decision-making on migration related matters. First of all, civil 
society organizations, in this case a group of activist lawyers, through their appeal 
applications bring the courts into the policy-making process. Thus, another activity 
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of civil society organizations is their use of the judicial system. Second, this expert‟s 
comments also reveal that, since 1985, each piece of migration related regulation has 
led to an appeal before a Spanish court. This suggests that the regulations on 
migration have been under continuous scrutiny with respect to the Spanish 
constitution, which itself aims to secure rights for all. Thus, one can argue that the 
Spanish courts are in reality an important democratic accountability mechanism on 
matters concerning migration in general. 
 
6.5. Concluding Remarks 
Similar to Greece also Spain has become a country of immigration starting by 
the mid 1980s; and since then the number of immigrants has increased considerably.  
In 2010, immigration constituted 14.1 % of the Spanish population.  Immigrants of 
Spain are coming mainly from Morocco, Romania, Ecuador, Columbia, and various 
other Latin American countries.  Similar to Greece, also Spanish territory has been 
used as a transit zone for immigrants who are heading to Central and Northern 
European countries; however adding to that more and more immigrants are coming 
for settlement as well.  Spain attracts a considerable number of irregular immigrants 
as it is the case with Greece.  Existing research states that Spain as well could not 
efficiently manage the interaction between the demand for immigrant labour in the 
economy and the supply of immigrant labour (Arango and Finotelli, 2009). Thus, 
there is a large number of immigrants, who work in low paid, unskilled jobs in the 
informal economy without the necessary documentation for residence and/or work.  
Most of the irregular immigrants enter the country legally as tourists but then 
overstay their visa (Serrano et al., 2009).  Furthermore, “befallen irregularity” 
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(Gonzales-Enriquez, 2009B) is also very common in Spain where immigrants are 
unable to renew their work and/ or residence permits as a result of slow state 
bureaucracy.  
On the other hand, as opposed to Greece, Spain‟s immigration legislation has 
a relatively liberal approach towards the protection of immigrants‟ rights in general.  
As a result of that Spain‟s immigration rules and regulation adopt a more protective 
approach towards the fundamental rights of irregular immigrants than the rules and 
regulations of Greece.  Once the irregular immigrants register in local registrars 
(padróns) they could benefit from public services on the same basis as the nationals 
of Spain and the immigrants with legal documentation.  Therefore, access to health 
care and education is granted to all immigrants without excluding the ones without 
necessary legal documentation which means the official protection of irregular 
immigrants‟ fundamental human rights is more liberal in Spain then in Greece.  Up 
until 2003 the Ministry of Interior did not have the right to access the information 
within the padróns however as of 2003 the Ministry had been given a right to access 
these registrars.  Nonetheless, interview findings show that the Ministry of Interior 
made a public statement announcing that it will not exercise this power, and the 
number of immigrants who are being registered in the padróns did not go down. 
Findings of the interviews point out that there are various civil society 
organizations also in Spain that offer very basic social assistance to irregular 
immigrants, even though the state grants these services on paper.  This may be 
interpreted as that the de facto access to these rights are inadequate though there is a 
de jure access.  Thus, civil society services supplements the protection of rights of 
irregular immigrants by offering them social assistance such as health care services.  
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Moreover, legal counselling offered by the civil society organizations is very 
common in Spain.  Thus, civil society activism also involves informing irregular 
immigrants about their rights in Spain. Additionally, like the Greek case, there is 
civil society activism that is protesting restrictive measures concerning immigrants‟ 
integration and supporting a better protection of irregular immigrants‟ rights.  Not 
every civil society organization is very influential on the state while decisions are 
being taken; however interview findings point out that as opposed to the Greek case 
trade unions are powerful actors whose opinion state does take into account; and 
trade unions are supportive of immigrants‟ rights in general without excluding the 
irregular immigrants.  Like the Greek case,  for the Spanish context interview 
findings point out that it is not very common for courts to review existing legislation 
on immigration for enabling a better protection of irregular immigrants‟ rights. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
7.1. History of Immigration in Turkey  
 
In terms of migration, Turkey has been considered more as a sending country 
than a receiving country. Turkey‟s role as a sending country started in the 1960s, 
primarily through labour emigration to Northern European countries. In particular, 
Turkish immigrants moved in large numbers to West Germany after Turkey signed 
an agreement opening the flow of Turkish labour immigrants to the country. For the 
two countries‟ governments, the two goals converged in meeting Germany‟s need for 
temporary unskilled labour and decreasing the unemployment rate in Turkey. Similar 
agreements were also signed with Austria, Belgium, Holland, France and Sweden. 
The Turkish government of the time encouraged these waves of emigration because 
it thought that those labour emigrants would eventually come back to Turkey, 
bringing the new skills that they acquired in Europe, which would in turn help to 
reconstruct the Turkish economy. However, the plan did not work out as expected 
because, instead of returning, most of the Turkish labour emigrants settled in these 
European countries (Kirişçi, 2007: 91). Emigration to Europe slowed down in the 
1970s when European countries closed their borders to labour immigration due to 
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economic recession. Nevertheless, Turkish emigration to Europe continued slowly 
due to family reunification and family formation (Kirişçi, 2007: 91). In addition, 
particularly beginning in the 1980s, European countries began to receive asylum 
seekers from Turkey. This was mainly the result of the political developments 
following the 1980 military coup and the on-going Kurdish conflict, especially in 
eastern Anatolia (İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 5).  
Europe was not the only destination for Turkish immigrants. In the 1970s, 
some Turkish workers moved to the Middle East, to countries such as Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, and they moved as well to the Soviet Union and to other places in the 
Soviet Bloc. The growing economies of these countries were a pull factor in these 
migrations. However, as opposed to emigration to Europe, emigration to these 
countries rarely involved the entire family of the Turkish worker concerned (Kirişçi, 
2007: 91). 
Although emigration has been one important defining character of migratory 
movements involving Turkish territory, immigration has also been seen to a lesser 
extent. Starting with the early years of the Republic, immigration of those ethnic 
groups, such as Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks and Tatars, having a close 
relationship to Turkish culture and language, was encouraged and supported by the 
state (Kirişçi: 2007). One important reason for supporting the immigration of these 
ethnic groups was to develop the „homogeneity‟ of the newly established Turkish 
state (Kirişçi: 2007). The countries these immigrants came from included Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Turkmenistan among others. For example, 
between 1923 and 1997, approximately 800,000 people arrived from Bulgaria, and 
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approximately 400,000 people arrived from Greece (İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 4). 
Overall, “from the establishment of Turkey in 1923 to 1997, more than 1.6 million 
immigrants came and settled in Turkey” (İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 93).  
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Turkey started to receive a new type of 
immigration with immigrants who came to be considered as „foreigners‟, in 
comparison to the previous „immigrants‟ from ethnic groups with historical, cultural 
and/or identity ties to Turkish people. The new immigrants arriving in Turkey were 
nationals of neighbouring countries, EU nationals, and irregular transit migrants from 
various countries (Kirişçi, 2007: 93). Due to the economic liberalization of early 
1980s and an increase in global flow of commodity and capital through Turkey, 
together with the development of tourism as an economic sector, the number of 
foreigners in Turkey increased (İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 5-6). In addition, 
international developments, especially those concerning Turkey‟s neighbours, also 
contributed a lot to Turkey‟s becoming an immigrant receiving country. These 
developments included the political turmoil that developed in countries like Iran, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel/Palestine. The earlier collapse of the Soviet Union was 
another development that contributed to Turkey‟s role as a receiving country by 
triggering the immigration of citizens from former Soviet Bloc countries looking for 
better prospects of life in neighbouring countries like Turkey (İçduygu and Biehl, 
2009). Thus, “the ongoing political turmoil and clashes in neighbouring areas ... 
pushed people away from their homelands and toward other lands, where there [was] 
hope for a better life, security, and protection from persecution” (İçduygu, 2004: 89-
90), and Turkey was perceived as one such country for these people.  
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Turkey‟s geographical position can also be considered as a factor which 
triggered the flow of immigration. The country‟s location between East and West, 
and North and South made it a transit zone for migrants heading to Western and 
Northern countries (İçduygu, 2004: 89-90). As a result, Turkey came to attract a 
large number of (transit) immigrants because of its geographical position. This has 
created a situation in which there are growing numbers of asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants staying in Turkey in order to transit to Northern European 
countries.  Additionally, it is worth noting that the immigration policies of the 
European countries have also had an effect on migratory movements across the 
Turkish territory. As increasingly restrictive immigration policies have created the 
“Fortress Europe”, previous migratory movements across the European continent 
have been diverted towards the „peripheral zones‟ like Turkey (İçduygu, 2004: 90). 
These developments have created new movements of „foreigners‟ to and through 
Turkish territory. As a result, since the 1990s, Turkey has been considered a “transit” 
and “migrant receiving” country, in addition to its more traditional role as a sender 
country (Kirişçi, 2007: 91).  
Today, therefore, there are immigrants with many different backgrounds and 
various motivations residing in Turkey: for example, there are immigrants who 
married Turkish nationals; there are retirees and students studying at various 
universities of Turkey. According to OECD data, in 2007, approximately 184,000 
residence permits were granted to immigrants. “Of the 175,000 residence permits 
granted to foreigners in Turkey in 2008, 19,000 were for work, 29,000 for study and 
127,000 were granted for other purposes. … [A] vast majority of residence permits 
are issued to citizens from these neighbouring regions, most of whom come to join 
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relatives or friends living in the country, or to study and work for a limited period” 
(İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 12). While most of the immigrants with residence permits 
continue to originate from the Balkans, former Soviet Union countries, and the 
Middle East as a result of close cultural and historical ties, there are now increasingly 
also immigrants from European countries such as Germany and France, and from the 
United States. For example, in 2008, the largest numbers of residence permits were 
granted to immigrants from Bulgaria (16,536) and the Russian Federation (10,937), 
while 9,909 permits were granted to immigrants from Germany and 8,490 permits 
were granted to immigrants from Iraq
28
 (İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 45).  
A number of immigration related statistics, presented in Table 5, can help 
provide a better understanding of Turkey‟s new role as an immigrant receiving 
country. This information also enables a comparison of Turkey‟s current status as a 
country of immigration with Greece and Spain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
28
 These numbers are gathered from the study of İçduygu and Biehl (2009). The authors compiled a 
table of “Residence permits granted to foreigners in 2008” by using data from the Bureau for 
Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of the Interior.  
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Table 5: Migration Related Statistical Information on Turkey 
 
Population (2010) 75.7 million 
Net Migration Rate (2005-2010) -0.1 migrants /1,000 population 
Immigrants as a percentage of 
population (2010) 
1.9 % 
Inflows of asylum seekers (2009) 7830 
Estimates of the number of irregular 
foreign residents (2008) 
N/A 
Number of apprehended irregular 
migrants (2008) 
65,737 
 
Source: The data in this table were produced from multiple secondary sources: the 
figures in the first three lines were gathered from the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) data (available at 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/europe/eastern-europe/turkey retrieved on 
07.10.10). The data on the inflows of asylum seekers is taken from OECD-
International Migration Data 2010 (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33931_45634233_1_1_1_37415,
00.html retrieved on 07.10.10). Although, estimates on irregular foreign residents 
data was available for Greece and Spain from the database of CLANDESTINO 
project, this data is not available for Turkey in this database. Finally, the number of 
apprehended irregular migrants comes from Kale (2009), which is a country case 
report of the "CLANDESTINO: Counting the uncountable – data and trends across 
Europe" project (2007-2009), funded by the European Commission, DG Research, 
Sixth Framework Programme. 
 
When considered in comparison with the figures provided for Greece and 
Spain, the figures in Table 6 show that Turkey is still in the process of becoming a 
country of immigration; or, to put it differently, Turkey‟s role as an immigrant 
receiving country is not that developed in comparison with the roles of Greece and 
Spain as receiving countries. This can be realized by looking at the ratio of 
immigrants to natives in each country, as this number is significantly lower for 
Turkey than for Greece and Spain. According to the IOM data, immigrants in Turkey 
constitute 1.9% of the whole population, whereas in Spain they constitute 14.1% of 
the population and, 10.1% in Greece (IOM, Turkey, n.d.).  Additionally, the net 
migration rate for the period 2005-2010 is -0.1 for Turkey, in comparison to 2.7 and 
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7.9 for Greece and Spain respectively (IOM, n.d.). 
The number of asylum seekers also helps understand Turkey‟s changing role 
as an immigrant receiving country. While the number of asylum seekers leaving 
Turkey for European countries has been declining, the number of asylum seekers 
entering Turkish territory has shown an increase in the last couple of years. In 2007, 
there were 7,600 asylum applicants at Turkey‟s borders, which was 70% higher than 
2006, and this figure grew to around 14,000 in 2008 (OECD, SOPEMI, 2009).  In 
relation to the asylum issue, it should be noted that Turkey still maintains the 
geographical limitation
29
 in the 1951 Geneva Convention so it does not accept non-
European refugees on a de jure basis. However, because most asylum seekers 
currently arrive from non-European countries, Turkish authorities have been working 
with UNHCR in order to resettle them in other countries (İçduygu, 2004: 92).  
Table 6 below shows changes in the number of apprehended irregular 
immigrants. Although there are problems in relying on these figures for accurately 
evaluating changes in the rate of apprehensions, they do give us some idea about the 
degree to which a country attracts irregular immigration flows.  Thus, in Turkey‟s 
case, the number of apprehended irregular migrants shows a sharp decrease in 2003, 
especially over 2000 and 2001. Later on, this figure fluctuated around about 59,000 
between 2003 and 2008. As noted in previous chapters, it is not possible to tell 
whether these changes are because there have been more or fewer irregular 
immigrants arriving at Turkey‟s borders, or because border controls have become 
                                                     
29
 The geographical limitation of the 1951 Geneva Convention granted the status of refugee only to 
persons who were being affected from the events occurring in Europe. This geographical limitation 
was lifted later on with the 1967 Protocol and the scope has been expanded to problems of 
displacement all around the world. Turkey has not yet accepted the removal of geographical 
limitation.   
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more or less effective. Thus, we should approach these figures with caution, and 
should not consider them as providing more than a general idea of Turkey‟s role as a 
target of irregular immigration flows.  
Taking these figures on apprehensions from a comparative perspective, one 
can recall that the number of apprehended irregular immigrants at Greece‟s borders 
was 228,421 in 2000, but only 57,623 in the first half of 2008 (see table 2). In the 
case of Spain, there were 15,195 apprehensions at sea borders in 2000 and 18,057 in 
2007 (see table 4).  Although it should be acknowledged that because the data on 
apprehensions for each case comes from different sources, making it problematic to 
evaluate them on a strictly comparative basis, it can still be argued that the figures in 
Table 6 strongly suggest that Turkey attracts similar levels of irregular immigration 
flows as Greece and Spain do.  
 
Table 6: Number of apprehended irregular immigrants in Turkey between 
2000 and 2008 
 
YEARS TOTAL APPREHENSIONS 
2000 94,514 
2001 92,365 
2002 82,825 
2003 56,219 
2004 61,228 
2005 57,428 
2006 51,983 
2007 64,290 
2008 65,737 
 
Source: The data in this table is a copy of Table II „Statistics for Undocumented 
Migration (2000-2009)‟ Kale (2009; 70). 
 
As with the other cases, however, the figures for irregular immigrants 
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entering Turkey remain as „estimates‟ derived from different sources, and vary 
accordingly. For Turkey, these estimates range from 150,000 to 1 million, 500,000 to 
1 million, and 600,000 to 700,000 according to different studies (Kaya, 2008: 26).  
Regarding the origins of these irregular immigrants, the 2003 IOM report 
prepared by Ahmet İçduygu found, on the basis of interviews conducted in Istanbul 
and Van provinces with 53 irregular migrants , that one-quarter of the sample was 
composed of Iranians and Iraqis, 14% was Afghanis, and the rest originated from 
former Eastern Bloc countries or from Africa. Most of these irregular immigrants 
were working irregularly in the informal economy. A large proportion of these were 
working in domestic services such as child and elderly care, and there were also 
migrants working in the construction, textiles, and entertainment sectors. As in 
Greece and Spain, the IOM report found that irregular migrants took those jobs that 
are generally turned down by the natives. However, as Turkey, in contrast to other 
Southern European countries, has high rates of unemployment and an excess supply 
of unskilled labour, irregular migrant labour in Turkey does compete with native 
labour to a certain extent, especially in the manufacturing and construction sectors 
(Toksöz, 2007).  
Before ending this section, given its focus on immigration related statistics 
and developments, it is necessary to note that such statistics in Turkey are not yet 
developed (or provided) properly. As İçduygu and Biehl (2009: 8) point out, 
statistical data on immigration “is extremely scarce and poorly researched. With the 
available data in Turkey it is not possible to determine properly who 
emigrated/immigrated, how/why, and to/from which country”. Various discussions 
and projects have taken place in recent years within the Turkish Statistical Institute, 
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the State Planning Organization, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security on integrating immigration statistics with general population 
statistics. However, currently, the main source of migration related statistical data in 
Turkey is the Bureau for Foreigners, Borders and Asylum (BFBA) under the 
Ministry of Interior. The BFBA data primarily includes information on work and 
residence permits for foreigners, and also some information on numbers of 
apprehended irregular migrants according to their country of origin and year of 
apprehension (İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 8).  
 
7.2. A Brief Overview of Immigration Policies of Turkey 
As has been stated in the previous section, Turkey‟s status as a receiving 
country is a rather new subject. Thus, international migration related categories, such 
as asylum seekers, refugees, labour migrants, irregular immigrants and the like, 
whose boundaries are usually rather blurred anyway, are very new and unfamiliar 
concepts for Turkish political culture. This reflects the fact that, as İçduygu and Biehl 
(2009) point out, the recent growth of international immigration to Turkey “did not 
occur as a result of active state policy. For many years, in fact, these migration flows 
to Turkey have been largely ignored, and there has been little discussion at state and 
public levels regarding both the management of these flows and, more importantly, 
about the integration of migrants” (7). 
Turkey‟s main existing immigration rules were set out in the Law of 
Settlement (1934). This law was originally adopted primarily considering the 
movement of ethnic Turks, and as a result it favours Turkish ethnicity and culture 
over other ethnic and cultural groups.  For example, the law grants certain privileges 
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to immigrants with Turkish ethnicity and culture, such as easy access to citizenship, 
whereas the rules governing the permanent settlement of other foreigners carry more 
restrictive elements (İçduygu, 2007A: 206). More importantly, according to Law 
2510 (1934; amended in 2006), an immigrant is defined as a person of Turkish 
descent who belongs to the Turkish political culture. Thus, all other immigrants 
within Turkey are considered “foreigners” not “immigrants”. It can be argued that 
this category of foreigner implies a temporary status and a restricted belonging, 
which might imply that the Turkish state rules out, by definition, the adoption of 
measures necessary for the integration of resident „foreigners‟ into Turkish society. 
Therefore, against this legal jargon, when I use the term “immigrant” in this chapter 
it means that I refer to these „foreigners‟ as well, since they are also de facto 
immigrants, despite what the law might imply.  
In addition to the Law on Settlement, there are many other laws governing the 
rights and responsibilities of immigrants; indeed, unlike Greece and Spain, Turkey 
currently lacks a single specific law designed only to regulate immigration. A new 
law on „Foreigners‟ is in the process of being drafted and may be ratified in 
parliament within the next year or two; however, currently it is Law 5682 (the 
Passport Law of 1950) that regulates the entry and exit of foreigners through Turkish 
territory; Law 765 (The Turkish Penal Code of 1926) that regulates penalties for 
forged documents concerning immigration; and Law 403 (The Turkish Citizenship 
Law of 1964) that sets out the terms for acquiring Turkish citizenship. Other than 
these, there are certain other laws that specifically concern foreigners: Law 5683 of 
1950 (the Law on the Residence and Movement of Foreigners in Turkey), Law 2527 
of 1981 (the Law Regarding Allowing Aliens of Turkish Descent to Practice their 
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Professions in Public and Private Institutions or Enterprises in Turkey), and Law 
4817 of 2003 on the Work Permits of Foreigners. This latter law is the first example 
of the adoption of systematic legislation specifically concerning the settlement of 
immigrants in Turkey (Kaiser, 2007).  It has liberalized to some extent the previously 
very restrictive process of granting work permits. However, it still does not give 
immigrants the right to a permanent work permit. Rather, the law only states that 
immigrants who have resided in Turkey for eight years continuously, or who have 
worked legally for a total of six years, may receive a work permit without 
consideration of the situation of the labour market and developments in working life, 
and without the restriction of the permit to a specific enterprise, occupation, 
ownership or geographical area (Article 6). However, Article 13 states that 
immigrants are still not allowed to practice certain occupations, such as being a 
medical doctor, pharmacist, nurse or pilot, among others. Under these circumstances, 
most immigrants find it impossible to finance themselves within the law by their own 
labour. For example, in mixed marriages when the Turkish spouse cannot provide for 
the couple‟s living costs for some reason, the subsistence of the family is threatened. 
Similarly, in case of divorce, immigrant partners face certain restrictions in terms of 
their continued residence and work permits, and may even be forced to leave Turkey 
(Kaiser, 2007: 480-1). In conclusion, it is fair to say that, an immigrant does not 
enjoy his or her rights as much as a national (Kaiser, 2007).  
Regarding asylum, Turkey‟s first national regulation (other than its adoption 
of related UN conventions) was implemented in 1994. “Regulations on the 
Procedures and the Principles related to Mass Influxes and Foreigners Arriving in 
Turkey or Requesting Residence Permits with the Intention of Seeking Asylum from 
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a Third Country” introduced rather restrictive provisions to the management of the 
country‟s asylum system. For example, non-European asylum seekers were 
originally allowed only five days after arrival to register themselves with the Turkish 
authorities, before being subject to deportation although this requirement was later 
lifted (İçduygu and Biehl, 2009). At the time of writing, the current government is 
preparing both a new Foreigners Law and a new Law on Asylum, which is intended 
to provide a smoother mechanism to process asylum applications, and to better 
protect the rights of asylum seekers.  
Turkey is thus in the process of adopting new laws both for immigration and 
asylum so we can expect to see new policies and enforcements in the near future in 
relation to these issues. During a conference held in January 2011, the Deputy 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, Zekeriya Şarbak, noted that policies 
concerning immigration and asylum have been mainly concerned with security and 
order; he claimed, however, that his government is well aware of the legal and 
human rights dimensions of the matter, and predicted that, with the adoption of new 
laws on immigration and asylum, concern for these dimensions would become 
dominant.
30
 The proposed law, currently named the Foreigners and International 
Protection Law Proposal Draft, has already been made public through the website of 
the Migration and Asylum Bureau
31. In the draft law, the term “foreigner” now refers 
without discrimination to any person who is not a citizen of Turkey, and the term 
“international protection” refers comprehensively to refugee, “conditional refugee”, 
or “secondary protection” statuses. “Conditional refugee” status is given to refugees 
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Developing Legal Frameworks”, Second Academic Network Seminar, 6-7 January 2011, Ankara, 
organized by UNHCR. 
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from non-European countries, indicating that Turkey in a sense still adopts the 
geographical limitations of the 1951 UN Convention on refugees. “Secondary 
protection” status is given to those asylum seekers not given refugee or conditional 
refugee status, but whose refoulement to their country of origin carries serious risks 
to their physical integrity. That is, it appears that the Turkish state intends to adopt 
for the first time a law which will govern the status of immigrants, asylum seekers 
and refugees in a systematic manner. However, it is not yet clear whether or not it is 
justifiable to agree with the Zekeriya Şarbak‟s optimism, because this depends on 
what kind of comparison one makes. That is, while it is true that the new law, as a 
single and consistent document on immigration and asylum, may better serve the 
rights and liberties of the people involved by preventing the arbitrary decisions that 
can occur in the absence of a single legal framework, when one compares the 
Turkish government‟s draft law to the analogous legislation in Greece and Spain, one 
can observe that the former is rather less developed regarding rights and liberties 
than it is regarding the obligations of immigrants and asylum seekers. I will elaborate 
more on how this situation relates to the rights of irregular immigrants in the next 
section; however, before doing this it is necessary to describe the broader framework 
as well. 
The second and third chapters of the draft law govern the conditions of 
foreigners and subjects of international protection. The general themes of the articles 
relating to foreigners concern entry and exit to the country, visas, residence permits, 
deportation and deportation centres. That is, there is no general article or section that 
specifically regulates the rights of foreigners, neither is there any reference to any 
regularization program or policy, although the section on long term residence permits 
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(Article 44) does state that long term residence permit holders can enjoy rights on the 
same basis as Turkish nationals. On the other hand, in the third chapter on 
international protection, there is a separate section (Articles 86-88) that governs the 
rights and obligations of the subjects of international protection. These three articles 
regulate asylum seekers‟ access to public education, social security and health 
services, and also govern the condition of irregular immigrants, as will be outlined in 
the next section. 
Before the draft law proposal was made public, the government‟s policy-
makers distributed the titles of the articles of the draft law to those members of 
Turkish civil society and academia who work in fields related to migration, asking 
for their comments. This issue, of the way in which the new law has been prepared 
and the extent to which civil society has been able to participate in the process, is 
discussed fully in the fourth section of this chapter; however, I would like to note 
here that state officials have been stating, for example in various seminars and 
conferences on immigration and asylum in Turkey, that the new laws are being 
prepared  in response to the comments received from various EU and civil society 
actors, which also includes academics in a rather transparent process.
32
  
Regarding the Turkish state‟s motivations for introducing this new law, there 
appear to be several influences. On the one hand, the country feels the need to 
regulate immigration and asylum more and more because of its growing role as an 
immigration and transit country in the region. On the other hand, the “push impact” 
of the EU accession process is also a significant factor in the process of developing a 
new law. That is, the push impact of “conditionality” means that European 
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integration is having an important influence on migration-policy making in Turkey 
(İçduygu, 2007A). Although the impact of Europeanization is quite moderate in the 
sense of not bringing about “paradigmatic change”, it is nevertheless becoming an 
increasingly stronger influence over time (İçduygu, 2007A: 217)33. More 
specifically, through the Accession Partnership Document and multiple Progress 
Reports, the EU requires certain measures in relation to immigration that Turkey 
must align its national policy before it can gain accession to the Union. In simple 
terms, these measures concern matters such as visa policies, border control and 
management, the fight against „illegal‟ immigration, the establishment of removal 
centres, the fight against human trafficking and smuggling, improvement of 
cooperation and coordination between the EU and Turkey, preparations for Turkey‟s 
implementation of the Schengen system, improvement of management strategies for 
asylum matters, especially the abolition of geographical limitations, and the signing 
of readmission agreements with the EU and other countries. Turkey‟s willingness to 
tackle these matters identified by the EU, and its responses have been monitored and 
evaluated through the National Program of Action for the Adoption of the EU Acquis 
of 2001, 2003 and 2008, and also through the National Action Plan for Asylum and 
Migration of 2005. In short, apart from other influences, Turkey‟s soon to be enacted 
foreigners‟ law, which will be its first, is clearly being conceived in relation to the 
EU demands resulting from the dynamics of the accession process. 
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7.3. Irregular Immigration Policies and Rights of ‘Irregulars’ In Turkey  
 
As has been mentioned in the first section, irregular immigrants arrive in 
Turkey from diverse countries. First, there are immigrants from Eastern Europe 
coming to Turkey for work. For example, Moldovan immigrant women mostly work 
as domestic workers taking care of middle and upper class families‟ children or 
elderly relatives. Second, there are transit immigrants from Middle Eastern countries 
such as Iran, Iraq, from Asian countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, 
and from African countries such as Congo, Nigeria, and Somalia, who are all 
heading for European countries and using Turkish territory as a transit zone 
(İçduygu, 2003: 17-8). From another perspective, irregular migration flows into 
Turkey are conceived of as including diverse, but also overlapping categories. 
İçduydu (2003), for example, classifies irregular immigrants as illegal entrants, visa 
overstayers, and rejected asylum seekers. This classification is almost identical with 
the classification of irregular immigrants in Greece and Spain, where there are also, 
as discussed in earlier chapters, irregular immigrants whose status shifts back and 
forth between „legality‟ and „illegality‟ through various regularization programs.  
As Turkey has not yet adopted specific legislation concerning immigration, 
the current system concerning the rights of foreigners does not directly regulate 
whether or not irregular migrants who are already within the country can access 
various social services, such as health care and education. In the draft Foreigners 
Law, however, there are three articles (86, 87 and 88) that respectively regulate 
asylum seekers‟ rights to public education, social assistance, and health services. 
According to the draft law, irregular immigrants who have already made their 
applications for a refugee status will be able to gain access to public education on the 
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same basis as Turkish citizens, asylum applicants will also be able to enjoy social 
assistance if they are in need, and applicants will have the right to ask for public 
health services within the framework Law 5510 of 2006, the Law on Social 
Insurance and General Health Insurance. I explain the related clauses of Law 5510 
below. However, there is an additional clause of Article 88, which declares that, once 
the state recognizes that an asylum application has been made solely for the purpose 
of benefitting from public health services, then the state has the right to ask for 
compensation for that applicant‟s treatment and medical expenses. This clause 
clearly underlines the state‟s intention that public health services are to be granted 
only to asylum applicants, but not to irregular immigrants, who might have applied 
for asylum merely for the sake of benefitting from these services.  
In addition, various other laws and regulations also govern irregular 
immigrants‟ access to public health care and education. First, Law 3294 of 1986 (The 
Law on the Encouragement of Social Assistance and Solidarity) opens the way for 
immigrants to receive social assistance. In According to Article 1, social assistance 
services (health, education, shelter, food and clothing) is to be provided to all 
disadvantaged groups, including people who have entered Turkish territory in 
whatever way. Thus, in theory, regardless of holding a residence permit, a migrant 
may apply to the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF) for social 
assistance. Second, a regulation called “Principles on the Implementation of Health 
Assistance Programs” was introduced by the Social Assistance and Solidarity 
Foundation in 2005 in order to “cover the health costs of poor and vulnerable persons 
who have no social security, including foreign nationals” (İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 
31). Under Section 7.7, “[h]ealth costs of foreign nationals” in Turkey, whether they 
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hold a residence permit or not, were included under the funds offered by the Social 
Assistance and Solidarity Foundation.
34
 However, with the adoption of a new law on 
general health insurance, Law 5510 of 2006 (The Law on Social Insurance and 
General Health Insurance), health insurance is now provided to specific categories of 
foreigners, in particular those who have been granted refugee status by the Ministry 
of Interior (Article 60c/2), stateless people (Article 60c/2), and foreigners with a 
residence permit if they are not being covered by the social insurance program of 
another country (Article 60d). The implementation of this law means that immigrants 
without a residence permit were taken out of the health coverage provided by state. 
Later on, however, in May 2009, as a result of new legislation contained in Law 
5510, General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity issued an internal 
directive describing the applications concerning foreigners‟ access to social security. 
This directive excluded all foreigners covered by Law 5510 from the funds of the 
SASF; however, it did include in its application area asylum seekers applying for 
refugee status, victims of human trafficking and apprehended irregular immigrants.
35
 
According to the law, these immigrants “may apply for the SASF for health 
assistance as well, yet only for medication costs related to outpatient treatment” 
(İçduygu and Biehl, 2009: 32). To conclude, current legislation in relation to 
foreigners‟ access to social assistance services does not allow irregular immigrants 
access to such services and, most importantly, to health coverage unless they are 
identified as victims of human trafficking and/or have been apprehended. That is, no 
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part of the irregular immigrant population currently has the right to health care within 
Turkish territory.  
In contrast, when it comes to education, attendance of primary school is 
obligatory in Turkey and open to everyone, with this right being protected by many 
laws and directives, including the Turkish Constitution (article 4). However, migrant 
children need valid residence permits to enrol in schools, and even if schools are 
willing to accept the children of irregular immigrants as “guest students” under 
special conditions with the agreement of the school principal, these children cannot 
receive a diploma to mark the end of their education (İçduygu and Biehl: 2009). 
Therefore, irregular immigrants and their children lack full access to right to 
education as well as to health services.  
 
 
7.4. Democratic Accountability and Irregular Immigration 
In this part of the chapter, as in the chapters on Greece and Spain, I analyse 
the part played by the two democratic accountability mechanisms on the protection 
of the rights of irregular immigrants. Based on the information provided in the in-
depth interviews, I analyse the extent to which civil society organizations and courts 
have been able to contribute to irregular immigrants‟ access to their fundamental 
rights. The interviews for the Turkish case were conducted in Ankara and Istanbul in 
June and July 2010. I interviewed four academic researchers, five representatives of 
NGOs (four national and one international), and one representative from an 
international organization.  All of the interviews, except one (the international NGO 
representative), were conducted in Turkish. Therefore, contrary to the Greek and 
Spanish cases, all quotations from the interviewees provided below are not their own 
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words, but are direct translations into English.  
 
 
7.4.1. Civil Society in Migration Policy-Making 
In relation to the involvement of civil society in immigration policies, the 
picture that emerges from the Turkish context is rather different from that in Greece 
and Spain. As already discussed in the two preceding chapters, in Spain and Greece, 
civil society is active as an intermediary between immigrants and the state, in 
working for the cause of the former against the latter. However, in the Turkish 
context, civil society‟s involvement in immigration related matters is not very 
developed, and there are few actors in civil society working to support the human 
rights of immigrants in general and of irregular immigrants in particular. The 
respondents explained this situation mainly by referring first to the fact that Turkey is 
not a fully developed country of immigration yet, and for that reason immigration is 
not an issue high on the political agenda. As a result, civil society in general is 
indifferent and ignorant on matters concerning immigration. A few example 
comments can illustrate this point:  
Turkey is not a country of immigration. Canada is a country of immigration 
with 20%; Britain is a country of immigration with circa 13%; the US with 
12.9% if I am not wrong. Same for France and Germany with similar 
figures… However, the ratio of immigrants in Turkey is 0.3%. This figure 
also indicates how immigration related problems are perceived and how it 
should be perceived. (Researcher-I, personal communication, June 9, 2010) 
 
The fact that there are not very many civil society organizations providing 
social assistance to the [irregular] immigrants has many reasons but one main 
or general reason is that the immigration issue has not yet entered into the 
political sphere and it is not being discussed, heard… I mean the immigration 
issue is very new, and for that reason civil society did not have any interest 
until today. (NGO representative-I, personal communication, June 10, 2010) 
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Thus, the relatively small amount of attention on the part of civil society to 
matters concerning immigration is explained by reference to a political atmosphere 
within which immigration has not developed as a critical political issue. In addition, 
irregular immigration in particular is also a “new” concept within the political and 
civil spheres of Turkish society. Currently, the debate over irregular immigration in 
civil society carries on in a confused state, without consistent definitions and 
concrete understandings of the term. The information I gathered from interviewees in 
the three countries suggests that this is a rather different situation from that in Greece 
and Spain. In particular, in these countries, there is a clear understanding within civil 
society of who is or is not an irregular immigrant. As one respondent described it, 
 
matters related with [irregular] immigrants are always discussed during 
advocacy activities and work within civil society among the members. And 
yes, we vocalise these discussions as well. We agree on a 
discourse/vocabulary. However, still within some civil society organizations 
people can still use the term illegal immigrant, as if a human being could ever 
become illegal. Thus, there is not much thought and enlightenment on these 
issues yet within the civil society environment. (NGO representative-I, 
personal communication, June 10, 2010) 
 
This respondent‟s complaint clearly exemplifies the situation, illustrating that 
there are different points of view within civil society on how to define and perceive 
irregular immigrants. It can also be interpreted to mean that civil society 
organizations are yet to experience the phrase of thinking through and 
conceptualizing matters concerning irregular immigration, and that there are certain 
tensions among such groups during theoretical discussions in relation to irregular 
migration. These disputes seem to concern, specifically, the normative position to 
take towards the issue of whether or not the presence of irregular immigrants within 
the country should be considered as „illegal‟. In contrast, during the interviews I 
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conducted in Greece and Spain, I did not come across any mention of such disputes 
in civil society on the normative positions taken towards irregular immigrants. In 
both countries, I got the impression that civil society agrees on the idea that irregular 
immigrants form a vulnerable group in the society. The experience of the Turkish 
respondent quoted above, however, implies that certain civil society organizations in 
Turkey have not yet fully recognised irregular immigrants as a distinct and 
disadvantaged group. At the same time, most of my Turkish respondents noted that 
civil society organizations are currently in the process of developing actions on 
immigration related matters in Turkey, because, as the statistics suggest, the country 
has been facing more and more immigration movements across its territory, and also 
because the state has started a process of adopting new legislation on immigration. 
We may therefore expect that these developments will also encourage a more 
coherent and clearer position towards irregular immigrants in pro-migrant civil 
society organizations. 
 Although in the course of the interviews my interviewees revealed that the 
current state of being of civil society is rather different in Turkey from Greece and 
Spain, I continued to pose the same interview questions to Turkish respondents for 
the sake of gathering comparative information. Thus, for the Turkish context I 
inquired about civil society‟s actions concerning irregular immigration in terms of 
providing social assistance to these people, and about their lobbying of state 
authorities on matters concerning the rights of irregular immigrants. 
In order to gather information on the social services provided to irregular 
immigrants, I asked how irregular immigrants in Turkey can meet their basic needs, 
such as for food, shelter, health and education, and also whether there are any 
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organizations within civil society that help these immigrants meet such needs. My 
findings from the interviews indicate that Turkish civil society‟s provision of social 
assistance concerning health care, education and legal advice to irregular immigrants 
is very poor, in fact almost non-existent. Some work is going on currently, especially 
within recently established leftist civil society organizations of migration, in order to 
create more awareness about irregular immigration, and also to develop social 
assistance for these groups by, for example, attracting the attention of relevant 
occupational groups like doctors; apart from these activities, however, at the 
moment, recognition of irregular immigrants as a vulnerable group, and the provision 
of social assistance for them has certainly not yet developed to the extent that it has 
in Greece and Spain.  
This is not to say that there is no help for immigrants; rather, as the following 
comment illustrates, it is particularly irregular migrants who lack support: 
There are not very many civil society organizations providing social 
assistance and consultancy yet. The ones that provide such services are 
mostly working in 32 satellite cities, which are identified by the Ministry of 
Interior, and they offer their services to asylum seekers with a residence 
permit. However, we have to separate illegal [sic] migrants at this point. First 
of all, there are problems in reaching those people who have been 
apprehended as illegal immigrants. As result, as civil society organizations 
cannot reach those illegal immigrants, these organizations also cannot provide 
any social assistance to these people. (NGO representative-IV, personal 
communication, July 9, 2010)  
 
This comment is important because the respondent clearly indicates that it is 
mainly officially recognised asylum seekers for whom civil society organizations 
provide assistance. Thus, Turkish civil society makes an important practical 
distinction between an asylum seeker and an irregular immigrant. Additionally, the 
respondent highlights that it is not possible to reach apprehended „illegal‟ 
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immigrants, even if an organization wishes to offer them social assistance. This 
distinction between an asylum seeker and an irregular immigrant came up quite a lot 
during the interviews in Turkey, particularly in discussions concerning the assistance 
provided to immigrants. For example,  
 
[i]n Turkey, from the civil society perspective, everyone is concerned with 
the asylum issue. There is no undocumented migration. Undocumented 
migration is a topic that is not discussed and for which there isn‟t any service 
being provided. (Scholar-III, personal communication, June 9, 2010) 
 
This admission makes it clear that the recognition of irregular immigrants as a 
disadvantaged and vulnerable group has no practical reality in Turkey yet. In 
contrast, asylum seekers are recognized more frequently as a disadvantaged group 
and their situation creates more concern within civil society. As a result, civil society 
organizations mainly provide their services to asylum seekers. The following 
comment highlights a further problem preventing these organizations from helping 
irregular migrants:   
It is not possible for civil society organizations to systematically become part 
of the procedures related with the illegal immigrants. For that reason, it is not 
possible to talk about the social services provided to illegal immigrants. On 
the other hand, there are nearly 15,000 people as asylum seekers and 
refugees, whereas we know that a minimum of 65,000 people are being 
apprehended as illegal immigrants every year. Some of those people who 
have been apprehended are being sent to the origin country as they receive an 
illegal immigrant status, others receive asylum seeker status. Only when these 
people are considered as asylum seekers can we work for their access to 
certain social services. This means that they are out of the illegal immigrant 
status and they have the application of asylum. Thus, the help provided does 
not count as social services offered to illegal immigrants. (NGO 
representative-IV, personal communication, July 9, 2010)  
 
For this particular respondent, the legal status of an immigrant is important 
for civil society organizations providing social assistance. Specifically, only when an 
apprehended irregular immigrant is officially recognized as an asylum seeker can the 
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organization help that person. Otherwise the organization will be deemed to be 
offering help to an „illegal‟ immigrant, which is an act the organization does not 
seem to be willing to do. I should not, however, assume that this respondent‟s 
attitude can be generalized to all pro-migrant civil society organizations, and in fact 
there are some voluntary organizations already providing small-scale localized 
assistance to irregular migrants: 
In Aksaray there are Muslim Senegalese groups, who are illegal [sic]. There 
is a mosque association helping out these immigrants. There, there is also a 
craftsman who sells a 3-4 lira meal at a cheaper price to immigrants. So, this 
person provides the meal only for 1 lira to these immigrants. On the other 
hand, there is a church in Beyoğlu, and illegal [sic] Nigerian immigrants 
receive social assistance from this church. (Researcher-I, personal 
communication, June 15, 2010)  
 
Thus, it seems that in areas where immigrants are gathered in relatively larger 
numbers, certain voluntary groups or private individuals have appeared who are 
willing to provide small-scale social assistance to irregular immigrants. Nevertheless, 
one clear conclusion from the interviews is that there is relatively more civil society 
assistance being offered to asylum seekers and refugees than to irregular immigrants. 
In short, irregular immigrants in Turkey lack both formal rights to access basic 
public social services, and also remain unsupported by any organized or systematic 
social assistance on the part of civil society. Another useful summary of the current 
state of affairs was provided by one NGO representative when I asked if there are 
any civil society organizations providing assistance to irregular immigrants: 
 
There are in Istanbul. It is said that there are very many Armenian people; it 
was on the news. They help these people. Especially the churches help a lot. 
There are children of economic immigrants. These children needed to be 
educated and receive special courses. Let‟s call them voluntary organizations; 
they are not proper civil society organizations as well. These organizations 
provide education for these children and some food help as well. However, as 
these people by definition have the status of illegal immigrant, registered and 
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direct assistance to those people… in the end, service providing NGOs could 
be blamed for providing help to smugglers or traffickers. (NGO 
representative-IV, personal communication, July 9, 2010) 
 
This response indicates one reason why civil society in general is rather 
reluctant to offer certain social services to irregular immigrants. That is, it may be the 
case that the civil society organizations keep their distance from irregular migrants in 
order to avoid becoming associated with human smuggling and trafficking. This 
reluctance can also be explained by referring to relations between the Turkish state 
and civil society organizations. I infer from the comment above that civil society 
organizations may also be afraid of causing any confrontation with the state by 
providing assistance to irregulars. This fear was emphasized by other respondents. 
For example, one reported that  
[y]es every discussion is held around the issue of asylum because the state 
drives them [civil society organizations] into that corner. The state does not 
allow it, so what is it to work on undocumented migration… Undocumented 
by definition means nonexistent on paper. Thus, the state does not accept 
working on it, supporting it or financing it. (Scholar-III, personal 
communication, June 9, 2010) 
 
Therefore, one explanation for the lack of attention to irregular immigration 
on the part of civil society organizations stems from the attitude of the state towards 
the issue of irregular immigration in general. As the state does not recognize the 
existence of irregular immigrants, it also closes off ways of working on irregular 
immigration or for irregular immigrants.  
Regarding civil society‟s assistance to irregular immigrants, a final point that 
emerged from the interviews seems to be particular to the Turkish case, as it did not 
come up in the interviews conducted in Greece or Spain. This is that, some of the 
respondents indicated that the social context does not encourage civil society 
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organizations to develop their efforts to offer social assistance, whether to irregular 
immigrants or even to asylum seekers and other foreigners within Turkey. They 
reported that there is an exclusionary and discriminatory social atmosphere within 
which civil society efforts towards alleviating the social situations of „foreigners‟ is 
perceived as misplaced, as there are Turkish people in need who, the critics suggest, 
should be receiving assistance in the first place. For example, one of my respondents 
notes that when they visit municipalities in order to increase awareness and to offer 
help, the reaction they receive trivializes or deemphasizes what they aim to 
accomplish. The reactions come in the form of questioning why people should try to 
help foreigners when „we‟ (Turks) have lots of „our own‟ deprived and destitute 
citizens (NGO representative-IV). In a similar manner, another respondent notes the 
following:  
One common response that we hear in the field a lot is that Turkey has lots of 
„poor‟ of its own. Turkey could not solve the problems of its own poor. These 
poor people also could not receive proper health services when they go to 
hospitals. This kind of attitude is unbelievably high in Turkey. We are a 
country with a very nationalistic point of view. According to which 
parameters can you compare an Afghan child and a Turkish child on the 
street? How can you decide on something like I am going to help this one but 
not the other one? But people think that Turkish citizenship is a priority. 
(NGO representative-I, personal communication, June 10, 2010) 
 
This kind of attitude that civil society organizations face in the social sphere 
where they pursue their work is an obstacle making their work more difficult, and 
also hinders the development of social awareness of the vulnerable position of 
immigrants. If nothing else, it creates a psychological atmosphere within which the 
organization has to continuously defend its exclusive commitment to „foreigners‟ and 
its choice of „not prioritising‟ Turkish citizens.  
When it comes to the second question, about civil society‟s lobbying of the 
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government for the protection of the rights of (irregular) immigrants, in the Turkish 
context there is again only rather limited activism in comparison to Greece and 
Spain. As civil society‟s awareness on immigration developed very recently in 
Turkey this has also affected the current level of rights advocacy by civil society 
organizations against state policies. As a result, as with the social assistance provided 
to irregular immigrants, the pressure that these organizations are able to put on 
government on matters concerning the humanitarian conditions of irregular 
immigration remain rather undeveloped. One NGO representative made the 
following comments about difficult relations with the state as part of a discussion 
focusing on the extent to which civil society organizations participate in the policy-
making process on immigration in general, and whether or not policy-makers consult 
these organizations during the decision-making process.  
 
The current situation is much better. Two years ago things were much worse. 
There wasn‟t any communication [between the organization and the state] 
and the doors were closed. We didn‟t have any connection at all with the 
Ministry of Interior. Especially after the publication of a report on foreigners 
we experienced a total „blacklisting‟. Even though, through various press 
releases, we declared that we are in this business and that we are an important 
actor, the doors were closed to us for a long period. For example, these new 
reception centres are being established and there have been discussions and 
meetings going on; however, we didn‟t get invited to any of these on purpose. 
Then other rights based civil society organizations also declared that they are 
not going as well and that they could not accept such a blacklisting. (NGO 
representative-I, personal communication, June 10, 2010) 
 
Although, of course it is not possible to generalize from this single example 
concerning the nature of the relationship between the state and organizations, still it 
hints at a general pattern that may have developed in the relationship between civil 
society organizations and the state. In other words, with the publication of a dissident 
report, the relationship between the civil society organization and the state 
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deteriorated and the organization was excluded from the policy-making process. 
This, and similar responses by the state, directly prevents civil society‟s involvement 
in the policy-making process. The respondent also underlines that the organization 
kept maintaining that they are an important actor in the field whose opinion should 
be taken into account. Yet the state was reluctant to consider these demands. Thus, 
based on this experience, I infer that at the time there was a certain system of 
relations between the state and civil society organizations that can be characterized 
by tension and closure to the diverse and critical ideas of Turkish civil society. On 
the other hand, other information given in the interviews also suggests that this 
system of relations between the state and civil society organizations appears to have 
been changing very recently, albeit in a slow and modest manner. The following 
report better illustrates these current developments regarding state and civil society 
relations on matters concerning immigration: 
 
Currently, during the preparation of this new asylum and immigration law, 
there has also been a new formation within the Ministry of Interior. A new 
office has been established in order to work on this matter and inspectors 
have been hired. These people did very detailed research, observed the 
problem and discussed with civil society organizations as well; and it was 
their group that prepared the draft law, and I can say that we have good 
communication with them. They forwarded the titles of the draft law to us; 
not the content, but only the titles. However, we gave a twelve-page 
suggestion on these titles, even if we haven‟t seen any content. This was a 
step forward towards us and we didn‟t want to take a step back. (NGO 
representative-I, personal communication, June 10, 2010) 
 
This narrative indicates that the state has increasingly started to consider civil 
society opinions in the policy-making process. In support of this conclusion, this 
change in the attitude of the state towards the civil society participation was raised by 
almost all of the respondents. As I described previously, currently policy makers are 
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working on Turkey‟s very first immigration and asylum law, which is expected to be 
enacted either in 2011 or 2012. During the preparation of these laws, the information 
from the interviews, such as the comments above, suggest that policy makers are 
now engaged in dialogue with civil society organizations. Various other respondents 
also noted that policy makers sent the article titles of the draft law to certain civil 
society organizations in order to receive feedback. That is, currently, policy-makers 
seem to be including as many of the stakeholders as possible in the drafting of the 
new law. However, it is not possible to identify right now to what extent the concerns 
and comments of these civil society organizations will be included in the final 
version of the law. Nonetheless, the developments in late 2009 and 2010 suggest that 
the voice of civil society is being heard more and more in the drafting of the new 
law. 
One final, and important point that emerges from the interviews concerning 
the participation of civil society organizations in the Turkish context, is that there is 
not such a diversity of types of organizations on immigration operating within 
Turkish civil society as there is in the case of Greece and Spain. The organizations 
working on this matter in Turkey are mainly the ones focusing specifically on asylum 
matters, together with a couple of human rights organizations which are either solely 
focusing on the rights of immigrants, or are also focusing on immigrants among 
other disadvantaged groups. In contrast to Greece and Spain, Turkish trade unions 
have not become active participants on any issue concerning immigration so far, and 
do not act as significant stakeholders on matters concerning irregular immigration 
either, as shown by the following remarks: 
 
They [trade unions] are not knowledgeable on these issues and they do not 
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have any sensitivity as well. I mean they saw the issue independent of their 
area of operation. One reason for this is because trade unions have a very 
limited relation to the informal economy or informal employment and they 
are not organized in that area. When I say this, I mean they do not have much 
access to the informal enterprises that exist within the sector they are 
organized in. Or, when they make efforts to get organized in this area, most of 
the time the result is the closing down of the enterprise and the workers 
become unemployed. (Scholar-II, personal communication, June 18, 2010) 
 
This explains why irregular immigration and the irregular, i.e. informal, 
employment of immigrants remains outside the scope of trade union attention. The 
fact that trade unions are not organized in the area of the informal economy and 
employment automatically leaves irregular immigrants out of their area of activism. 
On the other hand, there are efforts to catch the attention of trade unions on matters 
concerning immigrants. For example, one of my respondents informed me that her 
organization regularly contacts health sector trade unions in order to increase their 
awareness on matters concerning immigration (NGO representative-I, personal 
communication, June 10, 2010).  
Similarly, there are almost no migrants‟ organizations operating within 
Turkish civil society for the cause of immigrants. When asked about migrants‟ 
organizations, respondents note that they are very few, and most of those that do 
exist are informal networks organized mainly by irregular African immigrants (NGO 
representative-I, personal communication, June 10, 2010). The state refuses to 
interact with these organizations under any circumstances.  
When it comes to public attitudes towards the issue of immigration, my 
respondents argue that a coherent and cohesive pattern has not developed yet in the 
Turkish context on matters concerning immigration in general, let alone irregular 
immigration in particular. For example, some respondents claim that general public 
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is not xenophobic, whereas others spot some degree of xenophobia in the country. 
I don‟t think that public opinion has awareness on irregular immigration. In 
the places where these people (immigrants) are present there is awareness, but 
this awareness is not very pleasant. Racist and xenophobic… Because I think 
in Turkey there is a certain xenophobia at the societal level. … I am of the 
opinion that in Turkey, there is a negative prejudice against the foreigner, 
non-Muslim or against a person who is not alike, who is different. (Scholar-I, 
personal communication, June 9, 2010)   
 
According to this respondent, in areas where immigrants are common, one 
cannot speak of unawareness or indifference on the part of the public. Rather, the 
public is aware of immigrants, and adopts attitudes that are not very responsive or 
inclusive towards them to a degree that can be described as racist and xenophobic. 
Additionally, according to the respondent, this xenophobia at the societal level 
targets not only immigrants but also all „others‟ whose various characteristics are 
different from those of the majority‟s. It indicates that there is a larger framework 
governing attitudes concerning “us and them” in the Turkish context that also targets 
immigrants. However, as I also noted regarding the Greek and Spanish cases, one 
cannot reach a sound conclusion concerning the overall nature of public opinion 
towards immigration and immigrants without undertaking large-scale comparative 
surveys that evaluate the issue in a more detailed manner.   
Most of the respondents argued that, in the Turkish case, immigration on the 
whole is not at the top of the public‟s agenda, and that in fact the Turkish public‟s 
overall opinion on irregular immigration is currently strongly influenced by media 
coverage of sunken boats and the migrant victims of such events, as the following 
illustrates: 
The media is neither interested nor informed on the issue [of irregular 
immigration]. When some people are drowning or when a lorry turns over 
and people get injured, then the issue appears on the news, and when it does it 
is misrepresented: These people are represented as criminals who have been 
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caught. Very few media organizations are careful while covering this kind of 
news. There is not any proper consciousness of the fact that these people are 
human beings who have rights and that border crossing cannot be a reason for 
detention. Consequently, the public‟s level of awareness is the same as well. 
(NGO representative-I, personal communication, June 10, 2010) 
 
This comment suggests that developing a broader and more coherent public 
attitude towards irregular immigration will mainly rely on improving media coverage 
of illegal border crossings and the consequent human casualties of these actions. 
Meanwhile, conducting a focused survey in those areas where irregular immigrants 
are concentrated would be a useful first step to provide a more reliable picture of 
public attitudes towards irregular immigrants. 
 
 
7.4.2. Courts 
In order to evaluate the courts‟ role as another democratic accountability 
mechanism with the potential to protect the rights of irregular immigrants, I asked 
the respondents if they could recall any incidences where a Turkish national court 
had given a favourable opinion about the protection of an irregular migrant‟s rights. 
As in Greece and Spain, so also in Turkey, the information provided in the 
interviews leads me to conclude that judicial oversight and review does not emerge 
as an important push factor that might pressure governments to revise certain 
measures that restrict irregular immigrants‟ access to their fundamental human rights. 
In Turkey, the respondents could not think of one single case where the courts had 
blocked the emergence or implementation of a restrictive measure relating to 
immigration. 
On the other hand, in the case of Turkey, international courts, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights, have become an important democratic 
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accountability mechanism, especially on matters of asylum and refugees. The 
European Court in particular is able to impose significant pressure on Turkish policy 
makers, especially during the process of Turkey‟s attempt to gain accession to the 
European Union. Both state officials and the government feel the need to meet the 
requirements of the Court, and also to prevent any other contrary decisions. One 
respondent provides a description of how the European Court of Human Rights has 
got involved in the process of immigration-related decision making in Turkey.  
Especially, applications to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
made in the previous years were also effective. There was already the 
intention to enact an asylum law. However, the seriousness of this issue was 
clarified with the punishments and decisions of the ECHR, and with the 
damages it imposed on Turkey. In this tiny office [of the NGO], we made 
maybe around 25 ECHR applications in this last year. As the ECHR holds the 
opinion that Turkey does not obey international norms, they reached their 
decisions very easily. However, these are interim decisions; there are seven 
final decisions. They are not all our applications. There are a couple of other 
lawyers; there is an organization in the United States, called something like 
the Iranian Refugee Alliance, they also have couple of applications. But all 
these were effective. (NGO representative-I, personal communication, June 
10, 2010) 
Thus, similar to the Greek and Spanish cases, the national courts in Turkey do 
not emerge as significant liberal constraints on the decision-makers on matters 
concerning the rights of irregular immigrants. However, this conclusion again 
derives solely from the information provided in the interviews. It is clear from the 
interviews that the experts on immigration interviewed for this study do not consider 
the national courts as effective democratic accountability mechanisms in practical 
terms at the moment. 
7.5. Concluding Remarks 
Immigration to Turkey is a much more recent development when compared to 
immigration to Greece and Spain. Similar to Spain and Greece, also Turkey has 
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started to receive immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s; however immigrants 
constituted only 1.9 % of the total population in 2010.  Adding to that net migration 
rate is still negative in 2010 which means there are more people emigrating than the 
ones immigrating to Turkey.  Nonetheless, the number of immigrants and asylum 
seekers has been increasing, especially in the 2000s.  Turkey is receiving immigrants 
especially from the countries in the neighbourhood such as Iraq, Iran, Russia, 
Bulgaria, and there are increasing numbers of immigrants coming from African 
countries as well. Like Greece and Spain, the geographical position of Turkey makes 
it a transit zone for immigrants who are heading to Central and Northern European 
countries.  
 Irregular immigrants work mainly in construction, textiles, and entertainment 
sectors and also they work in child and elderly care.  For example, Moldovan 
immigrant women work as domestic workers taking care of middle and upper class 
families‟ children or the elderly (İçduygu 2003).  Immigrants took the jobs that are 
turned down by the natives; however immigrants also compete with native labour to 
a certain extent in sectors such as manufacturing and construction.  Although the 
bureaucrats have prepared a draft law on immigration, Turkey still lacks a legislation 
that exclusively governs immigration (and asylum) in Turkey.  Therefore, unlike in 
Greece and Spain, rules and regulations that govern immigrants‟ rights are dispersed 
across various legal documents such as the Law on the Encouragement of Social 
Assistance and Solidarity (Law 3294 of 1986) and the Law on Social Insurance and 
General Health Insurance (Law 5510 of 2006).  According to these laws immigrants 
need to have an identification number in order to access public health care services.  
Thus, irregular immigrants‟ right to health care is not granted in Turkey.  Adding to 
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that, although children of irregular immigrants may be accepted in schools as “guest 
students” they are not allowed to receive diplomas without valid documentation. 
Therefore, also the right to education is imperfectly recognised for irregular 
immigrants‟ children.  As a result, official treatment of irregular immigrants in 
Turkey is similar to that of Greece‟s rather than Spain‟s treatment of irregular 
immigrants.  
 Concerning the involvement of civil society organizations to the protection of 
rights of irregular immigrants, interview findings point out that as opposed to Greece 
and Spain, civil society in Turkey does not offer social assistance to irregular 
immigrants yet.  Civil society organizations provide social assistance mainly to 
asylum seekers and fail to recognise irregular immigrants as an exclusive group that 
has vulnerable living conditions. Similarly rights advocacy of civil society is at its 
infancy: As there are few social assistance programs offered to irregular immigrants, 
there is also a much less developed activism (only within certain leftist 
organizations) supporting a better protection of irregular immigrants‟ rights.  State 
bureaucrats have held consultation meetings with the civil society organizations 
during the preparation of the draft law; but it is not clear yet how much of civil 
society input has actually been incorporated within the draft law on immigration.  As 
a final remark, in relation to court involvement on matters concerning the protection 
of irregular immigrants, interview findings point out that similar to Greece and Spain 
judicial review do not seem to be very effective in protecting or improving the rights 
of irregular immigrants.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
FINAL ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overall analysis of the three cases, presented 
separately in the previous chapters, this time in a comparative and integrated manner.  
The chapter also offers conclusions to the whole study. 
The fundamental concern of this study was to explain the state‟s treatment of 
irregular immigrants, and the extent to which fundamental rights are respected. The 
study focused specifically on the influence of the democratic accountability 
mechanisms of civil society activism and judicial review on the treatment of irregular 
immigrants in order to establish a link between democratic accountability 
mechanisms and the treatment of irregular immigrants by examining the role of 
democratic accountability mechanisms (civil society activism and judicial review) in 
the protection of rights of irregular immigrants.  The main proposition of the study 
was that a more active involvement or integration of democratic accountability 
mechanisms in the political system results in a more liberal treatment of irregular 
immigrants. That is, greater activism by civil society, and more frequent judicial 
review of policies concerning the rights of irregular immigrants, is likely to lead to 
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more guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights of irregular immigrants.    
 
8.2. Rights: Treatment of Irregular Immigrants  
In order to explain the differences and similarities in the three cases, in terms 
of treatment of irregular immigrants, the study focused on national legislation on 
immigration and the formal rules and regulations that govern immigrants‟ access to 
their fundamental human rights. Thus, this research did not focus on the question of 
whether or not irregular immigrants could in practice actually enjoy the rights 
granted to them on paper. Nonetheless, it acknowledges the possibility that de jure 
granting of rights does not necessarily guarantee de facto enjoyment of those rights 
by irregular migrants.
36
 
The first two rights to consider are those concerning health care and 
education.  Every human being‟s right to access these two social services has been 
formalized in the UN‟s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) in the 
following manner: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event 
of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (Article 25/1); and, “Everyone has 
the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall 
be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit (Article 26/1).   
                                                     
36
 More discussion on this distinction will be made in the Conclusion section of this chapter.   
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Tables 7 and 8 below summarize the legislative framework on access to 
health care and education provided in chapters 5, 6 and 7 concerning the formal 
recognition of irregular immigrants‟ rights in Greece, Spain and Turkey.  
 
 
Table 7: National legislation on irregular immigrants‟ access to public health care 
Greece Law 3386/2005:  
“Third-country nationals legally residing in Greece shall be insured with 
the relevant insurance organizations and all have the same insurance 
rights as Greek nationals.” (article 71, para.1) 
Spain Organic Act 2/2009: 
“Foreigners in Spain registered on the municipal register of residents 
[i.e. Padrón] for the municipality where they have their regular abode 
are entitled to health care under the same conditions as Spanish 
citizens.” (article 12/para.1) 
 “Foreigners in Spain are entitled to emergency public health care as a 
result of serious illness or accident, whatever the reason, and to ongoing 
care up until their medical discharge.” (article 12/para.2) 
Turkey Law 3294/ 1986 (The Law on the Encouragement of Social Assistance 
and Solidarity) provides social assistance services (health, education, 
shelter, food and clothes) to all disadvantaged groups who are on Turkish 
territory.  
 
Law 5510 of 2006 (The Law on Social Insurance and General Health 
Insurance) provides health services only to migrants with residence 
permits and to asylum seekers who have been recognized by the Ministry 
of Interior. 
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Table 8: National legislation on irregular immigrants‟ access to public education 
Greece Law 3386/2005: 
“By way of exception, children of third-country nationals may enrol 
in public schools with insufficient documentation when: … (case d.) 
They are third-country nationals residing in Greece, even if their 
legal residence therein has not been regulated.” (article 71, para.3)   
Spain Organic Act 2/2009: 
“Foreigners aged under sixteen years of age have the right and duty 
to attend education, including access to basic, free, compulsory 
education. Foreigners aged under eighteen years of age also have the 
right to post-compulsory education. This right includes the right to 
obtain the corresponding academic qualification and access to the 
public system of grants and bursaries under the same conditions as 
Spanish citizens. Should they reach the age of eighteen years during 
the course of the academic year, they shall retain this right until 
conclusion thereof.” (article 9/para.1) 
Turkey Primary school education is obligatory in Turkey and is open to 
everyone and this right is being protected by many laws and 
directives and also by the Turkish Constitution (article 4).  
 
However,  migrant children need valid residence permits to enrol in 
schools and even if the children of irregular migrants may be 
accepted in  schools as „guest students‟ they may not receive any 
diplomas when they finish their education. 
 
The tables show that the most liberal case is Spain in its treatment of irregular 
immigrants in relation to both health and education rights.  In Spain, the only 
condition for irregular immigrants (as for any other immigrant) to access social 
services provided by the state is to be registered with the local padrón.  Registration 
with the padrón does not require any residence permit so it is possible that once 
irregular immigrants are registered with these padróns they can find the opportunity 
to access the public health care and education systems with similar rights to Spanish 
people and those who legally reside in Spain. Although the police have had a right to 
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access these registrars since 2003, the Ministry of Interior issued a statement 
announcing that it will not exercise this power. Therefore irregular immigrants do not 
fear an immediate and real threat of deportation once they are registered in padrón.  
In the Greek and Turkish cases, by contrast, the legal framework shaping 
access to these rights is more restrictive.  In the Greek legislation, access to public 
health care is not as clearly granted to all foreigners irrespective of their legal status 
as it is in Spain. Specifically, public insurance is guaranteed only to those third 
country nationals who are “legally residing” in Greece.  Most importantly, public 
service providers are prohibited from offering their services to irregular immigrants. 
These officials are also obliged by law to inform the police when they come across 
such immigrants.  The only exception to this rule is hospitals and clinics where 
emergency admissions may be made. Therefore, irregular migrants may only access 
emergency care in Greece without being subject to the fear of scrutiny and 
deportation. In contrast to its strict regulations concerning health care services, Greek 
legislation does provide access to public education for the children of irregular 
immigrants.    
Turkish policies are more similar to the policies in Greece than Spain. A 
residence permit is currently required (since late 2011) in order to receive social 
assistance.  In other words, foreigners need an identification number in order to be 
able to receive treatment in hospitals.  Moreover, even if the children of irregular 
immigrants may be enrolled in public schools as guest students they do not receive 
diplomas unless they provide valid identity documentation. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that Turkey still does not have a specific law on immigration and asylum, 
which means the rights of foreigners in Turkey have not been legislated for as clearly 
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as in the case of Spain or Greece. Indeed, currently, multiple laws govern how 
irregular migrants may access rights.   
Therefore, in the Greek and Turkish contexts, one conclusion is that the 
treatment of irregular immigrants is comparatively illiberal compared to the Spanish 
context, and this situation extends also to the living conditions of asylum seekers as 
well. Although this research was not concerned with asylum seekers or refugees, the 
interviews suggest that, in Greece and Turkey, under certain circumstances even 
asylum seekers who have officially recognized documentation cannot properly and 
regularly receive free social services of the state to which they are legally entitled. 
The conditions of access by irregular immigrants are much worse than those of 
asylum seekers though.  
The findings of this research thus suggest that there is a significant 
divergence between Greece, Spain and Turkey in the way they adopt policies 
concerning the rights of irregular immigrants.  According to the results of the 
analysis of policy documents, irregular migrants enjoy only moderate access to 
services to respond to their fundamental human rights in Spain, and a rather 
restricted access in Greece and Turkey.  
This research did not provide answers to the question of why there is 
divergence among these cases, as this would require further research on the 
economic, cultural and political reasons behind this divergence individually. Instead, 
this study focused on a single political variable, i.e. democratic accountability 
mechanisms. More specifically, it investigated the role of civil society activism and 
judicial review as democratic accountability mechanisms in the official treatment and 
protection of the rights of irregular immigrants who are already resident and 
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participating in the life of these countries. The theoretical orientation behind using 
the concept of democratic accountability mechanisms was explained at length in the 
third chapter on the theoretical framework. The use of this political variable related 
to broader theoretical discussions that concern state and society interaction, together 
with agency versus structure explanations within comparative politics. The concept 
of democratic accountability, as it includes the impact of judicial review, does not 
follows a “holistic” and an “organic” view of the state, which prevents the 
recognition of different policy goals and principles within the state structure. In 
addition, the concept provides a balanced view of state and society interaction, as 
proposed by Migdal (1994) in his “state in society” perspective. The activism of pro-
immigrant civil society groups illustrates how societal pressures may impact on the 
policy goals and principles of the state.  
  
8.3. Democratic Accountability: Protection of Irregular Immigrants’ 
Rights 
 
The composition of the informal economy, the demand for irregular 
immigrant labour, cultural practices concerning foreigners, and the position of 
political parties towards the issue, may all be counted among different factors 
shaping states‟ treatment of irregular migrants. This research focuses on one such 
influence, the one created by democratic accountability mechanisms, specifically 
civil society activism and judicial review in this study.  
 
 
8.3.1. Civil Society 
This study proposed that pro-migrant civil society organizations constitute the 
main stakeholders on matters concerning the protection of the rights of irregular 
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immigrants within the country. This proposition derives from existing research 
focusing on (irregular) immigration and the civil society relationship. The main 
claim in this literature is that it is primarily civil society organizations and human 
rights NGOs that support the cause of irregular immigrants (see Laubenthal, 2007; 
Chimienti, 2011).  In a recent study (Chimienti, 2011), the lack of mobilization of 
irregular immigrants in Copenhagen, in contrast to the existence of mobilizations in 
Paris and London, is explained by the fact that claims of irregular immigrants are 
made individually, whereas mobilization is carried out mainly by NGOs in London 
and, to a lesser extent, also in Paris.  Therefore, through the literature one can 
conclude that civil society organizations emerge as the main actors in national 
settings that support the cause of irregular immigrants.  Following that, in this study 
as well, one of the claims was that it is mainly civil society organizations and the 
political processes activated by these organizations that have the potential to improve 
the rights conditions of irregular immigrants. Thus, the main suggestion of this study 
is that political processes that might be affecting the official treatment of irregular 
immigrants are created by the involvement of civil society organizations in the issue. 
Taking this into account, the role of civil society was theorized in the following 
manner. Civil society influences the protection of the rights of irregular migrants in 
two ways: First, by offering certain social services; and secondly, by pressurising 
governments with various forms of social actions for the better protection of 
immigrants‟ rights.  
In Greece, for example, pro-migrant civil society organizations offer a 
significant number of services to immigrants without permits, with different 
organizations providing health, education and legal services. Either these 
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organizations reach out to irregular immigrants or the immigrants contact them. 
Thus, civil society in Greece is aware of the vulnerable life situations of irregular 
immigrants in the country, and there are organizations that offer social assistance. 
Although the quality and extent of the services provided by Greek civil society do 
not completely correspond to those that may be provided by the state, it still makes a 
difference in the lives of many immigrants because Greek national legislation blocks 
irregular immigrants‟ access to any type of social service other than “emergency” 
health care, and even access to emergency health care is problematic. Under these 
circumstances, the services, especially health related services, offered by Greek civil 
society turns out to be rather significant in improving the life situations of irregular 
immigrants. The interview information also suggested that there is an intrinsic 
problem in the Greek system: the state is aware that civil society will intervene, 
hence the state refrains from expanding the services it provides.  Therefore, although 
in the short run the provision of services by civil society seems to be a valid solution 
for improving access to services by irregular immigrants, in the long run, the 
sustainability of such a system seems to face challenges. Therefore, increasing the 
Greek state‟s involvement seems to be imperative in order to provide a sustainable 
service provision.  
In the Spanish context, although the state allows irregular immigrants‟ access 
to certain social services, still there are civil society organizations that provide basic 
social assistance to immigrants without proper documentation. This shows that there 
is still a need for the social assistance of organizations in civil society because 
immigrants‟ access to their legal rights remains imperfect.  As a matter of fact, one 
interview respondent specifically and continuously underlined that having rights on 
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paper does not guarantee access in practice.  Nonetheless, the fact that the state 
provides a level of social assistance impacts on how civil society in Spain is involved 
in service provision.  That is, in contrast to the Greek case, civil society in Spain 
complements the role of the state. For example, one of the most significant activities 
of Spanish civil society organizations is to inform irregular immigrants about the 
rights that they can enjoy in Spain.  Another significant role performed by civil 
society organizations is to provide legal counselling and to increase the awareness of 
immigrants about national legislation affecting them. 
The Turkish context is rather different from that in Spain and Greece in terms 
of the involvement of civil society on the issue. In contrast to Greece and Spain, 
there is almost no social assistance provided to irregular immigrants by civil society 
organizations. Thus, neither the state nor civil society offers any services that have 
the potential to improve the rights conditions of irregular immigrants. However, this 
situation is not only typical for irregular immigrants but is also true for almost all 
categories of foreigners. In other words, civil society activism addressing the rights 
of foreigners is still in its infancy in Turkey. The number of such organizations is 
very low, and most of them take asylum seekers and/or refugees rather than irregular 
immigrants as their target group for social assistance. As a result, existing social 
assistance is devoted to asylum seekers/refugees than to irregular immigrants. A 
number of reasons emerge in the literature to explain the distinction made between 
these two groups. One of the most important reasons is the fear of supporting an 
“illegal” person or a “terrorist” and, following that, the fear of jeopardizing relations 
with the state. Hence, there is a rather different perception of an irregular immigrant 
in Turkish civil society when compared to Greece and Spain. Irregular immigrants 
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are not recognised as constituting a vulnerable group who require social assistance 
and support. There are a very few leftist organizations within civil society that do 
recognize them as vulnerable and hence require assistance. However, the majority 
recognises that helping asylum seekers and refugees is more legitimate than helping 
irregular immigrants. One other reason behind such an orientation on the part of 
Turkish civil society is the fact that irregular immigration is not an issue at the top of 
the political agenda, and so civil society organizations do not focus on this issue.      
 The second method of involvement with the rights conditions of irregular 
immigrants in civil society is political action performed to bring about policy 
changes regarding the access to rights.  That is, civil society can also improve the 
protection of irregular immigrants‟ rights through lobbying activities. Lobbying 
activities also have great potential to influence political discourses forming around 
irregular immigration.  
In Greece, protest movements in favour of immigrants‟ rights are common. 
One recent (February 2011) example of that was the support certain leftist 
organizations provided to the hunger strikes of the irregular immigrants during the 
first months of 2011. Approximately 300 irregular immigrants ended a six-week 
hunger strike when they reached an agreement with the Greek government on 
residence permits (BBC News, 2011). The support of pro-migrant civil society 
organizations and activists was immense during this period. Greek civil society has a 
certain culture for organizing protest movements for the rights of immigrants. During 
the interviews, various respondents mentioned actions of civil disobedience on the 
part of workers like teachers and doctors when they refused to report the presence of 
irregular immigrants to the authorities, but instead provided their services to them. 
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However, the interviews also suggested that the role of civil society was limited in 
making the state increase its protection of the rights of immigrants in general and 
irregular immigrants in particular.  There are certain human rights organizations, 
migrants‟ organizations and trade unions that lobby for the rights of immigrants in 
general. However, according to the responses given during the interviews, these 
organizations have not been effective in bringing about changes during the decision-
making process on policies concerning the rights of immigrants.  
Turning to Spain, the interview data suggest that the impact of civil society 
on immigration related matters is stronger than in Greece. It can also be said that the 
policy-making process in Spain is relatively more open to the voice of the civil 
society when compared to Greece.  One of the most important findings of the 
interviews was that trade unions are rather significant actors, whose opinions on 
immigration related matters are taken into account by Spanish governments. The data 
from the interviews also suggest that trade unions support an immigration policy that 
would better protect the rights of immigrants in general. For example, respondent 
from one trade union stated that the organization “fights for the social and labour 
rights of all immigrants, including irregulars”.  Therefore, in contrast to the political 
context in Greece, in Spain, there is very influential trade union activism and 
lobbying for the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants. Most importantly, 
the interviews suggested that Spanish governments do take into account the 
comments and concerns of trade unions on matters of immigration.    
Finally, in the case of Turkey, the role of civil society activism in improving 
the rights conditions of irregular immigrants is rather different from Greece and 
Spain. First, civil society interaction with the government on matters of migration is 
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only a rather recent development (post 2005). The state bureaucracy has been 
working on a draft immigration law since 2009, and during that process consultation 
meetings with civil society have taken place.  Some interview respondents 
appreciated that such an inclusion of civil society in migration policy making would 
not have been even possible only a few years ago. There were those who were more 
enthusiastic about this consultation process, and those who were sceptical about the 
whole process. The sceptics are concerned about the extent to which the concerns of 
the civil society would actually be reflected in the final policy document. Therefore, 
they argued that civil society‟s participation in the decision-making process was 
more of a show than a substantial partnership. 
One other important distinction between Greece, Spain and Turkey was the 
fact that organizations within civil society were least diversified in the Turkish 
context. In Greece and Spain, there are human rights organizations, migrant 
organizations, international organizations, an ombudsman, and trade unions, who are 
all more or less involved with immigration policy. Trade Unions, migrant 
organizations are much more integrated in the policy-making process in the Spanish 
context, and to a lesser extent in Greece. However, in Turkey, there are only a few 
human rights organizations other than international organizations like UNHCR and 
IOM that are involved with migration related matters. In contrast to the other two 
countries, Turkish trade unions, for example, are not active in immigration policy 
related matters. There are no migrant organizations other than small informal groups 
of some ethnic groups.  Moreover, the existing organizations work more on asylum 
related policies than on irregular immigration in particular.  
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8.3.2. Judicial Review 
When it comes to judicial review, the other type of democratic accountability 
mechanism (other than civil society participation) considered in this research, the 
theoretical chapter suggested that court rulings, also have the potential to improve the 
rights conditions of irregular immigrants by reviewing governmental decisions. 
Court decisions that favour the rights of irregular immigrants would be derived from 
the democratic constitutions of the states that better protect human rights when 
compared to specific immigration legislation, and also from international human 
rights treaties, whose discourse targets the rights of man rather than rights of citizen. 
Therefore, judicial review has the potential to put pressure on governments to enact 
national immigration legislation more in line with democratic constitutions and the 
international human rights regime.  
The interview data on judicial review suggested that the respondents were not 
familiar with any cases of judicial review pursuing justice or promoting the rights of 
irregular immigrants. This finding suggests that in none of the country cases, court 
rulings or judicial review are an important democratic accountability mechanism 
blocking the introduction of more restrictive policies towards irregular immigrants.  
In Greece, one respondent noted that even immigrants with legal documents 
to stay in the country do not go to the courts when faced with discrimination. The 
respondent explained this situation by the lack of knowledge on the part of the 
immigrants about their rights, and also the lack of practical knowledge on how to 
fight back through the legal system.  In the Spanish context as well, respondents 
could not recall any instance in which a court gave a favourable opinion on the 
protection of the rights of irregular immigrants. Nonetheless, some respondents 
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reported that courts are involved in the migration policy-making process through 
appeal applications made by certain civil society organizations. The Turkish context 
was also similar to Greece and Spain in the way that the courts did not emerge as an 
influential mechanism protecting the rights of irregular immigrants through judicial 
review of governmental decisions. However, in the Turkish context, contrary to 
Spain and Greece, this finding was also related with the lack of any single specific 
piece of legislation on immigration. One interesting finding from the Turkish case is 
that when appeal applications are made in relation to the issue of asylum they are 
made directly to the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, it was not Turkey‟s 
national courts, but rather the judicial review of a supranational court that emerged as 
the influential democratic accountability mechanism on matters concerning asylum 
in this case.   
Thus, although the study found that courts are not influential democratic 
accountability mechanisms for improving the rights conditions of irregular 
immigrants, in other migration related cases, such as in the case of asylum seekers 
and refugees, courts are involved in the policy making process and they appear to be 
an important mechanism that prevents the development of ever more restrictive 
migration policies. This argument especially holds in the case of Spain and Turkey. It 
is important to note that, in the Turkish case, it is the European Court of Human 
Rights, through its continuous criticisms of Turkey on matters of asylum, which has 
triggered further debate, as well as action among policy makers and scholars, to 
improve the protection of the rights of asylum seekers in Turkey.     
This study focused on judicial review only in so far as it concerned the rights 
of irregular immigrants living within the receiving country. By collecting the views 
  
 
237 
of immigration experts on how judicial review functions, this study aimed to reveal 
the extent to which judicial activism could improve the rights of irregular 
immigrants.   However, none of the interviewees appeared to have knowledge 
concerning the actions of the courts in this area, although there is a substantial 
academic literature examining the role of courts, or judicial review, on the protection 
of foreigners‟ rights in general. Some of the respondents referred to judicial activism 
on matters concerning asylum, refugees and other matters concerning documented 
immigration. In addition, the information collected in this study confirmed the 
findings of the literature, which notes that judicial review has the potential to restrict 
state action by dictating more liberal policies; however, this is true mostly for when 
immigration related matters intersect with those of asylum.  The involvement of 
courts on matters of migration in general, such as asylum and refugees, needs to be 
further studied for Greece, Spain and Turkey, as this focus lay beyond the scope of 
the present study.  At this point, based on the accounts in the interview data, one can 
still conclude that, for all three of the cases, judicial review did not function as an 
influential democratic accountability mechanism that could change or restrict 
national legislation blocking irregular immigrants‟ access to their fundamental 
human rights.  
 
8.4. On the relationship between the divergence in treatment of irregular 
migrants and the operation of democratic accountability mechanisms 
  
 My analysis of the treatment of those irregular immigrants already living 
within the host country showed that Spain is the most liberal case, followed by 
Greece and then Turkey. The analysis involved more descriptive inference than 
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causal, as the main question of the research was how democratic accountability 
mechanisms get integrated into the processes of the treatment of irregular immigrants 
or the protection of irregular immigrants‟ fundamental human rights. In order to 
answer this question, this study examined the role of democratic accountability 
mechanisms in improving the rights of irregular migrants. Table 9 below briefly 
summarizes the main findings in relation to the questions of the study regarding 
irregular immigrants.  
 
Table 9: Comparative findings 
 Greece Spain Turkey 
Treatment of 
Irregular 
Immigrants 
Repressive case Liberal case Relatively 
Repressive case 
Civil Society’s 
social assistance 
provided to 
irregular 
immigrants 
Active and 
supplementing 
state inactivity.  
Active and 
complementing 
state assistance 
Almost no social 
assistance  
Lobbying 
activities of Civil 
Society for the 
rights of irregular 
immigrants. 
Activism but not 
very effective 
Trade union 
activism 
Almost no activism  
Judicial review Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable 
  
Across all the cases, judicial review was found to be an ineffective 
democratic accountability mechanism for directly targeting the protection of the 
fundamental human rights of irregular immigrants.   For that matter, there was not a 
very meaningful relationship between official treatment and judicial review, at least 
within the cases under concern. When we consider this from the perspective of the 
literature, which theorizes on the state and the production of a political outcome, the 
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reason for looking at the impact of judicial review was to “disaggragate” the state 
(Migdal, 1994), rather than to adopt a holistic view (Skocpol, 1985). Thus, I 
predicted that courts would have a different policy orientation and goal compared to 
other branches of the state, such as the legislature or the executive. However, on this 
particular political outcome, protection of the rights of irregular immigrants, 
although the courts do not seem to push state policy in a different direction, this does 
not necessarily mean that one should treat the state as a holistic entity with a fixed 
ideology; rather these findings can only be interpreted as indicating that, on this 
particular political outcome, the courts do not seem to have much of a separate 
influence than executive or legislative branches of state. Further research across a 
larger group of cases is necessary on this relationship specifically, in order to support 
or refute this conclusion.   
On the other hand, when it comes to the relationship between official 
treatment and civil society activism, the second and third rows in Table 9 shows that 
there were different interactions across the three cases. In particular, the table shows 
that, in the most liberal case of Spain, there was influential trade union activism, in 
the form of certain lobbying activities for the rights of irregular immigrants. In 
contrast, in the less liberal cases, Greece and Turkey, the lobbying activities of civil 
society were relatively less developed. This may lead one to ask whether or not civil 
society activism on the protection of the rights of irregular immigrants can actually 
lead to differences in the way states either protect or disregard the fundamental 
human rights of irregular immigrants. Could it be that, when there is a divergence 
between the cases in terms of the liberalness of official attitudes adopted towards 
irregular immigrants, then civil society activism is more developed in the liberal 
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case? The discussion here, however, does not seek to propose an invariant causal 
relationship in answering such a question, but rather suggests something similar to a 
probabilistic causal argument that depicts a political mechanism, i.e. civil society 
activism, having the potential to increase the likelihood of a certain political 
outcome, i.e. more liberal official treatment. These findings, and the related 
interpretation, are also in line with previous theoretical discussions on the state and 
society interaction.  Specifically, the activism of pro-immigrant civil society has the 
potential to pull the political outcome closer to more liberal goals and principles than 
the ones adopted by the state. Thus, this tells us that, Migdal (1994) argues, the state 
is also molded by the society in which it is embedded, as well as itself molding the 
society. In other words, the goals and policy orientations of the state may change as a 
result of its engagement with different social groups, and this study has provided a 
comparative case study of this theoretical orientation.  
The findings of this research suggest that civil society does have the potential 
to improve the rights conditions of irregular immigrants. In the Spanish context, the 
study revealed influential actors within the civil society pressing for the rights of all 
immigrants, including the irregular ones.  However, I would nevertheless argue that 
one cannot conclude that it was because of civil society lobbying that there is 
relatively more liberal treatment in the Spanish context.  As well as the possibility 
that many other intervening factors affected Spanish treatment of immigrants, this 
treatment might itself also be affecting the current state of civil society activism. In 
other words, it could be the case that, when the state grants certain rights to irregular 
immigrants and is more attentive of the rights of irregular immigrants, then it may 
also become more receptive of the criticisms of the civil society, and it may more 
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easily open venues for lobbying by civil society groups pressing for more immigrant 
rights.   
 
8.5. Concluding Remarks on the Study 
Overall, this study aimed to highlight the rather exclusionary nature of the 
irregular immigration category within the current international mobility of people. As 
Criss notes, 
[t]oday, despite all the hype of globalization, humanistic and political 
cosmopolitanism is absent. The fast pace of our world also brings about 
simplistic and categorical sociopolitical descriptions that are often hostile and 
divisive. The current stage of globalization is about finance, economics, and 
technology; it has little to do with human beings (Criss, 2008: 67-8). 
 
 Her point highlights the situation of irregular immigrants in the current 
context of international immigration. The irregular immigrant, as a sociopolitical 
category, has become constructed in terms of exclusionary descriptions and policies.  
Irregular immigrants, as they are not „regular‟ and/or „legal‟ participants in the global 
flow of people, face policies that restrict the full possession of their fundamental 
human rights. This situation stands in marked contrast to the always regular and 
smooth mobility of goods, capital and services. This study investigated various 
restrictions on the rights of irregular immigrants by focusing on three receiving 
countries, and on the particular mechanisms that seek to resist and change this 
exclusionary nature of the categorization of irregular immigration.  In more specific 
terms, as discussed elsewhere in this study, this study investigated whether there was 
divergence (or convergence) between Greece, Spain and Turkey in the way they treat 
irregular migrants in relation to the recognition of these immigrants‟ fundamental 
human rights, and what role democratic accountability mechanisms (civil society 
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activism and judicial review) have in the protection of rights of irregular immigrants.   
As the number of irregular immigrants has grown in receiving states as a 
result of the current international mobility of people, political science studies on 
irregular immigration have focused relatively more on the identification and control 
policies of states, rather than on the political significance of irregular immigrants as 
recipients of human rights.  Moreover, studies focusing on the vulnerabilities of 
irregular immigrants and their life situations most of the time have neglected the 
political dimension of the issue, in the sense of considering what the state does 
concerning this issue, and what the liberal constraints there are on the state, 
pressuring it for better treatment of irregular immigrants. This study has, 
accordingly, attempted to fill these gaps in the literature on irregular immigration. It 
provided a contribution to the understanding of international irregular immigration 
through its unique research question, which investigated the basic human rights 
granted to irregular immigrants, and the liberal constraints on states that bring about 
a better protection of these rights. In particular, this study evaluated the role of civil 
society activism and judicial review on the protection of the rights of irregular 
immigrants primarily through examination of policy documents and in-depth 
interviews with migration experts. The study, by utilising a comparative perspective, 
was able to reveal important contrasts between the cases, thereby contributing to the 
overall scholarly understanding of irregular immigration, in three different national 
settings. The study has contributed to knowledge on irregular immigration by 
reconstructing the irregular immigrant category as a possessor of human rights before 
states that tend to focus exclusively on territorial control and sovereignty in their 
relationships with irregular immigrants.  The study also brought into consideration 
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civil society and judicial review as democratic accountability mechanisms and liberal 
constraints acting upon the state in this relationship. This provided a novel focus to 
theorizing on immigration policies. This study‟s final, and also very important 
contribution, was to provide important contrasts between Greece, Spain and Turkey. 
In doing so it has broadened our knowledge of immigration practices and patterns in 
these countries in a comparative manner.     
 
 
 8.5.1. Reservations 
 One should also refer to a couple of reservations concerning this study. One 
very important reservation derives from the distinction between de jure versus de 
facto access to fundamental human rights. This study exclusively focused on the de 
jure granting of rights to irregular immigrants. It investigated national immigration 
laws and regulations in Greece, Spain and Turkey in order to reveal the extent of 
official rights‟ protection. In other words, it focused exclusively on what states claim 
to do or not to do legally.  However, what is going on in practice may be different 
from such official statements, as laid down in immigration laws and regulations. 
Thus, there may (or may not) be huge discrepancies between the actual practice of 
irregular immigrants‟ access to their fundamental human rights, and what is being 
provided in the law.  For example, this study found a distinction between Greece, 
Spain and Turkey in each state‟s treatment of irregular immigrants (see Tables 7 and 
8).  Spain was the most liberal case where irregular immigrants have the right to 
public health care and education once they register in local registrars. On the other 
hand, in Greece and Turkey, the laws and regulations carry rather restrictive 
measures that block access to these rights.  Thus, even though there is this distinction 
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between the countries on paper, it is possible that, in practice, access to rights may be 
as problematic in Spain as in Greece or Turkey. In other words, there may not be any 
difference between these countries in terms of de facto access to rights, even though 
there is a divergence in terms of de jure provision of those rights. As justification for 
not investigating this issue, it can be argued that this was beyond the scope of this 
study. Having in mind this distinction from the start of the research, the study 
intentionally and exclusively focused on the de jure provision of rights, because the 
purpose was to show each state‟s official position before the recognition of irregular 
immigrants as recipients of human rights. Thus, the main idea behind this exclusive 
focus was to understand if the category of irregular immigration does actually create 
a divisive and exclusionary official attitude while protecting individuals‟ rights. That 
is why the research focused only on de jure provision, although it of course 
recognized the significance of de facto enjoyment for the actual living conditions of 
irregular immigrants. 
 The second reservation relates to the previous one: The study may be 
criticised for not conducting interviews with immigrants themselves. Conducting in-
depth interviews with irregular immigrants would probably have provided a better 
understanding of the actual living conditions of irregular immigrants: to what extent 
they could enjoy public services of health care and education; what the other 
channels were through which they could meet their needs relating to health care and 
education. Moreover, interviews with immigrants would also have offered a 
complementary understanding of the role of civil society and judicial review in 
advocating their cause: whether or not there were civil society organizations, 
activists or lawyers from whom they could seek assistance; where there were any 
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organizations that provided them with health care and education services. These and 
similar questions would of course have usefully complemented the information 
derived from the interviews with immigration experts. However, there were also 
some justifications for not conducting interviews with immigrants. First, in relation 
to the previous reservation and its justification, depicting the actual living situations 
of irregular immigrants was considered to be beyond the scope of this study, as there 
were other important questions that required the exclusive attention of this research. 
Thus, as I will argue in the following paragraphs, this study may act instead to 
inspire further studies in this matter. Secondly, although information from 
immigrants themselves on civil society and judicial review would surely have 
contributed valuably to the understanding of liberal constraints on the states, 
conducting interviews with immigrants would not have been possible due to practical 
constraints concerning time and finances. The field research in Spain and Greece had 
to be conducted in just two weeks as a result of a limited research budget. Within this 
time, it would have been impossible to reach immigrants as well as the immigration 
experts, and to have gained their trust and consent for participation in this study.  
Furthermore, there would have been language barriers in communicating with these 
immigrants. In Greece and Spain, sometimes communication was difficult even with 
immigration experts, who have a good command of English. It would have been 
particularly difficult to communicate with immigrants without the help of a local 
who spoke Greek or Spanish, so arranging such interpretation would not have been 
possible in the two weeks allotted for field work.  Interviews with immigrants could 
have been done in Turkey as the material costs and time constraints were minimal 
compared to the other two countries. However, this would have made the field 
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research in Turkey not comparable to the field research in Greece and Spain. For all 
these reasons, I chose not to include interviews with irregular immigrants. 
  
 
8.5.2. Further Studies 
This study has a strong potential to inspire a diversity of further studies. First, 
the research questions could be investigated in other contexts as well. This study 
focused on Greece, Spain and Turkey, on the basis of categorizing them as related 
Southern European countries.  It would be very interesting to repeat the same 
research in Italy and Portugal as well, as these are also important destinations for 
irregular immigrants to Southern Europe. Similarities and contrasts that would be 
revealed by such research could contribute to academic understanding of the de jure 
provision of rights, together with the role of democratic accountability mechanisms 
on the protection and extension of such rights.  At the same time, it would perhaps be 
much more interesting to conduct the same research in Northern European countries, 
in the expectation that in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Norway sharper contrasts could arise compared to those found between Southern 
European countries.   
As an illustration, the pilot study of this research was conducted in the winter 
of 2009 in Sweden, where I conducted an in-depth interview with an immigration 
expert, who was a former director of the now closed-down Integration Board of 
Sweden. The interview information showed that in Sweden as well there are civil 
society organizations and activists that lobby for and assist irregular immigrants for 
the protection of their rights. However, these issues were very sensitive at the time as 
there were almost no rights for irregular immigrants, and the Swedish state was very 
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reluctant to grant any such rights.  Consequently, irregular immigrants were very 
much marginalized and criminalized, and their existence remained relatively more 
underground than in the three cases I eventually investigated. In other words, the 
social and political position of irregular immigrants, and the nature of civil society 
activism on the matter, seemed to be very different in Sweden when compared to 
Spain, Greece or Turkey.   Thus, a study comparing Scandinavian practice with that 
of the Southern European states would probably provide some illuminating contrasts 
and explanations concerning the issue of irregular immigrants‟ rights. 
Another rather different study could be conducted specifically on the 
immigrant experience. As justified in the previous section, this study did not conduct 
any interviews with irregular immigrants so it was unable to evaluate both the de 
facto provision of rights and the immigrants‟ de facto enjoyment of them, and their 
experience with democratic accountability mechanisms.  Thus, one further study 
could investigate, in the same national contexts (or for others as well), to what extent 
de jure provision of rights parallels the de facto enjoyment of these rights by utilising 
interviews with irregular immigrants, who would tell their story of the extent to 
which they are able to access the rights granted to them on paper, and how. Such a 
study would also directly contribute to the literature on the life situations of irregular 
immigrants.  A second further study could utilize in-depth interviews with irregular 
immigrants to investigate immigrants‟ experience with democratic accountability 
mechanisms, which work in favour of protection of immigrants‟ rights.  
To conclude, in both its methodology and its findings, this study provides 
inspiration for various directions of further empirical research on irregular 
immigration that could improve current scholarly knowledge, which would also 
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contribute to theoretical views on key issues, such as cosmopolitanism, world 
citizenship and human rights.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 Policy making in general 
 
How would you describe the migration policy-making process in your country? Who 
are the main stakeholders in this policy-making process?  
 
How would you describe the official attitude towards the issue of irregular 
migration?  
 
 The EU 
 
Has there been any change on irregular migration policy with more EU involvement, 
especially with the enforcement of the Amsterdam Treaty of the EU? 
 
Do you think the EU has a positive influence on protecting the fundamental rights of 
irregular migrants?   
 
How does the EU affect the nature of migration policies in your country? 
 
 When it comes to undocumented migrants who are already within the country... 
 
which rights can irregular migrants enjoy in Spain? Do they have access to health 
care (beyond emergency services) and access to education for their children? 
 
 Courts 
 
Can undocumented migrants freely assert their rights deriving from international 
norms in courts and in the appeals courts? Has there been any such incident?  
 
If there is/would be such cases, do you think court rulings, by implementing 
universal human rights, could bring about a policy change in terms of the protection 
of the rights of irregular migrants? 
 
 Civil Society/NGOs 
 
How influential or successful do you think civil society organizations are in 
advocating the fundamental rights of irregular migrants?  
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Do you think they are influential enough to make a policy change on that issue? (Are 
they powerful stakeholders in the policy-making process? Do official authorities 
negotiate with them while making policy on irregular migration?) 
 
How influential are migrant organizations while advocating the rights of irregular 
migrants? 
 
 Trade Unions 
 
Do trade unions advocate the fundamental rights of irregular migrants? If yes, are 
they influential enough to negotiate policies in favour of the fundamental rights of 
irregular migrants? Have these policies been accepted? 
 
 Public Opinion 
 
How would you describe the attitude of people towards irregular migrants? 
 
Do you think the public would be in favour of irregular migrants‟ access to health 
care beyond emergency services, and access to education? 
 
Would public opinion be opposed to massive expulsions of irregular migrants? If 
yes, why; if not, why not? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
 
Greece 
Trade Unions 
GSEE - the General Confederation of Greek Workers  
 
Ombudsman 
 The Greek Ombudsman 
 
International Organizations 
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
International Non-Governmental Organizations 
 Hellenic Red Cross 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
 Praksis (Projects of Development, Social Support and Medical Cooperation) 
 HLHR-KEMO Hellenic League for Human Rights 
 
Other NGOs: Migrant Organizations 
 Greek Forum of Migrants 
 Somali Community 
 
University/ Research Centre 
 
 
Spain 
Trade Unions 
CCOO (Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras) – Trade Union 
Confederation of Workers’ Commissions 
 
Ombudsman 
 The Spanish Ombudsman  
 
International Organizations 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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International Non-Governmental Organizations 
 Caritas 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
 SOS Racismo  
 
Governmental Organizations 
Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration 
 
University/ Research Centre 
 
 
Turkey 
 
International Organizations 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
International Non-Governmental Organizations 
Caritas 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
Sığınmacılar ve Göçmenlerle Dayanışma Derneği (Association for Solidarity 
with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants)  
Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği (Helsinki Citizens Assembly) 
Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği (Mülteci-der) (Association for Solidarity 
with Refugees) 
 A Church Organization 
 
Semi-governmental Organizations 
 The Police Academy  
 
University/ Research Centre 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
LIST OF THE LEGAL DOCUMENTS STUDIED FOR THIS RESEARCH 
 
Greece 
Law 2910/2001. Entry and Stay of Aliens in Greek Territory. Acquisition of Greek 
Citizenship by Naturalisation and Other Provisions (Official Gazette 91, A‟) 
As amended by Law 3013/2002 (Official Gazette 102, A‟) 
As amended by Law 3074/2002 (Official Gazette 296, A‟) 
As amended by Law 3103/2003 (Official Gazette 23, A‟) 
As amended by Law 3146/2003 (Official Gazette 125, A‟) 
Law 3386/2005. Entry, residence and social integration of third-country nationals in 
the Hellenic Territory. 
 
Spain 
19949 Organic Act 2/2009, of 11 December 2009, reforming Organic Act 4/2000, of 
11 January 2000, on the rights and liberties of foreigners in Spain and their social 
integration. 
 
Turkey 
Law 3294 of 1986, the Law on the Encouragement of Social Assistance and 
Solidarity 
Law 5510 of 2006, the Law on Social Insurance and General Health Insurance 
 
 
 
